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No. 70-73 Moore v. California Argued 1/19/72 
This is an appeal from a conviction, after jury trial, in a 
California state court of violating Section 311.2 of the California Penal 
Code which prohibits the mailing of obscene matter. 
The case was tried under Roth principles, with the jury being 
instructed in accordance with Roth standards. (Seep. 3 of my Bench memo). 
The appellant assigns as error (i) failure to apply national rather 
than local standards, (ii) the state statute imposes an unreasonable burden 
on interstate commerce; and (iii) that petitioner's conviction was uncon-
stitutional because the material was not obscene as a matter of constitutional 
fact. (This last point means, as I understand it, that this Court must make 
the decision as to obscenity rather than leave this to the jury). 
At the oral argument, counsel for the appellant (Mr. Marks) 
virtually abandoned his specific assignments of error. He made a plea that 
the entire law of obscenity be clarified and rewritten. 
My tentative views, subject to Conference: 
I would affirm the judgment below as being a valid application 
of Roth, with the jury applying Roth standards. 
But if the Court wishes an opportunity to reexamine the entire 
range of obscenity cases, and endeavor to prescribe new standards (based, 
possibly, on protecting the interest of junveniles and unwilling adults), 
this case affords such an opportunity. 
No, 70-73 OT 1971 
Miller v. California 
BENCH IY'EmO 
Appeal from App. Dept of Superior Ct, Calif 
I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
(1) In determining whether particular material is "obscene, .. 
should State courts look to national or local standards to de-
termine whether the material is "patently offensive" to contemp-
orary community standards? 
(2) If a local standard is employed, does the California 
statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material via-
late the commerce clause of the federal Constitution, i,e,, does 
the state law impose an unreasonable burden on interstate 
commerce? 
(3) Is the State law invalid because the federal interstate 
mailing of obscene material statute prefempts the field and is, ..._, 
RELEVANT CASES: Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 1957 ; Memoirs 
v • 1\'1 a s sac h use t t s , 3 8 3 U • S • 413 ( 1 9 6 6 ) ; Jacobe 11 i s]!. 
Ohio, 378 u.s. 184 (1964); Redrup v. New York, 386 
u.s. 767, 
(4) Was Petr's conviction unconstitutional because the 
material was not obscene as a matter of constitutional fact? 
(Petr's other claims do not deserve mention,) 
I I. FACTS 
Petr was tried by a jury in a California TC and was con-
victed of violating Section 311,2 of the Calif Penal Code--
'" \.\ causing to be mailed obscene matter, Proof at trial indicated ......._ 
that Petr had mailed 5 brochures containing advertising for --several books and a movie, The advertisements depict, as the ------- -
State points out, 11 cunnilingus, sodomy, buggery and other similar 
acts performed in groups of two or more," The pertinent material 
is available for your perusal if you should find it helpful. 
At trial the State introduced the testimony of a Sergeant 
on the Los Angeles Vice Squad, He had conducted an informal 
statewide survey and was allowed to testify that the materials ______________________ __,_ .... ___________ .... 
involved here were offensive to California community standards 
... -
of decency. Other witnesses testified as to whether the material 
had redeeming social value1 a JZrofessor_~{ &.n~Jj-sh and a~ychiat-
' - - ..... .. _;.,..! .. r~~ ~-n b~ ~he St.at;,:. testified tha~-=~~a_t__:::_~a,~~~~s _ w2:!h~~t 
redeeming social value; another professor of Petr~stated that the 
J - J 
'~ ~ material did -have - ;edeeming social value. On the bas is of this 
~ evidence the jury convicted Petr and his conviction was aff'd 
by the App Dept without opinion. 
III. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
(Rather than outlining the parties' arguments separately, I will 
treat each party's responses on each of the issues as a unit.) 
(1) Question if: 1 
Petr is challenging the standard used by the TC to determine 
'·· 
whether the material in question is patently offensive to 
d contemporary standards. The stanard used by the State is reflected 
in the testimony of the Resp's expert witness who discussed the 
California view on the matter. In order fully to understand the 
_'~laim here it is first important to set out the form presently 
~ _ being followed in obscenity cases. According to recent pronounce-
~ ments by this Court, obscenity is not protected speech and may be 
~~jcohibited by the State. The f:u~as be~;refore, ~-
~l~f~ning what is obscene and then applying that standard. The 
~~~· yVrst~rd appar~y accepted at present by most lower courts is 
? the Roth-Memoirs (see cites in "relevant Cases"). Under that 
~ #" i1 
~~~ approach three factors must coalesce before material may be deemed 
,.~ .. onscene 1 (1) "the~minant theme of the material taken as a -.;' •f H \ 
who ppeals to a prurient interest in sex; 
~ __. ~·Wii"ST •-. ~· loio.·,.r· 
(2) "the material is patently offensive because it 
1,.. ~ffronts contemporary community standards relating 
to the description or representation of sexual 
(3) 
matters; and ._... 
"the matterial is utterly without redeeming social -- . -
value." 
Under this standard, even if the book is found to appeal to the 
prurient interest and to offend community standards,it may not 
be suppressed unless it is utterly without redeeming social value. 
-~ 
~ 
Presently, the jury is instructed that it is to consider whether / t ~ 
h 
. 1 . . . . . • -~~ t e materLa Ln questLon Ln any gLven case meets these three ~~ 
requirements--if it does the matterial may be suppressed and con-
~ 
r victions based thereon. Aleo . of course.. this Court A has taken the 
~ approach of re-evaluating the material as a matter of 6determinifl~ 
\'\ 
Constitutional fact since the determination is one which resolves ______ ... 
the question whether the First Amendment applies. This is the 
Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. -W wr 767 practice. Under it, each Jus-tice has been evaluating material to determine whether it meets 
his own standards of obscenity (caveat: the three part Roth-Memoirs 
standard commanded 5 votes in Roth and only 3 in Memoirs-~among 
those Brennan is the only one still on the Court; Stewart uses· a 
test of "hard-core pornography" , see Jacobellis v. Ohio , supra; 
Douglas firmly believes , as did Justice Black , that all written 
material , movies , etc are entitled to First Amendment protection; 
Harlan believed that different standards should apply depending 
on whether the case came from a state or a federal court, see 
his opinion in Roth; other Jusltices apply other tests , I 
believe, for instance , that Marshall has followed Brennan). 
At any rate, the question presented on this leg of the case 
is whether the jury . should conside~erely local standards of ----- ~ community decency or whether a national standard is applicable. -
The parties point out that this Court has addressed itself to that 
issue without definitive result in Jacobellis v. Ohio , supra. The 
opinion for the Court was written by Brennan with whom Goldberg ~ 
joined (White joining only in the result). Here Brennan clearly ~4.,.-..,.. 
Na..~~ 
states that national standards must ~ern, 378 U.S. at 192 .. 95 . .,,..,_~ 
The reasoning proceeds from the premise that the First Amendment 
applies to the States and that the test for obscenity is a federal 
test. The opinion also points out that "communit~~vary in many 
respects" and that those differences should not allow of a different -
constitutional result. In that same case CJ Warren and Clark 
~ ... ~-- _.. ., 5 -----.. 
stated that they would commit the resolution of these factual 
questions to the trial court with this Court exercising a much 
narrower area of review. They further concluded that the standard 
must be a local rather · than a national standard. Justice Harlan , ----------
after noting t:t:;;a his view that the First Amendment does not apply 
with the same vigor to the states as it does to the federal govern-
ment , and after acknowledging that his view had been rejected by a 
majority of the Court, stated that he would apply a test of "rat-
ionality" to the States. "I would not prohibit them from banning 
any material which, taken as a whole, has been reasonably found 
in state judicial proceedings to treat sex in a fundamentally 
offensive manner, under rationally established criteria for judging 
such material." 379 lJ.S. at 204. 
Petr argues that Brennan's view must prevail. The State ~ 
argues that the local test should control but goes on to assert~~ 
that local standards are relevant only for the first two . parts ~~ 
of the three-part test and that this Court should apply national ~~ ~; 
standards in determining whether material is utterly without 
redeeming social value. 
It is very difficult to pinpoint the problem in this case. 
Primarily this case must require you and Justice Rehnquist to 
-·------~--------~----~-------------------------------
decide where you stand on the obscenity question. If you reject 
the Roth-Memoirs test it makes little difference whether the 
community standard is local or national. If you adopt Harlan 's 
position, the local view will obviously prevail. This case is 
essentially a blank check, not only for you but for the entire 
Court. All the Justuces are aware that the area is in serious 
need of reevaluation and that no standard is presently accepted 
by a majority of five. As part of this re-evaluation, you will 
also need to decide whether you accept Justice Brennan 's assertion - ............ 
stated most strongly in Jacobellis that it is the function of this 
II ,\ 
Court to make independent findings of constituional fact. Or, 
should those determinations be made exclusively by the state courts? 
Obviously, this case confronts you with precisely the same 
quality of "incorporation" problems you are presently considering 





I would appreciate the opportunity to write at length my 
on the question of incorporation and, more particularly, my 
views on the proper treatment of the obscenity problem. Time does 
not permit such consideration at this time. I can only suggest 
a 
that you postpone judgment and await the views of your coliegues 
on this question. 
(2) Question # 2 
The second question is tied to the first. Does the use of 
local standards in judging obscenity--especially in cases of 
distribution--constitute an unreasonable burden on interstate 
commerce thereby cinstituting a violation of the Commerce Clause 
~t!d 
of the Constitution? The argument offered by Petr ~ that1 ~f~er-
ing standards in the various States imp "s the free flow of 
e. ,. 
m~:te c~~~e:ce. ~ analogizeJto the cases, 
like Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, in which the 
?11 
regulations of one state (here dealing with the type of )}ud flap 
to be used on interstate trucks) would be so out of line with those 
in other states as to interfere unreasonably with the flow of 
commerce bet,veen the States. In Bibb the laws of Illinois required 
truckers to stop at the border and change th~ mud flaps from 
rubber to steel. The Court said that it was essential in such case 
to balance the interest of the State in passing the legislation, 
or promulgating the rule, against the ~nterest in free commerce. 
Petr seeks, sub silJentio, to rephrase the balancing question to 
make in one of balancing the interest of the State against the 
interest of the individual to exercise First Amendment rights. 
Resp points out the missed focus of Petr' s argument--the federal 1 
government's concern with obscenity is not under the commerc~ 
clause but unde~ the First Amendment. This is a subsidiary Lssue ...., - ~ .... _________ .., __________  
at any rate and will doubtless drop out of the case before its 
resolution here. 
Question :/1 3 
Petr also complains that the State law , insofar as it pro-
hibits the mailing of obscene material , conflicts with the federal 
regulation of the mail and is therefore pre-empted. The Court 
lin Roth squarely held that no federal pre-emption problem existed . The Court there pointed out that pre-emption arises only when there 
is a direct interference with the federal mail system. The federal 
postal laws do not eliminate the power of the state to regulate 
~ ,....._....._..---...,_ ---
the mailing of obscene advertisements . 378 U.S. at 493-94. 
Question :/1 L~ 
Finally 9 Petr contends that the materials in this case are 
4 ~ ~ 
not obscene as a maiter of Constitutional fact . On the strength 
of Redrup he makes the argument that this material is no more 
offensive than material held not obscene in other cases which have 
been summarily reversed in recent years under Redrup . I do not 
believe this issue is really still in the case. I do not 
anticipate that the Court would use the Redrup standard to dis-
pose of a case which has been granted and set for argument. This 
case will doubtless call for the setting out of basiu views on 
obscenity and will not lend itself to summary treatment (unless 
the Court shouMd conclude that it is , for some reason , not prepared 
to tackle the difficult Constitutional issues presented.). 
IV . DISCUSSION 
I have attempted to scotch the arguments which are without 
serious merit--I believe the first question deserves 
serious consideration by the Court . And , the question of local-
-------------------~----------
I 
national standards is really subsidiary to your determination of 
where you stand on the much more basic questions ofltncorporation 
an~finition of obscenity . I will be glad to do whatever additional 
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Rehnquist, J ................. . 
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Marshall, J . ................. . 
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CERT. JURISDICTIONAL MERITS MOTION AB- NOT 
~--.--+---.ST_A_T_E.,..M_E_N_T,.... --t--....,..--+--,------lSENT VOT-
G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D lNG 
No. 70-73 
MARSHALL, J. 41- • iJ.... 
~ ~ ·1"'=f 
BLACKMUN, J. 
PowELL, J. 




.t, #"\.-~o/ t· 
5/21/72--LAH 
Re: Hiller v. California 
Judges 
Attached is the proposed memorandum of an opinion by the 
CJ in this obscenity case--this is the case raising the question 
whether local or national standards of community values are 
to be applied in resolving questions under the First Amend-
ment. I have read the opinion only once and will need to 
reread it with great care several times before I begin to 
discuss the matter with you. It is a mind"full. 
You have a luxury in this area . Other Justices , who have 
long dealt with this most difficult conceptual area , will 
bear the burden of immediate response. We would be wise and 
safe to await the views of your other colleagues- ... this 
opinion will most surely s tir a diversity of vi~ws. -
The the s,is of the opinion is that local community 
standards of patent offensiveness in the description of sexual 
material govern. Local standards are to be determined by 
the jury applying the "reasonable man" standard and 
ascertaining whether the material is offensive to the "average" 
man in the locale . The jury~ be assisted by testimony 
from obscenity experts but need not be . It is entirely 
permissible for jurors to make the judgment on the basis of 
their personal views of acceptability. This Court , and other 
appellate courts , retain some review function but it is 
unclear--probably intentionally--what test t~--~ to -------------- ~ --------~ 
use . Since no evidence is required it cannot be the -standard sufficiency of the evidence test . My guess is that 
the test will be whether a conviction for distribution of a 
paeticular item is sufficiently shocking to 5 men on the Court. 
--2- ... 
The opinion does other significant things: (1) it -
embraces Roth; (2) in draws a cloudy distinction between 
"public" dessimination and private use, but it does so 
without citing Stanley v. Georgia; (3) he eschews, appar-
ently, any interest analysis approach, staing at page 11 
that the justification. for regulation is "the offense it 
1 
·.~ gives to the people living in the community." 
~ ~~ Innumerable questions jump out of these pages. ~n 
~ ~ ~· a reasonable man standard be applied in a criminal prosecution 
~ ~ where gfuilt must be determined beyond a reasonable doubt•· 
~~ can a jury be really instructed that they must find the 
~ """"0aterial l.reasonably offensive to the average man beyond a 
-RP~ IJ; reasonable doubt? Has the opinion turned the First 
Amendment into a majoritarian pronouncement--i.e. material 
is obscene andp therefore, outside the protections of the 
First Amendment if it is unacceptable to the majority of the 
reasonable and average people in the community? Roth re-
viewed and rejected a vagueness argument in this area: is 
it not fair now to re-examine that consideration? Can we 
say with any candor that persons can know with reasonable 
certainty what conduct is impermissible? Does the test 
outlined here provide any degree of notic~ that certain 
material is prohibited? If one of the considerations is 
an interest in getting the courts of this country out of 
tqe business of handling obscenity cases, this case will prove 
failure. The only judicial tribunal which will 
benefit in any subsnantial degree will be this one. You 
would be free simply to deny cert in every case on the ground 
that 12 jurors found thatp applying the community standards 
--3--
of whatever locale is concerned, found it offensive to 
the tastes (see p. 14) of the average reasonable man 
there. What of the federal district courts and the state 
trial courts? I doubt that many state judges would suppose 
that this decisiion will lighten their dockets. 
The next several weeks will provide you and me with 
many opportunities to consider the content of the First 
Amendmen~~ealy v. James~e ncwsmens 9 privilegep the 
~chool picketing cases, an~scenity). Maybe through 
all this, despite the formidable and apparently insuperable 
time obstaales, we can begin to arrive at some cohesive view 
of that critical Amendment. 
UH 
5/22/72--LAH 
Re: Obscenity cases 
Judges 
Attached you will find the following: (1) memo from 
Justice Brennan; (2) memo from Justice Stewart; (3) first 
circulation of Justice Douglas' opinion in Miller v. California; 
(4) recirculation of Justice Douglas' opinion in 12 200~ft 
reels. The exchange of memos between Justices Brennan and 
Stewart indicates that Justice Brennan is now prepared to 
execute Roth and to recognize that obscenity cannot be 
treated as sui generis under the First Amendment. He 
appears to lean toward the interest analysis approach 
which we have frequently discussed. Justice Stewart 
indicates encouragement. Justice Douglas isp of course, already 
on paper as opposing Roth; Justice Marshall, if he maintains 
he dedication to Stanley v. Georgia, may also disavow the 
ill-starred Roth precedent. 
This is obvoiusly quite an important development. While 
our private discussions and your statement at lunch today 
indicate that you are leaning away from the approach 
suggested by Justice Brennan, I think you will want to give 
his views the closest consideration. Your vote will be 
most likely a decisive factor (as seems to be the case with 
incredible frequency lately). In view of the significance 
of these developments, I would suggest that it may prove 
advisable for this Chambers to adopt a more collegial 
approach to the obscenity cases. All of us have had a number 
of cases in this area so no one can claim a peculiar exper-
tise. Fresh analysis, when Brennan's opinion circulates, 
may prove of value. Assuming nothing comes around for a 
--2--
couple of weeks, one or all of the other clerks might 
have more time available to devoue to these cases. 
At any rate, I see nothing to be done at present. 
LAH 
4th DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 70-73 
Marvin Miller, Appellant, 
v. 
State of California. 
On Appeal from the Ap-
pellate Department, Su-
perior Court of California, 
County of Orange. 
[March -, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, dissenting. 
We judges who work at the appellate level have an 
understandable tendency to write essay-like opinions that 
announce general constitutional principles, but often arc 
far removed from the gritty facts of the case. 
Today we send a man to prison for distributing bro-
chures which advertised books and a movie. A basic 
premise of criminal law under our Constitution is that 
it must give fair warning. I submit that the law of 
obscenity as defined by legislatures and by courts is so 
~as not to give fair warning. Some make it a crime 
to self a book which deals with sex "in a manner appeal-
ing to prurient interests." 1 Some define obscenity as 
literature which is "patently offensive because it affronts 
contemporary standards." 2 Others make a book ob-
scene when it is "utterly without redeeming social im-
1 Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 487. 
California defines "obscene matter" as "matter, taken as a whole, 
the predominant appeal of which to tho average person, applying 
contemporary standards, is to prurient interest, i. e., a shameful or 
morbid intem;t in nudity, sex, or excretion; and is matter which 
taken as a whole goes ::;ubstantially beyond customary limi ts of candor 
in description or representation of ::;uch mal tors; and is mat1 er 
which taken as a whole is utterly without redeeming social im-
portance." Calif. Penal Code § 311 (a). 
2 I d., 489. 
'r ~ r~·nnan 
t I'~ r > ' t c wart ' . 
~1!1i to ' 
r t' ~ . • 11"'1.11 '' 
Jp .. 1. d l Tl l n ( 
l.' ... L '~ I 1 '( p, I. I c....--
lf • .._T ... ! J '-' i t l T 
70-73-DISSENT 
2 l\liLLER v. CALIFORNIA 
portanco." :• Some condemn it if its "dominant tendency 
might be to deprave or corrupt a reader." 4 Others look 
not to the content of the book but to whether it is ad-
vertised "to appeal to the erotic interests of customers." " 
Some condemn only "hard-core pornography"; but even 
then a true definition is lacking. It has indeed been said 
of that definition, "I could never succeed in [defining it] 
intelligibly," but "I know it when I see it." 6 
Those are tho standards we ourselves have wr.itton into 
the Constitution.' Yet how under these vague tests can 
we sustain collvictions for the sale of a book prior to tho 
time when some court has cloclarecl that book to be ob-
scene. I subm.it that prior to a court's declaration that 
a specific book is "obscene," tho la"· is far too vague to 
send men to prison and yet satisfy the requirements of 
due process. 
3 !d., 484. 
4 !d., 502 (Harlan, J.). 
5 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 467. 
6 .Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 197. 
7 At the conrlu~ion of a 1\YO-year s1udy, 1hr U.S. Commission on 
Obscenity and Pornography determined that the stand:.uds we have 
written interfrre with constitutionall~· protected materials: 
"Society's attempts to legislate for adults in the area of obscenity 
have not been successful. Present laws prohibiting the consensual 
sale or distribution of explirit sexualmntcrials to adults arc extremely 
unsatisfactory in their practic;tl application. The Constitution per-
mits material to be deemed 'obscene' for adults only if, as a whole, 
it appeals to the 'prurient' interrst of the average person, is 'patently 
offensive' in light of 'community standards,' and lacks 'redeeming 
social value.' These vague and highl~r subjccti,·e aesthetic, psycho-
logical and mor.'ll tests do not provide meaningful guidance for law 
enforcement officials, juries or conrts. As a result, law is incon-
sistently and sometimes crroneou~ly npplied and the distinctions 
made by courts between prohibited and permissible materials often 
appear indefensible. Errors in the appliention of the l::tw and un-
certainty about its scope also cause intcrefrrence with the com-
munication of constitutionally protected materials." Report of the 
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 59 (1970). 
70-73-DISSENT 
l\JILLER v. CALIFOTINIA 3 
Yet we approved a conviction that sent Ralph Ginz-
berg to prison for five years' under those standards. This 
petitioner fares better, getting only 60 days in .Jail. Yet 
he could not possibly know whether the literature he 
offered would be held obscene. As Mr. Justice Harlan 
has said: 
"The upshot of all this divergence in viewpoint is 
that anyone who undertakes to examine the Court's 
decisions since Roth which have held particular ma-
terial obscene or not obscene would find himself in 
utter bewilderment." Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 
390 U. S. 676, 707. 
The decision of what is or is not obscene is a purely 
personal decision by each judge, based on his tastes,~ 
background, and perhaps his neuroses. Mr. Justice Black 
said in Kingsley International Pictures Corp. Y. Regents, 
360 U. S. 684. 600-·691, that 
"Such an individualized determination cannot be 
guided by reasonably fixed and certain standards. 
Accordingly, neither States nor moving picture 
makers can possibly know in advance, with any fair 
degree of certainty, "·hat can or cannot be done in 
the field of movie making ancl exhibiting. This 
uncertainty cannot easily be reconciled "·ith the rule 
of law which our Constitution envisages." 
We should have too much pride in the rule of law and 
in guidelines that keep a law from being a trap to fine 
or imprison people for violating such vague laws.9 "A 
8 Ginzberg v. United States, ~S3 U. S. 4(>:3. 
9 It i~ 110 an~wrr lo ~ay that Roth v. United SLates, :354 U.S. 476, 
491-492, set1led for all time the question whether obscenity stand-
ards are unconstitutionally Ya~uc. There, the Court noted "that 
lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due 
process." The Court then concluded that the "standard[s] for 
70-73-DISSENT 
4 MILLER v. CALIFORNIA 
failure of a statute limiting freedom of expression to 
give fair notice of what acts will be punished and such 
a statute's inclusion of prohibitions against expressions, 
protected by the principles of the First Amendment, 
violates an accused's rights under procedural due process 
and freedom of speech and press." Winters v. New York, 
333 U. S. 507, 509-510. "[Tlhere is no external meas-
uring rod for obscenity," Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 
147, 165 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Our obscenity 
decisions have been "left to a majority of this Court on 
a case-by-case basis," ibid. (Black J., concurring), with-
out the formulation of the predictable standards required 
by Winters. 
We have struck down, as unconstitutionally vague, 
statutes limiting expression based upon such uncertain 
terms as " [ d] escribing or portraying brutality, criminal 
judging obscenity ... [it had] discussed, g[a]ve adequate warning 
of tho conduct proscribed .... " /d., at 491. 
The rases relied upon to reach that conclusion were wholly inap-
posite to the standard of preciti ion necessary for the regulation of 
ron~titutional freedoms such as those srcurcd by the First Amrncl-
ment. "[T]his Court has intimated that stricter standards of 
penni sible statutor~· vaguenrss may be applied to a statute having 
a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be 
required to act at his peril hero, because the free dissemination of 
ideas may be the loser." Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 151. 
With one exception, however, the cases relied upon in Roth to gauge 
the requisite statutory precision, all dealt with instances of economic 
and social regulation where this Court has traditionally applied more 
lenient standards than those used in the area of expression. That 
sole exception-Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273-is a relic of the 
days prior to Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, and no longer 
is good law. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444. 
·or have our later decisions vindicated the determination in Roth 
on the precision of obscenity standards. On the contrary, those 
decisions have only further blurred the line between the constitu-
tionally protected and thai which five members of this Court will 
allow to be proscribed. 
Roth was, with all respect, predicated upon an improper promise J 
and the rnsuing years hnve accentuated that error. I\ 
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violence or depravity ... or sexual promiscuity or ab-
normal sexual relations." Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 
supra, at 681. So too, with other standards such as 
"approve such films ... [as] are moral and proper ... 
[and] disapprove such as are cruel, obscene, indecent or· 
immoral, or such as tend to debase or corrupt morals," 
Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U. S. 870; 
"immoral" and "tend to corrupt morals," Commercial 
Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U. S. 587; "moral, educa-
tional or amusing and harmless," Superior Films, Inc. v. 
Department of Education, 346 U. S. 587; "prejudicial to 
the best interests of the people," Gelling v. Texas, 343 
U. S. 960; "sacrilegious," Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 
343 U.S. 495; "criminal news or stories of deeds of blood-
shed or lust, so massed as to become vehicles for inciting 
violent and depraved crimes," Winters v. New York, 
supra. 
How can it be maintained that our obscenity decisions 
provide any more definite a standard than this plethora 
of statutes which we have held to be unconstitutionally 
vague? As Mr. Justice Black said in Ginzburg v. United 
States, 383 U. S. 463, 478-480 (dissenting opinion): 
"I think that the criteria declared ... as guide-
lines . . . are so vague and meaningless that they 
practically leave the fate of a person charged with 
violating censorship statutes to the unbridled dis-
cretion, whim and caprice of the judge or jury which 
tries him .... 
"(a) The first element ... is that the dominant 
theme of the material taken as a whole must appeal 
to the prurient interest in sex. It seems quite ap-
parent to me that human beings, serving either as 
judges or jurors, could not be expected to give any 
sort of decision on this element which would even 
remotely promise any kind of uniformity in the 
enforcement of this law. . . . [T]he submission of 
such an issue as this to a judge or jury amounts to . 
6 
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practically nothing more than a request for the 
judge or juror to assert his own personal beliefs 
about whether the matter should be allowed to be 
legally distributed .... 
"(b) The second element ... is that the material 
must be 'patently offensive because it affronts con-
temporary community standards relating to the 
description or representation of sexual matters .... ' 
... [H]ere again the guilt or innocence of a defend-
ant charged with obscenity must depend in the 
final analysis upon the personal judgment and atti-
tudes of particular individuals and the place where 
the trial is held .... 
" (c) A third element . . . is that the material 
must be 'utterly without redeeming social value.' 
This element seems to me to be as uncertain, if not 
even more uncertain, than is the unknown sub-
stance of the Milky Way. . . . Whether a particular 
treatment of a particular subject is with or without 
social value in this evolving, dynamic society of ours 
is a question upon which no uniform agreement 
could possibly be reached among politicians, states-
men, professors, philosophers, scientists, religious 
groups or any other type of group. A case-by-case 
assessment of social values by individual judges and 
jurors is, I think, a dangerous technique for govern-
ment to utilize in determining whether a man stays 
in or out of the penitentiary." 
If a specific book, play, paper, or motion picture has 
in a civil proceeding been condemned as obscene and re-
view of that finding has been completed, and thereafter 
a person publishes, shows, or displays that particular 
book or film, then a vague law has been made specific. 
There would remain the underlying question whether 
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the First Amendment allows an implied exception in the 
case of obscenity. I do not think it does and my views 
on the issue have been stated over and again.' 0 But at 
least a criminal prosecution brought at that juncture 
would not violate the time-honored void-for-vagueness 
test. 11 
10 Sec Unitrd SLat('S v. 12 200-Ft. fleets of Film, post, :it -; 
Byrne v. Karalexis, 396 U. R. 976, 977; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 
U. S. 629, 650; Jacobs v. New York, 388 U.S. 431, 436; Ginzburg 
v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 482; Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 
U. S. 413, 424; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 72; 
Times Film Corp. v. Citu of Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 78; Smith v. 
California, 361 U. S. 147, 167; Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 
360 U.S. 684, 697; Roth v. Unit('d State.~. 354 U.S. 476, 508; Kings-
ley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. R. 436, 446; Superior Films, Inc. 
Y. Department of Education, 346 U. S. 587, 588; Gelling v. Texas, 
343 U. S. 960. 
1t The Commi~~ion on Obsrenitr and Pornogrnph~, hn~ nch·ocn.t eel 
;;uch a procedure: 
"The Commission recommencb the emrtment, in nll jurisdictions 
which enact or retain provisions prohibiting the disscmimtion of 
se:>..'Ual materials to adults or young persons, of legislation authorizing 
prosecutors to obtain dcrlarntory judgments as to whether particular 
materials bll within existing legal prohibitions .... 
"A declaratory judgment procedure ... would permit proserutors 
to proceed civilly, rather th::m through the criminal process, against 
suspected viol:ltions of obscenity prohibition. If surh civil pro-
cedures arc utilized, penult ies would be imposed for violation of the 
hw only with respect to conduct occurring after a civil declaration 
i~ obtained. The Commi~sion believes this course of action to be. 
appropriate whenevrr there is :m existing doubt regarding the legal 
status of materials; where other alternatives are availuble, the crim-
inal process should not ordinarily be invoked against persons who 
might have reasonably believed, in good faith, that the books or 
films they distributed were entitled to constitutional protection, for 
any threat of criminal ~anctions might otherwise deter the free dis-
tribution of constitutionally protected material." Report of the 
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 70-71 (1970). 
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No such protective procedure has been designed by 
California in this case. Obscenity-which even we can-
not define with precision-is a hodge-podge. To send 
men to jail for violating standards they cannot under-
stand, construe, and apply is a monstrous thing to do in 
a Nation dedicated to fair trials and due process. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.!&u.vmn~ ([1nu·t of tip! ~lnitc() ~tatcs 
'Jllusf!iaghllt, p. <q. 20.£fJ~,S 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
May 22, 1972 
No. 70-73 - Miller v. California 
Dear Bill, 
I am most interested to learn of the views 
described in your memorandum and am grateful that 
you propose to write them out. I think that they offer 
a most hopeful approach toward extrication from what 
you correctly describe as an "intolerable mess." 
I shall suspend further consideration of the issues in 
this case pending receipt of what you write. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN . JR. 
,ju:prttttt ~omt of fltt ~tti±tb ,jtattg 
~agfpngttttt. ~. ~· 21!.?'~~ 
May 22, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 70-73 - Miller v. California 
With all r.espect, the Chief Justice's proposed solution to 
the obscenity quagmire will, in my view, worsen an already in-
tolerable mess. I've been thinking for some time that only a 
drastic change in applicable constitutional principles promises 
a way out. I've decided that I shall use this case as a vehicle 
for saying that I'm prepared to make that change. I'll write in 
effect that it has proved impossible to separate expression con-
cerning sex, called obscenity, from other expression concerning 
sex, whether the material takes the form of words, photographs 
or film; that Stanley (as well as the Chief Justice's 12, 000 Reels 
of Film?) has already eroded that concept; that we should treat 
obscenity not as expression concerning sex excepted from First 
Amendment speech but as expression, although constituting 
First Amendment speech, that is regulable to the extent of legis-
lating against its offensive exposure to unwilling adults and dis-
semination to juveniles. I'll try in due course to circulate my 
views. 
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Mn. JusTICE DouGLAS. 
My difficulty with the case is that 1 know of no con-
stitutional way by which a book, tract, paper, postcard, or 
film may be made contraband because of its contents. 
The Constitution never purported to give the Federal 
Government censorship or oversight over literature or 
artistic productions, save as they might be governed by 
the Patent and Copyright Clause of Art. I, ~ 8, cl. 8, of the 
Constitution.1 To be sure, the Colonies had enacted stat-
utes which limited the freedom of speech, see Roth v. 
United States, 354 U. S. 476, 482-484 nn. 10-13, and in 
the early 19th century the States punished obscene libel 
as a common law crime. Knowles v. State, 3 Conn. 103 
(1808) (signs depicting "monster"); Commonwealth v. 
Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821) (John Cleland's Memoirs of 
a Woman of Pleasure); State v. Appling, 25 Mo. 315 
( 1857) (utterance of words "too vulgar to be inserted in 
this opinion"); Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Pa. 91 
(1815) ("lewd, wicked, scandalous, infamous, and inde-
cent posture with a woman"). 
1 Even the copyright power is limited by the freedoms srcured 
by the First Amendment. Lee v. Runge, 404 U. S. 887, 892-893 
(DouGLAS, J., dissenting); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the 
First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 
U. C. L.A. L. Rev. 1180 (1970). 
.· 
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To construe this history, as this Court did in Roth, 
as qualifying the plain import of the First Amendment 
is both a non sequitur and a disregard of the Tenth 
Amendment. 
"[W]hatever may [have been] the form which the 
several States ... adopted in making declarations in 
favor of particular rights," James Madison, the author 
of the First Amendment tells us, "the great object in 
view [was l to limit and qualify the powers of [ th~ 
Federal] Government, by excepting out of the grant 
of po"·er those cases in which the Government ought· 
not to act, or to act only in a particular mode." 1 
Annals of Congress 437. Surely no one should argue 
that the retention by the States of vestiges of established 
religions after the enactment of the Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clause saps these clauses of their meaning. 
Yet it was precisely upon such reasoning that this Court, 
in Roth, exempted the bawdry from the protection of 
the First Amendment. 
When it was enacted, the Bill of Rights applied only 
to the Federal Government, Barron v. City of Baltimore, 
7 Pet. 243, and the Tenth Amendment reserved the 
residuum of power to the States and the people. That 
the States, at some later date, may have exercised this 
reserved power in the form of laws restricting expression 
in no wise detracts from the express prohibition of the 
First Amendment. Only ·when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was passed did it become even possible to argue 
that through it the First Amendment became applicable 
to the States. But that goal was not attained until the 
ruling of this Court in 1931 that the reach of the Four-
teenth Amendment included the First Amendment. See 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 368. 
At the very beginning, however, the First Amendment 
applied only to the Federal Government and there is not 
the slightest evidence that the Framers intended to put 
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the newly created federal regime into the role of ombuds-
man over literature. Tying censorship to the movement 
of literature or films in interstate commerce or into for-
eign commerce would have been an easy way for a gov-
ernment of delegated powers to impair the liberty of 
expression. It was to bar such suppression that we have 
the First Amendment. I dare say Jefferson and Madi-
son "·ould be appalled at "·hat the Court espouses today. 
The First Amendment was the product of a robust, 
not a prudish, age. The four decades prior to its enact-
ment "saw the publication, virtually ,.,.ithout molesta-
tion from any authority, of two classics of pornographic 
literature." D. Loth, The Erotic in Literature 108 
(1961). In addition to William King's The Toast, there 
was John Cleland's Fanny Hill which has been de-
scribed as the "most important work of genuine por-
nography that has been published in English .... " 
L. Markun, Mrs. Grundy 191 (1930). In England, 
Harris' List of Covent Garden Ladies, a catalog used by 
prostitutes to advertise their trade, enjoyed open circu-
lation. N. St. John-Stevas, Obscenity and the Law 25 
(1956). This was the age when Benjamin Franklin 
wrote his "Advice to a Young Man on Choosing a 
Mistress" and "A Letter to the Royal Academy at Brus-
sels." "\Vhen the United States became a nation, none 
of the fathers of the country were any more concerned 
than Franklin with the question of pornography. John 
Quincy Adams had a strongly puritanical bent for a 
man of his literary interests, and even he wrote of Tom 
Jones that it was 'one of the best novels in the lan-
guage.' " Loth, supra, at 120. It was in this milieu 
that Madison admonished against any "distinction be-
tween the freedom and licentiousness of the press." 
Padover, The Complete Madison 296 (1953). The An-
thony Comstocks, the Thomas Bowdlers and the Vic-
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torian hypocrisy-the predecessors of our present ob-
scenity laws-had yet to come upon the stage.~ 
Julius Goebel, our leading expert on colonial law. does 
not so much as allude to punishment of obscenity.a J. 
Goebel. Development of Legal Institutions (7th rev. 
1946 eel.); J. Goebel. Felony and Misdemeanor (1937); 
J. Goebel & T. Naughton, Law Enforcement in Colonial 
New York (1944). 
Nor is there any basis in the legal history antedating 
the First Amendment for the creation of an obscenity 
exception. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 
424 (DouGLAS, J., concurring). The first reported case 
involving obscene conduct was not until 1663. There, 
the defendant was fined for "shewing himself naked in 
2 Separating the worthwhile from the worthle~s has largely been 
a matter of individual taste because significant govPrmnental sanc-
tions against obsrrne literatmo are of relativrly recent vintage, not 
having developed until the Victorian Age of the mid-19th crntury. 
N. St. John-Stevas, Obscenity and the Law 1-85 (1956). See 1 T. 
Emerson, Tile System of Freedom of Expression 468-469 (1970); 
J. Paul & M. Schwartz , FPdernl CenHorship c. 1 (1961); Report of 
tho Commission on Obsccnit)' and Pornography 348-:354 (1970). In 
this country, the fir~t federal prohibition on obscenity was not until 
the Tariff Act of 1842. c. 270, § 21\, 5 Stat. 566. England, which gave 
us the infamous Star Chamber and a history of licensing of publish-
ing, did not raise a statui ory bar to the importation of obscenity 
until 1853, Customs Consolidation Act, 16 & 17 Viet. c. 107, and 
waited until 1857 to enact a statute which banned obscene literature 
outright. Lord Cnmpbell's Acl, 20 & 21 Viet. c. 83. 
'1 The only colonial statute mentioning the word "obscrne" was 
Acls and Laws of the Province of Mass. Bay, c. CV, § 8 (1712), 
Mass. Bay Colony Charter & Laws 399 (1814). It did so, however, 
in the context of "composing, writing, printing or publishing ... 
any filthy, obscene, or profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock ser-
mon, in imitation or in mimicking of preaching, or any other part 
of divine worship" and must, therefore, be placed with the other 
colonial blasphemy laws. E. g., Act for the Punishment of Divers 
Capital and Other Felonies, Acts and Laws of Conn. 66, 67 (1784); 
Act of 1723, c. 116, § 1, Digest of the Laws of Md. 92 (Herty 1799). 
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a balkony, and throwing down bottles (pist in) vi & 
armis among the people in Covent Garden, contra pacem, 
and to the scandal of the Government." Sir Charles 
Sydlyes Case, 83 Eng. Rep. 1146 (K. B. 1663). Rather 
than being a fountainhead for a body of law proscribing 
obscene literature, later courts viewed this case simply 
as an instance of assault, criminal breach of the peace, 
or indecent exposure. E. g., Bradlaugh v. Queen, L. R.. 
3 Q. B. 569, 634 (1878); Rex v. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. 849, 
851 (K. B. 1727) (Fortescue, J., dissenting). 
The advent of the printing press spurred censorship 
in England, but the ribald and the obscene were not, at 
first, within the scope of that which was officially banned. 
The censorship of the Star Chamber and the licensing of 
books under the Tudors and Stuarts was aimed at the 
blasphemous or heretical, the seditious or treasonous. At 
that date, the government made no effort to prohibit the 
dissemination of obscenity. Rather, obscene literature 
was considered to raise a moral question properly cog-
nizable only by ecclesiastical, and not the common law, 
courts.4 "A crime that shakes religion, as profaneness 
on the stage, &c. is indictable: but writing an obscene· 
book, as that intitled, 'The Fifteen Plagues of a Maiden-
head,' is not indictable, but punishable only in the Spirit-
ual Court." Queen v. Read, 88 Eng. Rep. 953 (K. B. 
1708). To be sure, Read was ultimately overruled and 
the crime of obscene libel established. Rex v. Curl, supra. 
It is noteworthy, however, that the only reported cases of 
obscene libel involved politically unpopular defendants. 
Rex v. Curl, supra; Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527 (K. B. 
1770). ) 
In any event, what we said in Bridges v. California, 
314 U. S. 252, 264-265 (1941), \vould dispose of any 
4 Lord Coke's De Libelli::; Famo::;i::; , 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (1606), for 
example, was the definitive statement of the common law of libel 
buL made no mention of tho misdemeanor of obscene libel. 
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argument that earlier restrictions on free expression 
should be read into the First Amendment: 
"[T]o assume that English common law in this field 
became ours is to deny the generally accepted his-
torical belief that 'one of the objects of the Revolu-
tion was to get riel of the English common law on 
liberty of speech and of the press.' More specific-
ally, it is to forget the environment in which the 
First Amendment was ratified. In presenting the 
proposals which were later embodied in the Bill of 
Rights, James Madison the leader in the preparation 
of the First Amendment said: 'Although I know 
whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom 
of the press, or liberty of conscience, come in question 
in [Parliament], the invasion of them is restricted 
by able advocates. yet the l\'Iagna Charta does not 
contain any one provision for the security of those 
rights, respecting which the people of America are 
most alarmed. The freedom of the press and rights 
of conscience, tho~e choicest privileges of the people, 
are unguarded in the British Constitution' " 
This Court has nonetheless ellgrafted an exception 
upon the clear meaning of words written in the 18th 
century. But see Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 
264-265; Grosjean \'. American P1·ess Co., 297 U. S. 233, 
249. 
Our efforts to define obscenity have not been produc-
tive of meaningful standards which I have tried to dem-
onstrate in Miller v. California, ante -, decided this 
day. What is "obscene" is highly subjective, varying 
from judge to judge, from juryman to juryman. 
"The fireside banter of Chaucer's Canterbury Pil-
grims was disgusting obscenity to Victorian-type 
moralists whose co-ed granddaughters shock the Vic-
torian-type moralists of today. Words that are ob-
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scene in England have not a hint of impropriety in 
the United States, and vice versa. The English 
language is full of innocent words and phrases with 
obscene ancestry." Brant, The Bill of Rights 490 
( 1965). 
So speaks our leading First Amendment historian; 
and he went on to say that this Court's decisions "seemed 
to multiply standards instead of creating one." I d., 
491. The reason is not the inability or mediocrity of 
judges. 
"What is the reason for this multiple schlerosis 
of the judicial faculty? It is due to the fact stated 
above, that obscenity is a matter of taste and social 
custom, not of fact." I d., 491--492. 
Taste and custom are part of it; but as I have said on 
other occasions,5 the neuroses of judges, lawmakers, and 
of the so-called "experts" who have taken the place of 
Anthony Comstock, also play a major role. 
Finally, it is ironic to me that in this Nation many pages 
must be written and many hours spent to explain why a 
person who can read whatever he desires, Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, may without violating a law 
carry that literature in his brief case or bring it home 
from abroad. Unless there is that ancillary right, one's 
Stanley rights could be realized, as has been suggested, 
only if one wrote or designed a tract in his attic, printed 
or processed it in his basement, so as to be able to 
read it in his study. United States v. Thirty Seven 
Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 382 (Black, J., dissenting). 
Most of the items that come this way denounced as 
"obscene" are in my vie'" trash. I would find few, if 
any, that had any redeeming social value. Yet by what 
right under the Constitution do five of us have to impose 
5 Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 661-671 (di~~cnting). 
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our set of values on the literature of the day? There is 
danger in that course, the danger of bending the popular 
mind to new norms of conformity. There is also danger 
in tolerance, for tolerance often leads to robust and ribald 
productions. Yet that is the plain thrust of the First 
Amendment. 
Irving Brant summed the matter up: 
"Blessed with a form of government that requires. 
universal liberty of thought and expression, blessed 
with a social and economic system built on that 
same foundation, the American people have created 
the danger they fear by denying to themselves the-
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MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, dissenting. 
We judges \Yho work at the appellate level have an 
understandable tendency to "Tite essay-like opinions that 
announce general constitutional principles, but often are 
far removed from the gritty facts of the case. 
Today we send a man to prison for distributing bro-
chures which advertised books and a movie. A basic 
premise of criminal law under our Constitution is that 
it must give fair warning. I submit that the law of 
obscenity as defined by legislatures and by courts is so 
vague as not to give fair warning. Some make it a crime 
to sell a book which deals with sex "in a manner appeal-
ing to prurie11t interests." 1 Son1e define obscenity as 
literature which is "patently offensive because it affronts 
contemporary standards." " Others make a book ob-
scene >vhen it is "utterly without redeeming social im-
1 Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 487. 
California defines "obscene matter" as "matter, taken as a whole, 
the predominant appeal of which to the average person, applying 
contrmporary standards, is to prurient interetit, i. e., a shameful or 
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion ; and is matter which 
taken as a whole goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor 
in description or representation of such matters; and is matter 
which taken as a whole is utterly without redeeming social im-
portance." Calif. Penal Code § 311 (a). 
2 !d., 489. 
J. 
V'{ 
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portance." 3 Some condemn it if its "dominant tendency 
might be to deprave or corrupt a reader." 4 Others look 
not to the content of the book but to whether it is ad-
vertised "to appeal to the erotic interests of customers." 5 
Some condemn only "hard-core pornography"; but even 
then a true definition is lacking. It has indeed been said 
of that definition, "I could never succeed in [defining it l 
intelligibly," hut "I know it when I see it." u 
Those are the standards we ourselves have written into 
the Constitution.' Yet ho\v under these vague tests can 
we sustain convictions for the sale of a book prior to the 
time when some court has declared that book to be ob-
scene. I submit that prior to a court's declaration that 
a specific book is "obscene," the law is far too vague to 
send men to prison and yet satisfy the requirements of 
due process. 
3 /d., 484. 
• !d., 502 (Harlan, J.). 
"Ginzburg v. United States, 38.'3 U. R. 463, 467. 
6 JacobeUis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 197. 
7 At the conclm;ion of a t wo-~·ca r study, the U. S. Commission on 
Obscenity and Pornography dcterminrd that the standards we have 
written interfrre with con~titutionally protected materials: 
"Society's attempts to legi~late for ndults in the area of obscenity 
h:wr not been sucre~sful. Pre,;enl laws prohibiting the consensual 
~ale or distribution of explicit. ~exual materials to ndults are extrrmely 
unsatisfactory in their pmctical application. The Constitution per-· 
mits matrrial to be deemed 'obscene' for adults only if, as a whole, 
it appeals to the 'prurient' intcrr~t of the avernge person , is 'patently 
offensive' in light of 'communil~· ~tnndards,' and lacks 'redeeming-
social value.' The.~e Yagne and highly subjerti\·e aesthetic, psycho-
logical and moral testH do not provide meaningful guidance for law 
enforcement officials, juries or courts. As a result, law iH incon-
sistently and sometimes erronrou~l~· npplied and the distinctions 
made by courts between prohibited ami permi~sible materials often 
appear indefrnsible . Errors in the application of the law and un-
cerlninty about its scope also cause intcrrfcrence with the com-
munication of constitutionnlly proteeted materinls." Report of th~ 
Commis~ion on Obscenity and Pornography 59 (1970). 
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Yet we approved a conviction that sent Ralph Ginz-
berg to prison for five years 8 under those standards. This 
petitioner fares better, getting only 60 days in Jail. Yet 
he could not possibly know whether the literature he 
offered would be held obscene. As Mr. Justice Harlan 
has said: 
"The upshot of all this divergence in viewpoint is 
that anyone who undertakes to examine the Court's 
decisions since Roth which have held particular ma-
terial obscene or not obscene would find himself in 
utter bewilderment." Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 
390 U. S. 676, 707. 
The decision of 'vhat is or- is not obscene is a purely 
personal decision by each judge, based on his tastes, his 
background, and perhaps his neuroses. Mr. Justice Black 
said in Kingsley International Pictures Corp. Y. Regents, 
360 U. S. 684. 690-·691, that 
"Such an individualized determination cannot be 
guided by reasonably fixed and certain standards. 
Accordingly, neither States nor moving picture 
makers can possibly know in advance, with any fair 
degree of certainty, what can or cannot be done in 
the field of movie making and exhibiting. This 
uncertainty cannot easily be reconciled with the rule 
of law which our Constitution envisages." 
We should have too much pride in the rule of law and 
in guidelines that keep a law from being a trap to fine 
or imprison people for violating such vague laws.0 "A 
8 Ginzberg v. United States, ~sa U. S. 4oa. 
0 It is 110 nn;:wrr to ~a~· that Roth v. United State8, 354 U. S. 47G, 
491-492, settled for all time the question whether obscenity stand-
ards are unconst itutionally Yague. There, the Court noted "that 
Jack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due 
process." The Court then concluded that the "standard[s] for 
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failure of a statute limiting freedom of expression to 
give fair notice of what acts will be punished and such 
a statute's inclusion of prohibitions against expressions,. 
protected by the principles of the First Amendment, 
violates an accused's rights under procedural due process 
and freedom of speech and press." Winters v. New York, 
333 U. S. 507, 509-510. "l T]here is no external meas-
uring rod for obscenity," Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 
147, 165 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Our obscenity 
decisions have been "left to a majority of this Court on 
a case-by-case basis," ibid. (Black J., concurring), with-
out the formulation of the predictable standards required 
by Winters. 
judging obscenity ... [it had] disrn~scd, graJvc adeC]uatc warning 
of the conduct proscribed .... " !d., at 491. 
The cases relied upon to rench that conclusion were wholly inap-
poRitc to the standnrd of precision necessary for the regulation of 
con~titutional freedoms ~urh ns tho ·c secured by the Fir~t Amend-
ment. "[T]his Court haR intimated that stricter Rtnndards of 
permissible statutory Ynguene~~ ma~· be applied to a stntutc hnving 
a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be 
required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of 
ideas may be the losrr." Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 151. 
With one exception, however, the cases relied upon in Roth to gauge 
the requisite statutory precision, all dralt with instances of economic 
and social regulation where this Court has traditionally applied more 
lenient standards than those used in the area of expression. That 
sole exception-Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273-is a relic of the 
days prior to Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, and no longer 
is good law. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444. 
Nor have our later dcci~ions vindicated the determination in Roth 
on the precision of obscenity standards. On the contrary, those 
decisions have only further blurred the line between the constitu-
tionally protected and that which five members of this Court will 
allow to be proscribed and have resulted in what one commentator 
has labeled "a constitutional di;mster area." l\1acGrath, Thr Ob-
scenity Cases: The Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 7, 59. 
Roth was, with all respect, predicated upon an improper premise 
and the ensuing years have accentuated that error. 
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We have struck clov.;n, as unconstitutionally vague, 
statutes limiting expression based upon such uncertain 
terms as "[d]escribing or portraying brutality, criminal 
violence or depravity ... or sexual promiscuity or ab-
normal sexual relations." Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 
supra, at 681. So too, with other standards such as 
"approve such films ... [as] are moral and proper ... 
[and] disapprove such as are cruel, obscene, indecent or 
immoral, or such as tend to debase or corrupt morals," 
Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U. S. 870; 
"immoral" and "tend to corrupt morals," Commercial 
Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U. S. 587; "moral, educa-
tional or amusing and harmless," Superior Filrns, Inc. v. 
Department of Education, 346 U. S. 587; "prejudicial to· 
the best interests of the people," Gelling v. Texas, 343 
U.S. 960; "sacrilegious," Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 
343 U. S. 495; "criminal news or stories of deeds of blood-
shed or lust, so massed as to become vehicles for inciting 
violent and depraved crimes," Winters v. New York, 
supra. 
How can it be maintained that our obscenity decisions 
provide any more definite a standard than this plethora 
of statutes which we have held to be unconstitutionally 
vague? As Mr. Justice Black said in Ginzburg v. United 
States, 383 U. S. 463, 478-480 (dissenting opinion): 
"I think that the criteria declared . . . as guide-
lines . . . are so vague and meaningless that they 
practically leave the fate of a person charged with 
violating censorship statutes to the unbridled dis-· 
cretion, whim and caprice of the judge or jury which 
tries him .... 
"(a) The first element ... is that the dominant 
theme of the material taken as a whole must appeal 
to the prurient interest in sex. It seems quite ap-
parent to me that human beings, serving either as 
judges or jurors, could not be expected to give any 
6 
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sort of decision on this element which would even 
remotely promise any kind of uniformity in the 
enforcement of this law. . . . [T]he submission of 
such an issue as this to a judge or jury amounts to 
practically nothing more than a request for the 
judge or juror to assert his own personal beliefs 
about whether the matter should be allowed to be 
legally distributed .... 
"(b) The second clement ... is that the material 
must be 'patently offensive because it affronts con-
temporary community standards relating to the 
description or representation of sexual matters ... .' 
... [H] ere again the guilt or innocence of a defend-
ant charged with obscenity must depend in the 
final analysis upon the personal judgment and atti-
tudes of particular individuals and the place where 
the trial is held .... 
" (c) A third element . . . is that the material 
must be 'utterly without redeeming social value.' 
This element seems to me to be as uncertain, if not 
even more uncertain, than is the unknown sub-
stance of the Milky \Vay. . . . Whether a particular 
treatment of a particular subject is with or without 
social value in this evolving, dynamic society of ours 
is a question upon which no uniform agreement 
could possibly be reached among politicians, states-
men, professors, philosophers, scientists, religious 
groups or any other type of group. A case-by-case 
assessment of social values by individual judges and 
jurors is, I think, a dangerous technique for govern-
ment to utilize in determining whether a man stays 
in or out of the penitentiary." 
If a specific book, play, paper, or motion picture has 
in a civil proceeding been condemned as obscene and re-
view of that finding has been completed, and thereafter 
a person publishes, shows, or displays that particular 
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book or film, then a vague law has been made specific. 
There would remain the underlying question whether 
the First Amendment allows an implied exception in the 
case of obscenity. I do not think it does and my views 
on the issue have been stated over and again. 10 But at 
least a criminal prosecution brought at that juncture 
would not violate the time-honored void-for-vagueness 
test.11 
H> Ser United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, post, at -; 
Byrne v. Kamlexis, 396 U. R. 976, 977; Ginsberg v. N etv York, 390 
U.S. 629, 650; Jacobs v. New York, 388 U.S. 431, 436; Ginzburg 
v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 41<2; Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 
U. S. 413, 424; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Svllivan, 372 U. S. 58, 72; 
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 78; Smith v. 
California, 361 U. S. 147, 167; Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 
360 U. S. 684, 697; Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 508; Kings-
ley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436. 446; Superior Films, Inc. 
v. Department of Education, 346 U. S. 587, 588; Gelling v. Texas, 
343 U. R. 960. 
11 The Commi~sion on Oh~crnit~· and Porno~raphy has ach·ocated 
such a procedure: 
"The Commission recommrnds the enactmrnt, in all jurisdictions 
which enact or retain provisions prohibiting the dissrmination of 
sexual matrrials to adults or young persons, of legislation authorizing 
prosecutors to obtain declaratory jud~mrnt~ as to whether particular 
materials fall within existin~ legal prohibitions . . . . 
"A declaratory judgment procedure ... would permit prosecutors 
to proceed civilly, rather than through thr criminal process, against 
suspected violations of obscenity prohibition. If such civil pro-
cedures arc utilized, penaltirs would be imposed for violation of the 
law only with respect to conduct occurring after a civil declaration 
is obtained. The Commission believes thi~ course of action to be 
appropriate whenever there is :m existin~ doubt regarding the legal 
status of materials; where other alternatives arc available, the crim-
inal process should not ordinarily be itwokecl against persons who 
might have reasonably believed, in good faith, that the books or 
films they distributed were entitled to constitutional protection, for 
any threat of criminal sanctions might otherwise deter the free dis-
tribution of constitutionally protected material." Report of the 
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 70-71 (1970). 
' ' ' 
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In Rabe v. Washing·ton, 405 U. S. 313, this Court re-
cently held that it was a denial of due process to sustain 
a conviction under an obscenity statute where the mean-
ing of the statutory word "obscene" was not clarified until 
the conviction was on appeal. Under such circumstances, 
we reasoned, the defendant was not given fair notice of 
the conduct which was proscribed. I fail to see the dif-
ference between Rabe and the typical obscenity case· 
where the defendant may not know whether a particular 
book or motion picture is constitutionally protected until 
his case becomes final on appeal. 
No such protective procedure has been designed by 
California in this case. Obscenity-which even we can-
not define with precision-is a hodge-podge. To send 
men to jail for violating standards they cannot under-
stand, construe, and apply is a monstrous thing to do in 
a Nation dedicated to fair trials and due process. 
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MR. JUSTICE DouGLAS. 
My difficulty with the case is that I know of no con-
stitutional way by which a book, tract, paper, postcard, or 
film may be made contraband because of its contents. 
The Constitution never purported to give the Federal 
Government censorship or oversight over literature or 
artistic productions, save as they might be governed by 
the Patent and Copyright Clause of Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the 
Constitution.1 To be sure, the Colonies had enacted stat-
utes which limited the freedom of speech, see Roth v. 
United States, 354 U. S. 476, 482-484 nn. 10-13, and in 
the early 19th century the States punished obscene libel 
as a common law crime. Knowles v. State, 3 Conn. 103 
(1808) (signs depicting "monster"); Commonwealth v. 
Holmes, 17 Mass. 330 (1821) (John Cleland's Memoirs of 
a Woman of Pleasure); State v. Appling, 25 Mo. 315 
( 1857) (utterance of words "too vulgar to be inserted in 
this opinion"); Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Pa. 91 
(1815) ("lewd, wicked, scandalous, infamous, and inde-
cent posture with a woman"). 
To construe this history, as this Court did in Roth,. 
as qualifying the plain import of the First Amendment 
1 Even the copyright power is limited by the freedoms secured 
by the First Amendment. Lee v. Runge, 404 U. S. 887, 892-893 
(DouGLAS, J., dissenting); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the 
First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press ·t, 17. 
U. C. L.A. L. Rev. 1180 (1970). 
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is both a non sequitur and a disregard of the Tenth 
Amendment. 
"fW]hatever may [have been] the form " ·hich the 
several States . . . adopted in making declarations in 
favor of particular rights," James Madison, the author 
of the First Amendment tells us, "the great object in 
view [was] to limit and qualify the powers of [the 
Federal] Government, hy excepting out of the grant 
of power those cases in which the Government ought 
not to act, or to act only in a particular 1node." 1 
Annals of Congrel"s 437. Surely no one should argue 
that the retention by the States of vestiges of established 
religions after the enactment of the Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clause saps these clauses of their meaning. 
Yet it was precisely upon such reasoning that this Court, 
in Roth, exempted the bawdry from the protection of 
tho First Amendment. 
When it was enacted, the Bill of Rights applied only 
to the Federal Government, Barron v. City of Balt'imore, 
7 Pet. 243, and the Tenth Ame11dment reserved the 
residuum of power to the States and the people. That 
the States, at some later date, may have exerciEed this 
reserved power in the form of laws restricting expression 
in no wise detracts from the expreEs prohibition of the 
First Amendment. Only when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was passed did it become oven possible to argue 
that through it tho First Amendment became applicable 
to the States. But that goal "·as not attained until the 
ruling of this Court in 10:31 that the reach of the Four-
teenth Amendment included the First Amondnwnt. See 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 368. 
At the very beginning, however, the First Amendment 
applied only to the Federal Government anrl there is not 
tho slightest evidence that the Framers intended to put 
tho ue,vly created federal regime into the role of ombuds-
man over literature. Tying censorship to the movement 
of literature or films in interstate commerce or into for-
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eign commerce would have been an easy "·ay for a gov-
ermnent of delegated powers to impair the liberty of 
expression. It ''"as to bar such suppression that we have 
the First Amendment. I dare say Jefferson and Madi-
son would be appalled at \\·hat the Court espouses today. 
The First Amendment was the product of a robust, 
not a prudish, age. The four decades prior to its enact-
ment "saw the publication, virtually without molesta-
tion from any authority, of two classics of pornographic 
literature." D. Loth, The Erotic in Literature 108 
( 1961). In addition to William King's The Toa.st, there 
\\·as John Cleland's Fanny Hill which has been de-
scribed as the "most important ''"ork of genuine por-
llography that has been published in English .... " 
L. Markun , Mrs. Grundy 191 (1930). In England, 
Harris' List of Covent Garden Ladies, a catalog used by 
prostitutes to advertise their trade, enjoyed open circu-
lation. N. St. John-Stevas, Obscenity and the Law 25 
(1056). Bibliographies of pornogra-phic literature list 
countless erotic works which were published in this 
time. Sec, e. g., A. Craig, Suppressed Books (1063); 
P. Fraxi, Catena Liborum Tacendorum (1885); 'V. Gal-
lichan , The Poison of Prudery (1929); D. Loth, The 
Erotic in Literature (1961); L. Markun. Mrs. Grundy 
(1930). This was the age when Benjamin Franklin 
wrote his "Advice to a Young Man on Choosing a 
Mistress" and "A Letter to the Hoyal Academy at Brus-
sels." "'Vhen the United States became a nation, none 
of the fathers of the country were any more concerned 
than Franklin "·ith the question of pornography. John 
Quincy Adams had a strongly puritanical bent for a 
man of his literary interests, and even he wrote of Tom 
Jones that it was 'one of the best novels in the lan-
guage.' " Loth, supra, at 120. It was in this milieu 
that Madison admonished against any "distinction be-
tween the freedom and licentiousness of the press." 
Padover, The Complete Madison 296 (1953). The An-
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thony Comstocks, the Thomas Bowdlers and the Vic-
torian hypocrisy-the predecessors of our present ob-
scenity laws-had yet to come upon the stage." 
Julius Goebel, our leading expert on colonial lavY, does 
not so much as allude to punishment of obscenity.3 J. 
Goebel, Development of Legal Institutions (7th rev. 
1946 ed.); J. Goebel. Felony and Misdemeanor (1937); 
J. Goebel & T. Naughton, Law Enforcement in Colonial 
New York (1944). 
Nor is there any basis in the legal history antedating 
the First Amendment for the creation of an obscenity 
exception. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 
424 (DouGLAS, J., concurring). The first reported case· 
involving obscene conduct was not until 1663. There, 
the defendant was fined for "shewing himself naked in 
2 Separating the worthwhile from the worthless has largely been 
a matter of individual taste because significant governmental sanc-
tions against obscrne literature arc of relatively recent vintnge, not 
having developed until ihr Victorian Age of the mid-19th century_ 
N. St. John-Stevas, Obscenity and the Law 1-85 (1956). See 1 T. 
Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 468-469 (1970); 
J. Paul & M. Schwartz, Federal Censorship c. 1 (1961); Report of 
the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 348-354 (1970). In 
this counlry, the fir,;t federal prohibition on obscenity \Yas not until 
tho Tariff Act of 1842, c. 270, § 28, 5 Slat. 566. England, which gave· 
us the infamous Star Chamber and a history of licensing of publish-
ing, did not raise a statutory bar to the importation of obscenity 
until 1853, Customs Consolidation Act, 16 & 17 Viet. c. 107, and 
waited until 1857 to enact a statute which banned obscene literature 
outright. Lord Campbell's Act, 20 & 21 Viet. c. 83. 
3 The only colonial statute mentioning the word "obscene" was 
Acts and Laws of the Province of Mass. Bay, c. CV, § 8 (1712), 
Mass. Bay Colony Charter & Laws 399 (1814). It did so, however, 
in the context of "composing, writing, printing or publishing ... 
any filthy, obscene, or profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock ser-
mon, in imitation or in mimicking of preaching, or any other part 
of divine worship" and must, therefore, be placed with the other 
colonial blasphemy laws. E. g., Act for the Punishment of Divers 
Capital and Other Felonies, Acts and Laws of Co1m. 66, G7 (1784); 
Act of 1723, c. 116, § 1, Digest of the Laws of Md. 92 (Herty 1799). 
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a balkony, and throwing down bottles (pist in) vi & 
armis among the people in Covent Garden, contra pacem, 
and to the scandal of the Government." Sir Charles 
Sydlyes Case, 83 Eng. Rep. 1146 (K. B. 1663). Rather 
than being a fountainhead for a body of law proscribing 
obscene literature, later courts viewed this case simply 
as an instance of assault, criminal breach of the peace, 
or indecent exposure. E. g., Bradlaugh v. Queen, L. R.. 
3 Q. B. 569, 634 (1878); Rex v. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. 849, 
851 (K. B. 1727) (Fortescue, J., dissenting). 
The advent of the printing press spurred censorship, 
in England, but the ribald and the obscene were not, at 
first, within the scope of that which was officially banned. 
The censorship of the Star Chamber and the licensing of 
books under the Tudors and Stuarts was aimed at the 
blasphemous or heretical, the seditious or treasonous. At 
that date, the government made no effort to prohibit the 
dissemination of obscenity. Rather, obscene literature 
was considered to raise a moral question properly cog-
nizable only by ecclesiastical, and not the common law, 
courts.4 "A crime that shakes religion, as profaneness 
on the stage, &c. is indictable; but writing an obscene 
book, as that intitled, 'The Fifteen Plagues of a Maiden-
head,' is not indictable, but punishable only in the Spirit-· 
ual Court." Queen v. Read, 88 Eng. Rep. 953 (K. B. 
1708). To be sure, Read was ultimately overruled and 
the crime of obscene libel established. Rex v. Curl, supra. 
It is noteworthy, however, that the only reported cases of 
obscene libel involved politically unpopular defendants. 
Rex v. Curl, supra; Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527 (K. B .. 
1770). 
In any event, what \Ye said in Bridges v. California, 
314 U. S. 252, 264- 265 (1941), would dispose of any 
1 Lord Coke'i:l De Libelli::; Famo~is , 77 Eng. Hep. 250 (1606), for 
example, was the definitive statement of the common law of libel 
but made no mention of the misdemeanor of obscene libel. 
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argument that earlier restrictions on free expression 
should be read into the First Amendment: 
"[T]o assume that English comnwn la\v in this field 
became ours is to deny the generally accepted his-
torical belief that 'one of the objects of the Revolu-
tion was to get rid of the English common law on 
liberty of speech and of the press.' More specific-
ally, it is to forget the environment in which the 
First Amendment 'vas ratified. In presenting the 
proposals which were later embodied in the Bill of 
Rights, James Madison the leader in the preparation 
of the First Amendment said: 'Although I know 
whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom 
of the press, or liberty of conscience, come in question 
in [Parliament], the invasion of them is restricted 
by able advocates, yet the .l\:Iagna Charta does not 
contain any one provision for the security of those 
rights, respecting "·hich the people of America are 
most alarmed. The freedom of the press and rights 
of conscience, those choicest privileges of the people, 
arc unguarded in the British Constitution' " 
This Court has nonetheless cngrafted an exception 
upon the clear meaning of words written in the 18th 
century. But sec Bridges v. Californ·ia, 314 U. S. 252, 
264-265; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 
249. 
Our efforts to define obscenity have not been produc-
tive of meaningful standards which I have tried to dem-
onstrate in Miller v. California, ante -, decided this 
day. What is "obscene" is highly subjective, varying 
from judge to judge, from juryman to juryman. 
"The fireside banter of Chaucer's Canterbury Pil-
grims was disgusting obscenity to Victorian-type 
moralists whose co-ed granddaughters shock the Vic-
torian-type moralists of today. Words that are ob-
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scene in England have not a hint of impropriety in 
the United States, and vice versa. The English 
language is full of innocent words and phrases with 
obscene ancestry." Brant, The Bill of Rights 490 
(1965). 
So speaks our leading First Amendment historian; 
and he went on to say that this Court's decisions "seemed 
to multiply standards instead of creating one." I d., 
491. The reason is not the inability or mediocrity of 
judges. 
"What is the reason for this multiple schlerosis 
of the judicial faculty? It is due to the fact stated 
above, that obscenity is a matter of taste and social 
custom, not of fact." !d., 491-492. 
Taste and custom are part of it; but as I have said on 
other occasions,G the neuroses of judges, lawmakers, and 
of the so-called "experts" who haYe taken the place of 
Anthony Comstock, also play a major role. 
Finally, it is iropic to me that in this Kation many pages 
must be written and many hours spent to explain why a 
perso11 who can read whatever he desires, Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, may without violating a law 
carry that literature in his brief case or bring it home 
from abroad. Unless there is that ancillary right, one's 
Stanley rights could be realized, as has been suggested. 
ouly if one \\Tote or designed a tract in his attic, printed 
or processed it in his basement, so as to be able to 
read it in his study. United States v. Thirty Seven 
Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 382 (Black, J., dissenting). 
Most of the items that come this way denounced as 
"obscene" are in my Yiew trash. I "·ould find few, if I 
any, that had any redeeming social value to m<'. But 
'vhat may be trash to me ma.y be prized by others.r· 
"Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U. S. G29, GG1-G71 (dissrnting). 
n I d., at 491. 
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Moreover, by ;vhat right under the Constitution do five 1 
of us have to impose our set of values on the literature 
of the day? There is danger in that course, the danger 
of bending the popular mind to new norms of con-
formity. There is also danger in tolerance, for toler-
ance often leads to robust and ribald productions. Yet 
that is the plain thrust of the First Amendment. 
Irving Brant summed the matter up: 
"Blessed with a form of government that requires 
universal liberty of thought and expression, blessed 
with a social and economic system built on that 
same foundation, the American people have created 
the danger they fear by denying to themselves the 
liberties they cherish." Op. cit. supra, at 493. 
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MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, dissenting. 
We judges who work at the appellate level have an 
understandable tendency to write essay-like opinions that 
announce general constitutional principles, but often are 
far removed from the gritty facts of the case. 
Today we send a man to prison for distributing bro-
chures which advertised books and a movie. A basic 
premise of criminal law under our Constitution is that 
it must give fair warning. I subrnit that the law of 
obscenity as defined by legislatures and by courts is so 
vague as not to give fair warning. Some make it a crime 
to sell a book which deals with sex "in a manner appeal-
ing to prurient interests." 1 Some define obscenity as 
literature which is "patently offensive because it affronts 
contemporary standards." ~ Others make a book ob-
scene when it is "utterly without redeeming social im-
1 Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 487. 
California defines "obscene matter" as "matter, taken as a whole, 
the predominant appeal of which to tho average person, applying 
contemporary standards, is to prurient interest, i. e., a shameful or 
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion ; and is matter which 
taken as a whole goe::; substantiaUy beyond customary limits of candor 
in description or representation of such mailers; and is matter 
which taken as a whole is utterly without redeeming social im-
parlance." Calif. Penal Code § 311 (a). 
~ 35-! U. S., at 489. 
70-73-DISSENT 
l\1ILLER v. CALIFORNIA 
portancc." 3 Some condemn it if its "dominant tendency 
might be to deprave ot· corrupt a reader." 4 Others look 
not to the content of the book but to whether it is ad-
vertised "to appeal to the erotic interests of customers." 5 
Some condemn only "hard-core pornography"; but even 
then a true definition is lacking. It has indeed been said 
of that definition , "I could never succeed in fdefining it] 
intelligibly," but "I know it when I see it." 6 
Those are the standards we ourselves have written into 
the Constitution. 7 Yet how under these vague tests can 
"·c sustain convictions for the sale of an article prior to 
the time when some court has declared it to be ob-
scene. I submit that prior to a court's declaration that 
a specific publication is "obscene," the la.w is far too 
vague to send men to prison a.ncl yet satisfy the require-
ments of clue process. 
3 I d., 484. 
4 Id ., 502 (Harlan , J.). 
5 G£nzburg v. United States, 383 U . S. 463, 467. 
G Jacobelli8 v. Ohio, 378 U . S. 184, 197. 
7 At the conclusion of a two-~•ra r ~ tudy , the U. S. Commi~8ion on 
Obscenity and Pornography determined th::tt the ~ t :mda rds we hn,•e 
written interfere with conRtitutionally protectrd materials: 
"Society's attempts to lrgiRlatc for adults in thr arra of ob~cenity 
hnn~ not been successful. Pre;-;cnt laws prohibiting the consensual 
sale or distribution of explicit sexual mnt crials to adults are rxtremely 
unsatisfactory in their prnciiral applirntion. The Constitution per-
mits material to be clermrd 'ob~ cene' for adults only if , as a whole, 
it appeals to the 'prnrient' interest of the ::t\'erage per~on , iH 'patently 
offensive' in light of 'community stnndards,' and lacks 'redeeming 
sorial value.' These Yal!;ue and hi!l:hly subjecti,·e aesthetic , psycho-
logical and morn! tests do no t pro,·ide meaningful guidance for l:lw 
enforcement offirinls , juries or courts. As a result , law is incon-
sistently and sometimes erroneously applied and the distinctions 
made by courts hrtween prohibited and permissible materials often 
appear indefensibl e. Error;; in the npplication of the lnw nnd un-
certainty about it s srope also cau~c intcreferenre with the com-
munication of constitutionally protected materirrk" Report of the 
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 59 (1970) . 
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Yet we approved a conviction that sent Ralph Ginz-
burg to prison for five years s under those standards. This 
petitioner fares better, getting only 60 clays in Jail. Yet 
he could not possibly know whether the literature he 
offered would be held obscene. As Mr. Justice Harlan 
has said: 
"The upshot of all this divergence in viewpoint is 
that anyone who undertakes to examine the Court's 
decisions since Roth which have held particular ma-
terial obscene or not obscene would find himself in 
utter bewilderment." Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 
390 u. s. 676, 707. 
The decision of what is or is not obscene is a purely 
personal decision by each judge, based on his tastes, his 
background, and perhaps his neuroses. Mr. Justice Black 
said in Kingsley International P1'ctures Cor]). Y. Regents, 
360 U. S. 684, 590-691, that 
"Such an individualized determination cannot be 
guided by reasonably fixed and certain standards. 
Accordingly, neither States nor moving picture 
makers can possibly know in advance, with any fair 
degree of certainty, "·hat can or cannot be done in 
the field of movie making and exhibiting. This 
uncertainty cannot easily be reconciled with the rule 
of law which our Constitution envisages." 
We should have too much pride in the rule of law and 
in guidelines that keep a law from being a trap to fine 
or imprison people for violating such vague laws.9 "A 
s Ginzburu v. United States, 3R3 U. S. 46;). 
~It id no nn~wer to ~ny that Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 
491-492, settled for all time the question whether obscenity stand-
ards arc w1constitut ionaUy vague. There, the Court noted "that 
lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due 
process." The Court then concluded that the "standard[s] for 
. ·
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failure of a statute limiting freedom of expression to 
give fair notice of what acts will be punished and such 
a statute's inclusion of prohibitions against expressions,. 
protected by the principles of the First Amendment, 
violates an accused's rights under procedural due process 
and freedom of speech and press." Winters v. New York, 
333 U. S. 507, 509-510. "[T]here is no extemalmeas-
uring rod for obscenity," Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 
147, 165 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Our obscenity 
decisions have been "left to a majority of this Court on 
a case-by-case basis," ibid. (Black J., concurring), with-
out the formulation of the predictable standards required 
by Winters. 
judging obscenity ... [it had] discus~ed, g[a]ve adequate warning 
of the conduct proscribed .... " I d., at 491. 
The cases relied upon to reach that conclusion were wholly inap-
posite to the standard of ;)recision necessary for the regulation of 
constitutional frredoms surh as thosr serured by the First Amend-
ment. "[T]his Comt has intimated that stricter standards of 
permissible statutory Y::tgue11ess may be applied to a statute having 
a potentially inhibiting effort on speech; a man may the less be 
required to act at hi::; peril here, because the free dissemination of 
ideas may be the loser." Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 151. 
With one exception, however, the cases relied upon in Roth to gauge 
the requisite statutory precision, all dealt with instances of economic 
and social regulation where this Court has traditionally applied more 
lenient standards than those used in the area of expression. That 
sole exception-Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273-is a relic of the 
days prior to Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, and no longer 
is good law. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444. 
Nor have our later decisions vindicated the determination in Roth 
on the precision of obscenity standards. On the contrary, those 
decisions have only further blurred the line between the constitu-
tionally protected and that which five members of this Court will 
allow to be proscribed and haw resulted in what one commentator 
has labeled "a con.-titut ional disaster area." MacGrath, The Ob-
scenity Cases: The Grape~ of Roth, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 7, 59. 
Roth was, with all respect, predicated upon an improper premise· 
and the ensuing years ha,·e accentuated that error . 
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We have struck down, as unconstitutionally vague,. 
statutes limiting expression based upon such uncertain 
terms as " [ d] escribing or portraying brutality, criminal 
violence or depravity ... or sexual promiscuity or ab-
normal sexual relations." Interstate Circuit v. Dallas~ 
supra, at 681. So too, with other standards such as 
"approve such films ... [as] are moral and proper ... 
[and] disapprove such as are cruel, obscene, indecent or 
immoral, or such as tend to debase or corrupt morals," 
1I olmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U. S. 870; 
"immoral" and "tend to corrupt morals," Commercial 
Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U. S. 587; "moral, educa-
tional or amusing and harmless," Superior Films, Inc. v. 
Department of Education, 346 U. S. 587; "prejudicial to· 
the best interests of the people," Gelling v. Texas, 343 
U. S. 960; "sacrilegious," Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson~ 
343 U. S. 495; "criminal news or stories of deeds of blood-
shed or lust, so massed as to become vehicles for inciting-
violent and depraved crimes," Winters v. New York, 
supra. 
How can it be maintained that our obscenity decisions 
provide any more definite a standard than this plethora 
of statutes which we have held to be unconstitutionally 
vague? As Mr. Justice Black said in Ginzburg v. United 
States, 383 U. S. 463, 478-480 (dissenting opinion): 
"I think that the criteria declared ... as guide-
lines . . . are so vague and meaningless that they 
practically leave the fate of a person charged with 
violating censorship statutes to the unbridled dis-
cretion, whim and caprice of the judge or jury which 
tries him .... 
"(a) The first element ... is that the dominant 
theme of the material taken as a whole must appeal 
to the prurient interest in sex. It seems quite ap-
parent to me that human beings, serving either as 
judges or jurors, could not be expected to give any 
6 
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sort of decision on this element which would even 
remotely promise any kind of uniformity in the 
enforcement of this law. . . . [T]he submission of 
such an issue as this to a judge or jury amounts to 
practically nothing more than a request for the 
judge or juror to assert his own personal beliefs 
about whether the matter should be allowed to be 
legally distributed .... 
11 (b) The second element ... is that the material 
must be 'patently offensive because it affronts con-
temporary community standards relating to the 
description or representation of sexual matters ... .' 
... [H] ere again the guilt or innocence of a defend-
ant charged with obscenity must depend in the 
filial analysis upon the personal judgment and atti-
tudes of particular individuals and the place where 
the trial is held .... 
11 (c) A third element . . . is that the material 
must be 'utterly without redeeming social value.' 
This element seems to me to be as uncertain, if not 
even more uncertain, than is the unknown sub-
stance of the Milky Way. . . . Whether a particular 
treatment of a particular subject is with or without 
social value in this evolving, dynamic society of ours 
is a question upon which no uniform agreement 
could possibly be reached among politicians, states-
men, professors, philosophers, scientists, religious 
groups or any other type of group. A case-by-case 
assessment of social values by individual judges and 
jurors is, I think, a dangerous technique for govern-
ment to utilize in determining whether a man stays 
in or out of the penitentiary." 
In Rabe Y. TV ashington, 405 U. S. 313, this Court re-
cently held that it was a denial of clue procE"ss to sustain 
a conviction under an obscenity statute where the mean-
ing of the statutory word "obscene" was not clarified until 
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the conviction was on appeal. Under such circumstances, 
we reasoned, the defendant was not given fair notice of 
the conduct \Yhich wal3 proscribed. I fail to see the dif-
ference between Rabe and the typical obscenity case 
where the defendant may not know whether a particular 
book or motion picture is constitutionally protected until 
his case becomes final on appeal. 
If a specific book, play, paper, or motion picture has 
in a civil proceeding been condemned as obscene and re-
view of that finding has been completed, and thereafter 
a person publishes, shows, or displays that particular 
book or film, then a vague law has been made specific. 
There would remain the underlying question whether 
the First Amendment allmYs an implied exception in the 
case of obscenity. I do not think it does and my views 
on the isc:ue have been stated over and again.10 But at 
least a criminal prosecution brought at that juncture 
would not violate the time-honored void-for-vagueness 
tcst.11 
10 Sec United States v. 1!2 200-Ft. Reels of Film, post, nt 
Byrne v. Karalexis, 396 U. S. 97G, 977; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 
U. R. 629, G50; Jarobs v. New York, 088 U.S. 431, 436; Ginzburg 
Y. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 482; M emoi1·s v. Massachusetts, 3S3 
U.S. 413, 424; Bantam Books, luc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 72; 
Times Film Co1'JJ. v. City of Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 78; Smith v. 
California, 361 U. 8. 147, 167; Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 
360 U.S. 684, 697; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508; Kings-
ley Books, Inr. v. Brown, 354 U. 8. 436, 4.46; S1tperior Films, Inc. 
v. Departrnrnt of Education, 346 U. 8. 587, 588; Gelling v. Texas, 
343 U. 8. 960. 
11 The Commission on Ob,.renity and Pornography has ad\·ocilted 
such a procedure: 
"The Commission recommends ihe enactment, in all jurisdictions 
which enact or retain pro\·isions prohibiting the disReminntion of 
sexual materials to adults or young persons, of legislation authorizing 
prosecutors to obtain declaratory jud!!:mf'ntl:l as to whether particular 
materials fall within existing legal prohibitions .... 
"A declaratory judgment procedure ... would permit prosecutors 
to proceed civilly, rather than through the criminal process, against 
70-73-DISSENT 
8 MILLER v. CALIFORNIA 
No such protective procedure has been designed by 
California in this case. Obscenity-which even we can-
not define with precision-is a hodge-podge. To send 
men to jail for violating standards they cannot under-
stand, construe, and apply is a monstrous thing to do in 
a N a.tion dedicated to fair trials and due process. 
suspected violations of obscenity prohibition. If such civil pro-
cedures are utilized, penalties would be imposed for violation of the 
law only with respect to conduct occurring after a civil declaration 
is obtained. The Commission believes this course of action to be· 
appropriate wheneYer there is an existing doubt regarding the legal 
status of materials; where other alternatives are available, the crim-
inal process should not ordinarily be invoked against persons who 
might have reasonably belieYed, in good faith, that the books or 
films they distributed were entitled to constitutional protection, for 
any threat of criminal sanctions might otherwise deter the free dis-
tribution of constitutionally protected material." Report of the 





Messrs. Hamm<md, Foz, 
Wllldns&m aad Pamell 
DATE: June 8, 19'12 
FROM: Lewta F. Powell, Jr. 
Obecealty Cues 
All IwW have to come dOirll "off of the face" wttbiD. the nut 
week or 10 days at most, I would appreetate aome adYice u to how 
thla problem is handled in other countrlea - upeelallJ In Engl&Dd. 
Larry is assigned to the obscenity cues, but tt may be that 
me of the other cHerlts will be free to look Into this before Larry 
concludes his present prior assignments. 
Although I am awaiting Blll Brennan's oplnicm, we understand 
that he is abandoning prior precedents and advocating a new constituticmal 
rule which would allow unlimited sale and Viewing of what heretofore 
has been regarded u obecene material, prorided caly the lDterut of 
mmore and noo-u-tm1 adults Ia pr~ected. 
This "Interest'' approach bdtJally bad CGD81derable appeal to 
me. At least it would be a way of getting this Court oat of the censor-
ship business. Yet, the more I have reflected on the problem over the 





of adopting the ''interest" teat. I start from a ccmvlctlOD that the cpaJJty 
ola society and a elvUtzattm depends, In stgniftcant degree, upm the 
pruence of some moral standards. AIJ a lawyer, and al8o u ODe who 
bu riewed human nature o.er quite a 8p8ll, I kll<7'r that laws do not 
determine moral standards or values. I therefore favor a minimum of 
effort by legislatures and c oorts to regulate or restrict what may be 
regarded as "immoral" cooduct. 
Yet, one of the purposes of law 1s to afford some protectlm to 
the sensibilities and to the values of a majority of the people. Thus, 
although we have moved (happily 1 agree) to the mtnl-aklrts aad more 
dubiously to the topless and bottomless cabarets, few would argue 
(although the munber perbape 18 blereumc) tbat pabllc D&kedaeu 8boald 
be allowed Jndtscrtmlnately on the streets and 1n the restaurants, or 
that public copulation is protected by Firat Amendment rtgbts. If theH 
examples seem extreme (and to some they would not), consider what 
would have been sald a couple of decades ago with reapect to the lep.lUy 
of the topleas and bottomless cabaret ntertatnment. The point here 
is that the movement of optntm, and of law, has been rather dramatteally 
toward Increased "freedom" or- u viewed by many- lDcreaaed lieenae. 
: 
3. 
However one may view the trend, I am unpersuaded that thoae 
who wish to enrich themselves by proctactng, selling, ablbltlng and 
pandertng some of the filth that 18 now available, ahould be accorded 
a prtYlleged sanctuary by this Court. If we 'filidafo the "interest,. doctrine 
there will be a flood of material deeply offensive to many - tf not most -
ettlt:ens. WUltng purchasers will exist by the t8H of thOWJI.Dds. The 
pornography which they purchase will not be locked in theffamUy wall 
safe, and viewed or read cwaly In private. We know perfectly well that 
tt wtll be widely disseminated, and that 1n tact it wUl reach the young 
throagh all sorts of channels. 
Although I have had no opportunity to study Justice Harlan's 
views with any care, Jay has summarized them briefly on pp. 1216-
121 'I of hts Virginia l .aw Review article on Harlan. Harlan would 
allow the state• wide, but not wholly unrestricted, latitude to regulate 
obscenity at the intrastate level. The Congress would, of course, 
eoottnue SliCh regulattc:m as it deems appropriate with respect to 
interstate comnMirce. 
I woald like to hear more about the pros and ems of the 
Harlan view. 
But the intUal purpose of this memorandum wu to request that 
one of you do such research as may be necessary to determine how 
England deals with this problem. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
..  
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Memorandum of MR. JuSTICE BRENNAN. 
I think that the time has come when the Court should 
admit that the standards fashioned by it to guide ad-
ministration of this Nation's obscenity laws do not work, 
and that we must. change our constitutional a,pproach 
i£ we are to bring stability to this area of the law. This 
memorandum will trace the sources of the difficulty and 
propose a solution.1 
Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 ( 1057) , of course, 
held that obscenity, although expression, is not within 
the area of speech or press constitutionally protected 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments against 
fed eral or state infringement.2 But Roth also empha-
sized that "sex and obscenity are not snyonymous," id., 
at 484, and that sexually oriented matter not obscene 
has the full protection of the Constitution, this because 
1 I do not acldrt>ss here the problem of live performances involving 
sexual acts, which may bring into play ronsiderution c not rclrvant 
to the analy::>iR of writ ten, pirtorial, or three-dimen~iona l sexually 
oriented expression. 
:! Even under Roth, it should be pointed out, governmental regu-
lation of obscenity has been subject to the commands of reasonable-
ness under the Due Process Clau::>e, sec GinsbeTg v. N ew YoTk, 390 
U. S. 629 (1968), and the Federal Government has been limited to 
the exercise of its enumerated powcri:) . 
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"[s]ex, a great and mysterious motive force m human 
life has indisputably been a. subject of absorbing in-
terest through the ages; it is one of the vital problems 
of human interest and public concern." Id., at 487." 
The core of our problem has been our inability to 
provide tools that effectively separate obscenity from 
other sexually oriented expression that has constitu-
tional protection, so that our laws will operate only to 
suppress the former. We have insisted that because 
"the freedoms of expression . . . are vulnearable to 
gravely damaging yet barely visibly encroachments," 
only "procedures that will ensure against the curtail-
ment of constitutionally protected r sexuall expression" 
can be tolerated. Bantam. Books, Inc. v. Sulliva·n, 372 
U. S. 58, 66 (1963). In that respect, we have merely I 
applied the larger principle . that "[t]he separation of 
legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for ... sensitive 
tools .... " Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525 
(1958). Candor compels the frank admission that we 
have not fa~wned t.Iiose •rscnSitiVe tools"  m t he obscen-
-----------------------------------------------------
"A~ to all ~uch problem~. thi~ Court said in Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U. S. 88, 101-102. 
"'The freedom of ~perch and of the prc~s gnnr:mtcecl b.v the 
Constitution embmee~ nt t hr lrast thr librrty to discu~s publicly and 
1 rnthfnlly all matters of ]ntbh:c concern, without previous restr.'lint 
or fC'nr of snbseqnrnt puniRhmc·n1. Thr rxigenciep of the colonial 
period and the efTorts to secure freedom from oppressive adminis-
tration dcvrloprd a broadcnrcl concPption of these librrtirs as ade-
quate to suppl~· the pnblic nrcd for information and education with 
reswct to the significant issues of the times. . . . Freedom of dis-
cu~sion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must 
embrnre all issues about 1vhirh information is needed or appropriate 
to enable the mrmbers of satiety to cope 1cith the exigencies of thrdr 
period.' (Emphnsi~ added.)" 
Both, 354 U. S., nt 487-488. Sec al~o, e. (f., Thomas v. Collins, 323 
U. S. 516, 531 (1945) ("the rights of free speech and a free press 
nrc not confined to any field of human interest"). 
a J.- • • f .;#tAt' 
-61r~ 
/Aitl..·~ Cj  
" . ·-~ 
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ity area. The attempt, as the late Mr. Justice Harlan 
observed. has only "produced a variety of views among 
tho members of the Court unmatched in any other course 
of constitutional adjudication." Interstate Circuit, Inc. 
v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 704-705 (1968) (separate opin-
ion). He concluded that "rt]he upshot of all this di-
vergence is that anyone who undertakes to examine the 
Court's decisions since Roth which have held particular 
material obscene or not obscene would find himself in 
utter bewilderment." !d., at 707. At the outset a brief 
review of that divergence is in order. 
I 
All but two members of this Court who have addressed 
tho question since Roth have shared tho view that there 
is something called "obscenity" outside the ambit of 
the First Amendment. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter once 
remarked, "Even the author of 'Laciy Ch; ttorley's 
Lover' ... knew there was such a thing as pornogrl:!:Phy, 
dirt for .... dirts,sg.~ .. . ! ' Kingsley P2ctu res Cor;:-v. 
Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 692 (1959). Yet a majority 
have not been able to settle on a satisfactory definition 
for obscenity in the context of a complete bar on its 
dissemination. In Roth five members of the Court did 
conclude that obscenity could be determined in terms 
of '\\'hether to the avera.ge person, apply contemporary 
community standards, the dominant theme of the ma-
teria.l as a whole appeals to prurie11t intf'rest." 3!)4 U. S., 
at 489. But agreement on that test-achieved in the 
abstract and without reference to the particular material 
before tho Court, sec id., at 481 n. 8-was short-lived. 
Tho painful history of the Court's subsequent deci-
sions need not be recounted in detail. It is sufficient 
to note that by 1967 the following views had emerged: 
Mr. Justice Black and MR. JusTICE DotrGLAS consis-
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to regulate any sexually oriented matter on the ground 
of its obscenity. See, e. g., Ginzburg v. United States, 
383 U. S. 643, 476, 482 (1966) (dissenting opinions); 
Jacobellis " · Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 196 (1964) (concur-
ring opinion); Roth, 354 U. S., at 508 (dissenting opin-
ion). Mr. Justice Harlan, on the other hand, believed 
that the Federal Go; ment in the exercise of its enu-
merated powers could control the distribution of "hard-
core" pornography, while the States ·were afforded more 
latitude to "[ban] any material which, taken as a whole, 
has been reasonably found in state judicial proceedings 
to treat with sex in a fundamentally offensive manner, 
under rationally established criteria for judging such 
material." Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, at 204 (dissent-
ing opinion). See also, e. g., Ginzburg v. United StaLes, 
supra, at 493 (dissenting opinion); A Quantity of Books 
v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205, 215 ( 1964) (dissenting opinion 
joined by Clark, J.); Roth, 354 U. S., at 496 (separate 
opinion). MR. JusTICE S'I'EWART regarded "hard-core." --pornography as the limit of both federal and state power. 
See , e. () ., "Gi'l7.zbuhg v. United States, supra., at 407 
(clissenting opinion); Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra., at 197 
(concurring opinion). 
The view that had the most, but not majority, SUI1-
port was the one adopted by Mr. Chief Justice W an·en, -Mr. Justice F~s, and myself-namely, that Federal 
or State Governments could control the distribution of 
material where "three elements . . . [independently] 
coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant 
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a 
prurient inttrest in sex; (b) tho material is patently 
offensive because it affronts contemporary community 
standards relating to the description or representation 
of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without 
redeeming social value." Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 -U. S. 413, 418 (1966). Even this formulation, how-
.· 
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ever, concealed differences of opinion. Compare Jacob-
ellis v. Ohio, supra, at 192-195 (BRENNAN, J., joined 
by Goldberg, J.) (community standards national), ·with I 
id., at 200-201 (Warren, C. J., joined by --cra;k, J., dis-
senting) (community standards local).4 Moreover, it 
did not provide a definition covering all situations. See 
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502 (1966) (prurient 
appeal defined in terms of a deviant sexual group) ; 
Ginzburg v. United States, supra ("pandering" pro-
bative evidence of obscenity in close cases). See also 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (obscenity 
for juveniles). ~r, finally, as I mentioned, did it ever 
command a majority of the Court. Aside from the-
other viewsCiescnbeCT a"'5ove, Mr. Justice Clark believed 
that "social importance" could only "be considered to-
gether with evidence that the material in question ap-
peals to prurient interest and is patently offensive." 
:Memoirs v. ,M as.sachusetts, supra, at 445 ( djssenting 
opinion). Similarly, MR. JusTICE WHITE held "a pub-
lication to be obscene if its predominant theme appeals 
to the prurient interest in a manner exceeding customary 
limits of candor," id., at 460-461 (dissenting opinion), 
and regarded "'social importance' ... not [as] an in-
dependent test of obscenity, but [as] relevant only to 
determining the predominant prurient interest of the 
m~terial .... " I d., at 462. 
In the face of this divergence of opinion the Court 
began the practice in 1967 in Redrup v. New York, 386 
U. S. 767, of per curiam reversals of convictions for the 
4 On the question of community standards sec also Hoyt v. Minne-
sota, 399 U.S. 524 (1970) (BLA~KMUN, J., joined by BunGER, C. J ., 
and Harlan, J. , di~scnting) (flexibility for state standards); Cain v. 
Kentucky, 397 U. S. 319 (1970) (BunGER, C. J., dissenting) (same); 
Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (Harlan, J., 
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dissemination of materials that at least five memLers 
of the court, applying their separate tests, deemed not 
to be obscene." This approach culminated the attempt 
in Roth to separate all forms of sexually oriented ex-
pression into two categori0s-thc one subj0ct to full 
governmental suppression and the other beyond the reach 
of governmental control to the same extent as any other 
form of speech or press. Neither the Reclrup approach l 
Hor the underlying effort in Roth can be allowed to con-
tinue further, for experience has shown that both are 
flatly inconsistent with abiding principl0s marked out 
by our obscenity decisions themselves. 
II 
The touchstone for analysis in the First Amendment 
area is the principle that " [ w] hen we deal with the 
complex strands in the web of freedoms which make 
up free speech, the operation and effect of the method 
by which speech is sought to be restrained must be sub-
jected to close anaiysis and critical judgment in the 
light of the particular circumstances to which it is np-
plied." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 ( 1958). The 
authority for this principle and the ramifica.tions of its 
application may be found in no better place than our 
obscenity decisions. Thus, in Roth we said. 
"The fundamental freedoms of speech and press 
have contributed greatly to the development and 
well-being of our free society and are indispensable 
r. No less thnn 31 en~'<'~ hnw hern di~po,rd of in this fashion. Aside 
from the three rn~cs rc,·rr~rcl in Redrup, these are found nt 388 
U. S. 440, 441, 442, 44~. 444, 446, 447, 44!-l, 452, 45~, 454 (1967); 
~89 U.S. 47, 48 , 50, 89,57:3, 578 (1967-1968); ~90 U.S. 340 (196 ) ; 
392 U. S. 6!55 (1968): 397 U. S. ~19 (1970); 398 U. S. 278, 434 
(1970); 399 U. S. 524 (1970); 401 U. S. 100G (1971); 402 U. S. 
938 ( 1971) ; 404 U. S. 806, 988 ( 1971) (two derisions report eel at 
988). 
~4>·~._.... ~ 
f1.,. • -4- ~ 1-t.-
fj- h.,O.,.ft-' 
~~ 
~ .... .. -;...~- &-.J ~ 
~c-·c·-.......,. 
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to its continued growth. Ceaseless vigilance is the 
by the States. The door barring federal and state 
intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar .... " 
354 U. S., at 488. 
The applications of this principle have been numerous. 
First. we have held that the defini_!ion of obscenit_y must 
provide adequate notice of exactl what is prohibited 
from 1sscnunatwn. See, e. g., Rabe v. TV as 7,mgton, 
- U. S. -; Interstate Circuit, l11c. Y. Dallas, 390 
U. S. 676 (1968); ·winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 
(1948). Of course, essential to the administration of 
all our criminal laws under the Due Process Clause is 
that "all [persons 1 arc entitled to be informed as to 
what the State commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New 
Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939). Anything less is a 
denial of fundamental fairness and an invitation to 
arbitrary and uneven enforcement of the la\Y. See. 
e. g., Papachristou v. Cily of Jacksonville, 405 U. 8. 156 
(1972). But the necessity for notice has particular im-
portance in the area of First Amendment freedoms. As 
this Court has indicated, "stricter standards of pennis-
siblc statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute 
having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man 
may the less be required to act at his peril here, be-
cause the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser." 
Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 151 (1959). 
Like,Yisc, \\·c have indicated that the definition of 
obscenity must be effective to safeguard protected expres-
sion. For this reason Roth rejected the test of Regina 
1. Hicklin, [18G8] L. R. 3 Q. B. 360, that "[judged] 
obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the most 
susceptible persons" and therefore "might \\"ell encom-
pass material legitimately treating \\"ith sex .... " 354 
U. S .. at 489. Cf. Mishkin v. l\'ew York, 383 U.S. 502, 
509 (1966). Also for this reason no "enactment ... 
[may] reduce the adult population ... to reading only 
1 
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'vhat is fit for children," Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 
380. 383 (1957); cf. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 
372 U. S. 58, 71 ( Hl63), nor may a statute "11revent 
the exhibition of a motion picture because that picture 
advocates an idea .... " Kingsley Pitcures Corp. v. 
Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 688 (1959). Cf., e. g., Gooding 
v. Wilson,- U.S.- (1972). In sum: 
"The objectionable quality of vagueness and over-
breadth . . . [is] the danger of tolerating, in the 
area of First Amendment fredoms, the existence 
of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and im-
proper application. Cf. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 
367 U. S. 717, 733. These freedoms arc delicate 
and vulnearable, as ''"ell as supremely precious in 
our society. The threat of sanctions may deter 
their exercise almost as potently as the actual ap-
plication of sanctions. Cf. Smith v. California, 
[361 U. S.], at 151-154; Speiser v. Randall, 357 
357 U. S. 513, 526. Because First Amendment free-
doms need breathing space to survive, government 
may regulate in the area only with narrow specific-
ity. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 311." 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 432-433 (1963). 
The same principle that has commanded this result 
has also dictated that "a State is not free to adopt what-
ever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity .... " 
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 731 (1961). 
"Rather, the First Amendment requires that procedures 
be incorporated that 'ensure against the curtailment of 
constitutionally protected expression . . . .' " Blount 
v. Rizzi, 400 U. S. 410, 416 (1971) (quoting Ba-;{;m - -B.Q_oks, Inc. v. Sullivan, supra). Thus, for example: -. 
"to avoid constitutional infirmity a scheme of ad-
ministrative censorship must: place the burdens of 
initiating judicial review and of proving that the 
70-73-~IEi\IO (A) 
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material is unprotected expression on the censor; 
require 'prompt judicial review'-a final judicial 
determination on the merits within a specified, brief 
period-to prevent tho administrative decision of 
the censor from achieving an effect of finality; and 
limit to preservation of the status quo for the shrot-
est, fixed period compatible with sound judicial reso-
lution, any restraint imposed in advance of the 
final judicial determination." !d., at 417 (sum-
marizing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51. 58-60· 
(1965). See also, e. g., United States v. Thirty-
SevP.n Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 367-375 (1971); 
Lee Art Th.eatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U. S. 636 
(1968); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 
205 (1964) (plura.lity opinion). 
In a similar vein the First Amendment has been held 
not to allow the possession of obscene material to b~ 
made a crime without some proof of the possessor's 
knowledge of its contents, Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 
147 ( 1959), for "proof of scienter" is necessary "to avoid 
the hazard of self-censorship of constitutionally pro-
tected material and to compensate for the ambiguities 
inherent in the definition of obscenity." Mishkin Y. 
New York, supra, at 511. See also Ginsberg v. New 
York, 390 U. S. 629, 644-645 (1968). Nor has it been l _ ~ 
permissible for courts to eschew their responsibility to ~~~ 
~~d~;;::•~:::::1 t:: :::::,::.:l:::::g M~:g::h: ~ v 
V \ . V'r tangible form of expression is . . . an individual V . _ _ _/ , \.\. ~ _J.J tter, and in the nature of things every such sup- . J.-~ _)._ ~ I;' ...Q¥ ~ 0.) pression raises an individual constitutiona.l prob- ~ ~ 
l~ • .AI- • . . 
0 
lem, in which a reviewing court must determine ~~ ..J/ 
,- for itself whether the attacked expression is sup- T 
V" .i.,bo ,(\ pressable within constitutional standards. Since ~) 
~ v those standards do not readily lend themselves to ( l ~ 
~~ 
~~ '1. * 8u.-f'--~--~1--1" 
~ r-1 rt..:r ~ ~ oh 4~ w.e..f' 7 
~v · &.c-~.J.o~~-
0 (St.,...... ~....,:~ ~""' ..... ~ ~ ) 
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generalized definitions, the constitutional problem 
in the last analysis becomes one of particularized 
judgments which appellate courts must make for 
themselves." Roth, 345 U. S., at 497 (Harlan, J.) 
(separate opinion). 
This rule, although once a mooted point," was firmly 
established by R earup ~v. "f! ew York, 386 '0. S. 7(f/ t 10li7), 
and 1t progeny, see n. 5, supra, a!J!:l?Plicable to fue 
obSceJu ty no less than to any other area in volvin free 
e~ion. ee, e. g., 'ew or c '2mes Co. v. Sulliva11, 
3~ S. 254, 284-285 (1964). It "·as indeed but 
another application of the principle "that procedures be 
incorporated that 'ensure against the curtailment of 
constitutionally protected expression .... ' " 
Fiften yeara experience since Roth has brought me 
to the firm conclusion that the effort to safeguard First 
Amendment values exemplified in the foregoing review 
has failed of its objective because certain predicates of 
~ : Roth have proved to be U11souncl. No definition of ob-
~~ .t- ~ scenity we have yet devised is itself completely un-
~ ~ ambiguous, though various tests have been upheld under 
t _ _... 0-" .>. ..(he Due Process Clause. See Gi:nsberg v. l\"ew York, 
J>&A · ~ f s_upra, at 643 (modified Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 
~ U.S. 413,418 (1966), test); M'ishkin v. New York, supra, 
a.t 506-507 ("hard-core" pornography); Roth, 354 U. S., 
u CompnrC' Ginsbl'rg v. New York, 300 U. S. 629, 672 (1968) 
(FortnR, .T., di~~mling), Jacobl'llis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 187-190 
(1964) (BnF<NNAN , J., joinrd by Goldbrr~ .. T.), Manual Entr1·pri..~l's, 
Ill('., v. Day, :370 U.S. 478,488 (Il::lrlnn, .T., joinC'd b~- R'l'E,YAnT, .T.), 
and Kingsley Pictures Co1'p. v. Regents, ::lGO U. S. 684, 695-597 
(FrankfttrtC'r , .T. , eonrurring) , 708 (Harlan, .T., joinrd b~r Frnnkfurlcr, 
.J., ::mel \VhittnkC'r, .T. , romurrin~) (1950), with lValke1' v. Ohio, 308 
U. S. 43-1: (1970) (Bunr.EH, C . .J., di~:-;cntin~). Jacobl'llis v. Ohio, 
supra, n,t 202-208 (Wnrren, C .. T., joinrd by Clark, .J., di~sC'nling), 
Uoth, 354 U. S., at 492 n. 30, and Kingsley Book~, Inr. v. Brown, 
:354 U.S. 4:36, 4~7 (1957) (BHE~KAN, .T., di~~C'ntin~). 
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at 491- 492 (Roth test). Indeed, the Court has more 
than once previously acknowledged that "constitution-
ally protected expression ... is often separated from 
obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line." Bantam 
Book, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963). See also, 
e. g., .il!?'.shkin v. New York, supra, a.t 511 (quoted p. -, 
supra). In any event, the current multitude of stand-
ards, when added to "the perhaps inherent residual 
vagueness" of each, Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 
464, 475 n. 19 (1966), c~n no longer possibly be said 
to "give ade uatc "·arning of tho conduct proscribed 
an mar\: ' ... boundanes su c1ently Istinct for .JUC ges 
and juries fairly to administer the law ..... ' " Roth, 
354 U. S., at 491. As Mr. Justice Black said "after the 
~ .............. ~ 
..a-~ .. J... ,~~.-/ 
-fourteen separate opinions handed down in [the trilogy 
of cases decided in 1966.1 no person, not even the most 
learned judge much less a layman. is capable of k11owing 
in advance of an ultim.atc clccisio11 in hi particular 
case by this Court whether certain material comes within 
the area of 'obscenity' .... " Gi11zburg v. United States, 
supm, at 480-481 (dissenting opinion). See also the 
statement of Mr. Justice Harlan in Interstate Circuit, 
Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676:7'07 (1968) (separate opin-
ion), quoted p. - , supm. The result ha.s been not 
merely to make "fb] ookselling ... a hazardous profes-
sion." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 674 (Fortas, 
J., dissenting). \Ve have also necessarily paid an in- I 
tolerable price by chilling the free dissemination of ideas 
in the area of protected expression. 
The practice of per curiam reversals, instituted in 
Redrup v. New York, supra, has only compounded the 
uncertainty of the test of obscenity by announcing no 
rationale of decision. At the same time, it has thereby 
given at lca.st the appearance of arbitarary action by 
this Court, see Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U. S. 278 (1970) 
J~7 
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(Harlan, J., dissenting), and placed a heavy toll on our 
judicial resources. 7 Most important, no less than the 
procedural schemes struck down in such cases as Blount 
v. Rizzi, 400 U. S. 410 (1971), and Freedman v. Mary-
land, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), it hR.s resulted in the effective 
censorship of protected expression by leaving lO\\·er court 
determinations of obscenity intact despite the fact the 
status of the material alleged to be obscene is entirely 
unsettled until final review here.8 It bears emphasis 
that the fundamental vice of this approach is not that 
courts are called upon to make their o"·n determinations 
of obscenity vel non, but that the st.anclard by which 
they are required to do that is left wholly ambiguous. 
Redrup, in other words, although firmly esstublishing 
the thoroughly sound requirement for de novo judicial 
review of allegedly obscene matter, see p. -, supra, 
cannot be used as a substitute for defining the test of 
obscenity itself without also unduly burdening our courts 
and, more importantly, infringing free speech. 
The inability of five members of this Cort to agree 
on a standard of obscenity and the practice, as a result, 
7 The havoc wreaked on lower courts attempting to comply with 
the covert conrlu~ions we havr rrached under our Redrup deci8ions, 
sec n. 5, supra, is vividly demonstrated by the painstaking rJTorts 
recently made by 1 he Court of Appeals for the Di~trirt of Columbia 
to establish and rationalize the kinds of materiab we haYe found not 
to be obscene. See Iluffman v. United States, No. 23,782, slip op., 
at 13-28 (decided Oct. 7, 1971). 
8 In Interstate Circuit, In c. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 690 n. 22 
( 1968) (emphasis added), the Court indicated that "[t]he assurance 
of a 'prompt final judicial deri~ion' [neces~ary to make certain that 
the censor's determination of obscenity does not become prematurely 
final] . .. is made 0 •• by the guaranty of a speedy determination 
in the trial court . 0 •• " See also Teitel F'ilm Corp. v. Cusack, 390 
U. S. 139 (1968). But "speedy determination in the trial court" 
suffices only if there is some a~surance that that judgment is prob-
ably correct. By leaving the trst of obscenity ob~cure, Redrup has 
completely undermined the basis for any such assurance. 
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of resorting to an unarticulated determination of its 
existence on a case-by-case basis arc, however, not the 
fundamental difficulty, but rather are symptomatic of 
more pervasive problems. Prophetically, Mr. Justice 
H rlan criticized the Court in Roth f2!: "[a~] that 
'o]?scenity' ~ a ~culiar genus o 'speech and pr:._ess' '~ 
is as distinct, recognizable, and classifiable as poison ivy 
is a m011_g Other plants." 354 U. S., at 497 (separate 
opinion).Anci M r. Chief Justice Warren stated in a 
related vein that obscenity is a function of the circwn-
stances of its dissemination: 
"It is not the book that is on trial; it is a person. 
The conduct of the defendant is the central issue, 
not the obscenity of a book or picture. The nature 
of the materials is, of course, relevant as an attri-
bute of the defendant's conduct, but the materials 
are thus placed in context from which they draw 
color and character." I d., at 495 (concurring opin-
ion). See also, e. g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 
184, 201 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Kingsley 
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436, 445-446 (1957) 
(dissenting opinion). 
These observations--that the obscenity of any particu-
lar item may depend upon nuances of presentation and 
the context of its dissemination-have been recognized 
by a majority of this Court, see Ginzburg v. United 
States, 383 U. S. 463 (1966), and indeed underlie and 
have been confirmed by our Redrup experience. Thus, 
for example, our cases have been deciphered to dis-
tinguish between the mere depiction of genitalia and 
even the suggestion of a semi-erect peuis, on the one 
hand, and the presentation of nude models with full 
erections, on the other. See Huffman v. United States, 
No. 23,782, slip op., at 21-22, 23-24 (CADC 1971). 
Similarly, Redrup itself suggested that obtrusive ex-
posure to unwilling individuals, distribution to juveniles, 
14 MILLER v. CALIFORNIA 
and "pandering" ma.y also bear upon the determination 
of obscenity. See 386 U. S. , at 769. These sorts of 
distinctions, needless to say, are judgmental and can 
only be applied on "a case-by-case, sight-by-sight" basis. 
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 516 (1966) (Black, 
J., disenting).u 
These considerations, of course, call into question 
whetl1er any standard of obscenity may meet the test 
of certainty ancl l ack of overbreadth required by the 
Due Process Clause ancr the First Amendment. They 
suggest indeed that no one definition, no matter how 
narrowly drawn, can possibly suffice for all situations, 
cf. the discussion of the Memoirs v. Massachusetts test, 
p. -, supra, or carve out fully unprotected expression 
from all media without also creating the substantial risk 
of encroachment upon Due Process and First Amend-
ment values. Although obscenity exists and, as it has 
been said, we "know it when [we] see it," Jacobellis 
v. Ohio, supra, at 107 (STEWART, J., concurring), words 
are evidently inadequate to describe it in advance with 
sufficient specifi"ci ty to precluae an abndgement of the 
free and precious traffic in ideas. In Roth " ·e held 
that the fact "'[t]hat there may be marginal cases in 
n Cf. Fullrr, Chnng;ing Sorirt~· Puts Tn~te to thr Test , The Nntionnl 
Observer, .Tunc 10, 19i2, n t 24: 
"Context is Rvcn}thing 
"Context is the es~cncc of e~thrtic judgment . . . . Thrrc is a 
world of differen('c bet ween Plnyboy n nd lr~~ prrtentious girly mng-
nzines on the one hnnd, and on the other, The Nude, a picture 
selection from the whole hi~tory of art, by that fine tenchrr and 
interpreter of civilization, Kennrth Clark. People may be jn~t as 
11akcd in one or the othrr, the bodies inhrrrntly just ns benutiful, 
but the context of the formrr is Yulgar, of 1he latter, esthetic. 
"The snme \Yorcls, the ~::nne actions, thnt are chenp and tawdry 
in onr book or pln~r may contribute to the sublimity, comic uni-
Yersality, or tragic power of others. For a Yiahlr theory of taste, 
context is nll. ... 
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" ·hich it is difficult to determine the side of the line 
on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient 
reason to hold the [test of obscenityl too ambiguous to 
define a criminal offense.' " 354 U. S .. at 491-492. Our 
experience since Roth, however, has demonstrated that 
the "marginal cases" arc neither the few nor the atypical. 
1 conCTude accordingly that the Constitution requires 
us not only to abandon the effort following Redrup to 
pick out obscene materials on a case-by-cas~is, but 
also to reconsider the attempt altogether under Roth 
to define a category of all sexually oriented exprc!"sion 
that may properly be subject to outright suppression by 
government. 
Last Term, in an opinon I joined, the Court noted: 
"[T]here is developing sentiment that adults 
should have complete freedom to produce, deal in, 
possess and consume whatever communicative ma-
terials may appeal to them and that the law's in-
volvement with obscenity should be limited to those 
situations where children arc involved or where it 
it necessary to prevent imposition on unwilling re-
cipients of " ·hatr\'er age. The concPpts ii1volved 
arc said to be so elusive and the laws so inherently 
unenforceable without extravagant expenditures of 
time and effort by enforcement officers and tho 
courts that basic reassessment is not only "·ise but 
essential." United States v. Reidel, 402 U. S. 351, 
357 (1971). -
The Court, nevertheless, concluded that "the task of 
restructuring the obscenity laws lies with those "·ho 
pass, repeal , and amend statutes and ordinances." Ibid. 
With all respect, I must now disassociate myself from 
that view. The law of obscenity has been fashioned by 
this Court-and necessarily so under our duty to en-
force the Constitution. If that law now offends' the 
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constitutional requirements of the Due Process Clause 
and the First Amendment, as I believe it does, the 
remedy is one this Court, expounder of the Constitu-
tion, must provide. 
III 
Since obscenity has not and cannot be defined in ad-
vance with sufficient specificity to prevent encroachment 
~ ................... .,. 
on protected sexually oriented expression, it follows that ~:-..~ .....t..e.,_ 
it may not be wholly suppressed, at least in the absence , 
1 
'' J 
of a demonstration of some 'subordinating governmental' --o -----
interest requiring that result. 10 No such interest exists. ....._ • /_ ~ .,G..Jt_ 
The Court indeed has already reached the conclusion ~~ .. 1'1-.,.,..~ 
that total suppression of obscenity is impermissible in - ' - ~  ~ 
view of the impossibility of satisfactorily defining it and ~  
the absence of countervailing considerations. In Stan- ~--- L~:.__ - ---- ... ____.....,. ...... 
ley v. Geo!£,ia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969), the Court ~'f lAA.~. 
held "that the First and Fourttenth Amendments pro-
hibit making mere private possession of obscene material 
a crime." The Court reached this result only after 
finding it irrelevant "that obscene materials . . . are 
arguably devoid of any ideological content. The line 
between the transmission of ideas and mere entertain-
ment is much too elusive for this Court to draw, if in-
deed such a line can be drawn at all." Id., at 566. The 
Court also necessarily rejected the notion that there 
is a legitimate state concern in the "control [of] the 
moral content of a person's thoughts." Id., a,t 565. 
Nor d~d the Court find any subordinating interest based 
onlJiegrow1d ''that exposure to obscene materials may 
lead to Ge'Viant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual v1o-
10 No such interest, of course, had to be shown in Roth, for it was 
there assumea- fncorrcctly, aR CXpenence has proven-that obscenity 
could be separated from other sextwlly oriented material wiLhout 
impairment of First Amendment values. See 354 U. S., at 486-487. 
See also, e. g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969). 
l:~ t/"'A.J -u-C) 
~~-~~ 
~~ 
-/-.) c. .. • , ... (l;tl .~ 
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lence." !d., at 566. The Court explained, id., at 
566-567: 
"There appears to be little empirical basis for that 
assertion.[uJ But more important, if the State is 
only concerned about printed or filmed materials 
inducing antisocial conduct, 'vc believe that in the 
context of private consumption of ideas and infor-
mn.tion we should adhere to the view that '[a]mong 
free men. the deterrents ordinarily to be applied 
to prevent crime arc education and punishment 
for violations of the Jaw . . Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U. S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring)." 
Finally, the Court found unpersuasive "the argument 
that prohibition of possession of obscene materials is a 
necessary incident to statutory schemes" serving legiti-
mate state interests. !d., at 567. "[W]e do not think," 
the Court said, tha.t those interests "would justify in-
fringement of the individual's right to read or ob-
serve . . . . Because that right is so fundamental to 
our scheme of individual liberty, its restriction may 
11 Indeed, since Stanley wns decided, the President's Commission 
o~Obsec~r an~ph:v has concluded: 
n sum, empinca re~ , rch designed to clarify the question has 
found no evidence to date that exposure to explicit sexual materials 
plays a significant role in the eausation of delinquent or criminal be-
havior among youth or adults. The Commis~ion cannot conclude 
that exposure to erotic materials i~ a faclor in the causation of sex 
crime or sex dclinquenc~'·" Report of the Commission on Obscenity 
and Pornography 27 (1970) (footnote omitted). 
To the contrary, the Commis~ion found that "[o]n the positive side, 
explicit ~cxual materials arc sought as a source of entertainment and 
information by substantial numbers of American adults. At times, 
these materials also appear to serve to increase and facilitate con-
structiYe communi ration about se:-.'Ual mat tcrs within marriage." 
/d., at 53. 
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not be justified by the need to ease the administration 
of otherwise valid criminal laws. Sec Smith v. Cali-
fornia, 361 U. S. 147 (1959)." 
The rc!::ult in Stanley also rested, of course, on othe1· 
propositions. The Court held, in particular, that there 
is a First Amendment "right to receive informa-
tion ... , regardless of [itsl social worth ... ," that 
"takes on an added dimension" in the context of an 
intrusion into the privacy of one's home. Id., at 564. 
The Court has recently disavowed the first half of this 
st!!:!:ei~ent--and, in n}i v~w, properly so.'" But the 
other holdirig'S"of Stan ley are no less true today than 
when they were first announced, and, in my judgment, 
i 
we should not shrink from the conclusion they logically 
c01n pel-namely, tf1ato6sccne materials may not be 
t'Ot'aily witiilield from public consumption with,out i.D.-
fr~1 g_emen~tec£ecr sexually ori£nted expres~n. 
'"Although Stan/ry stated that it~ result w.1~ in no way inconsiRtent I 
with Roth, sec :)94 U. S., at 56:)-564, 5()8, the contrary iR, with all 
respect, unquestionably correct. :For, if thc1·e is a "right to receive 
information ... , rrga rdiCSS Of ritR l ~oria] WOrth," the materia];:; 
~ubjrct to that right muRt of ncrc~Rity be clothed with Fir~! Amend-
ment 11rotcct ion. Sec Lamont v. Postmaste1' Gcne1'al, :381 U. S. 301, 
:307 ( 1965) (concurring opinion). A~ indii·atrd infm, however, I 
( 
a.s!!!:crr to the view thnt thrrr i~ a category of exprcs~ion ronrcrnir;g 
sex, called 11 ob~ccnity," that is wit hout social value and beyond the 
mnbit ot ihc Flr~t. AmcndmPnt,. Th:ll, 111 any event, appears lo have 
bern tho i)OS111on o(the Court la~t Term in United States v. Reidel, 
402 U. S. 351 (1971), where the 'right to receive' referred to in 
Stanley" wa~ held not to bP "so broad a~ to immunize [commercial] 
dealing;; in ob~renity ... ," id., at :~515, and Roth w:1s re-affirmed. 
Sec id., at 354, 35fi. Src nbo United States v. Thirty-Seven Photo-
graphs, 402 U.S. 363, 375-:377 (1971) (plmalit~· opinion). 
Of cour~c. for the rcn~on~ gi\·cn in the text I now di~assoeiate my-
He![ from the O]linion~ I joined in United &atcs v. Reidel and United 
States v. 'Thirty-Sct•en Photographs, S1l]J7'a. I do so, however, noL 
on the ba~i~ of any First Amt•ndmcnt, right to receive obscene ma-
terial articulated in St:wlcy, but on the altcrnati\·e reasoning of 
Stanley discussed in the text. 
~.,..... .. 
Jl.., C4A 4' ~, t 
e.~M-cllv .... ·........., 
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W c must, after all, "apply the limitations of the Con-
stitution with no fear that fredom to be intellectually 
and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate 
the social organization." West Virginia Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 641 (1943). 
IV 
Nothing in our experience since Roth, however, re- ~ 
quires that even obscene materials be considered pro-
tected expression or that govemment be constitutionally 
disabled from any regulation of obscenity. Obscenity 
laws have a lon.2i history in this country. Most of the 
States that h;iratified the Constitution by 1792 pun-
ished the related crime of blasphemy or profanity de-
spite the guarantees of free expression in their consti-
tutions, and Massachusetts expressly prohibited the 
"composing, writing, printing or publishing of any filthy, 
obscene or profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock-sermon, 
in imitation of preaching, or any other part of divine 
worship." Province Laws, 1711-1712, ch. 6, § 19. In 
1815 the first reported obscenity conviction was ob-
tained under the common law of Pennsylvania. See 
Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 S. & R. 91. A convic-
tion in Massachusetts under its common law and colo-
nial statute followed six years later. Sec Common-
wealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821). In 1821 
Vermont passed the first state law proscribing the pub-
lication or sa.Je of "lewd or obscene" material, Laws of 
Vermont, 1824, ch. XXIII, No. 1, § 23, and federal legis-
lation barring the importation of similar matter appeared 
in 1842. See Customs Law of 1842, § 28, 5 Stat. 566. 
Although the number of early obscenity laws was small 
and their enforcement exceedingly lax, the situation sig-
nificantly changed after about 1870 when Federal and 
State Governments, mainly as as a result of the efforts 
of Anthony Comstock, took an active interest in the 
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suppres;;;ion of obscenity. By the encl of the lOth o~n­
tury at least 30 States hacl some type of general pro-
hibition on the dissemination of obscene materials, and 
by the time of our decision in Rolh no State was without 
some provision on the subject. The Federal Govern-I 
ment mcauwhile had enacted no less than 20 obscenity 
laws brtwecn 1842 and 1956. Sec Roth, 354 U. S., a.t 
482-483, 485; Report of t.bc Commission on ObAccnity 
and Pomography 300-301 (1970). _,;:t-~ • 
This histroy caused us to conclude in Roth ''that II - J--~ 
th unconchhonal p11~1ng ot the Fir~ Amendment [tllat ~ W. • __ ..-
"Congress shall m.akeno law ... abridging the freedom ''t& ~'f&'CA ......... 
of speech, or of the press ... "] was not intended to ~ ~
protrct cvmy utterance." 354 U. S., at 4813. It ai'SO 
caused us to hold, as numerous prior decisions of this 
Court had assumed, see id., at 481, that obscenity could 
be denied the protection of the First Amendment and 
hence suppressed because it is a form of exprcPsion 
"utterly without redeeming social importance," 1'd., at 
484, a.s "mirrored in the universal judgment that [it] 
should be restrained .... " Id., at 485. I depart from 
these Yie"·s only insofar as is necessary to prescl'\'e con-
stitutiOnally ""i)Totectcd expressiOn. 
Our cases have i 'narkccl oUt' t"·o special govemmental 
concerns in the regulation of ob scemty-the prevention 
01 offensive exposure to unwilling individuals and dis-
semination to juvcnilcP."l These concerns cannot them-
' "Sec Rabe Y. Tra~hington , - U. S. -,- (1972) (ronrmring 
opinion); United Stott's v. Reidel, 402 U. S. 351, 360-3fl2 (1971) 
(srparnto opinion); R01ca11 Y. Post Of!ir·e De7Jt .. 397 U. R. 728 
(1970); Stanley v. Geomia, 394 U.S. 557, 5fl7 (1969); Ginsbera v. 
New ro1'k , :390 U.S. 629 (eourt opinion). fl74-G75 (di~srnting; opin-
ion) (1968); Redrup v. l':ew Yo1'k, ;)Sfl lT. S. 7fl7 , 769 (19()7); R('(l-
mond v. United Stott's, 384 U. S. 2fl4, 265 (19flfl): Ginzbma Y. 
United States. 383 F. S. 43fl (rom I opinion), 498 n. l ( diNsrnting 
opinion) (19flfl); ilfemoirs v. ilfassathusetts, 38::! U.S. 413, 421 n. 8 
(plurality opinion); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 195 (opinion 
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Rrlves justify a total suppression of obscenity with its 
conscqucn t deleterious effect on protected expression. 11 
But neither are they beyond accommodation with First 
Amcndn1cnt values. Insofar as offensive exposure is 
concerned, the definition of obscenity 1·s, as we shall 
shortly sec, susceptible to sufficient specificity to make 
any residual ambiguities tolerable so long as consenting 
persons can obtain any and all material they desire. 
Cf. Ginsberg Y. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 674-675 (1968) 
( lj"ortas, J., disenting). Moreover, the impact of even I 
those ambiguities can be ameliorated by app. ropriate pro-
cedural safeguards such as in rem proceedings against 
borderline material before any pro ecution. 1'' Cf. Jlf em-
airs Y. Massachusetts, 383 F S. 413, 458 n. 3 (1966) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
Other considerations justify restrictive regulation of 
distribution to juveniles, provided that the definition of 
ubscenity is similarly limited in this area and. enforce-
ment proceedings are hedged " ·ith the same procedural 
guaranties. \Vc have already recognized that "rtlhe 
State ... has an independent interest in the well-being 
of its youth." Ginsberg Y. 1\few York, supra, at 640, that 
may be pursued. to some extent at least, "even where 
of BHJ>NNA.l\', .T .• joinrd h~· Goldhrrg, .T.), 201 (dis~enting opinion) 
(1954). Sec nlso Report of tho Commi~~ion on Obscrnity and 
Pornogrnph:· 300-301 (1970) (focu~ of enrl~' oh~rrnity lnws on pro-
icction of youth). 
11 See, e. g. , Shelton \'. Tur·ker, 3G-l- U. 8. 479, 488 (1950): 
" rEJwn though ihr !!'Onrnmrntnl purpm:e br legitimate nnrl 8uh-
~tnntial, that pmpo~P cannot be pur~urd b~· mean~ thnt bro:ldly ~tine 
fund:unrntnl pcr~on:1l librrtirs when th<· rncl ran be more nnrrowl~· 
achieYe<l. The brrnclth of lep;i~lnt i1·e ahridgemrnt muRt be vie11·ed in 
ihc light of lr~~ dra~tic me;m~ for achir1·ing ihe ~amc bno:ir purpose." 
fkr al~o pp. ---, supra. 
Jr. See, e. g., the model derl:uatory judgment and injunction stnt-
ute n•commenc!Pcl hy the l)re~idrnt'~ Commi~~ion on Obscenity and 
Pornography ~et out in the apprnclix to this memorandum. 
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tlwrc is an invasion of [their l protected freedoms '' 
!d., at 638."' We have also recognized that, rather than 
definitively determining for itself the material harmful 
for child consumption, the State may support "the 
parents' claim to authority i11ti1'e1r own hou~eholcl to 
dir ect fh~earing of their children ... ," 1'd., at 6~0. by 
prohi5lting cTist ribution Of certain material without pa.. 
ental conse1it -Together, tl 1ese interests support the reg- ~ 
ulatwn under precisely drawn statutes of dissemination 
of obscenity to juveniles, despite their own claims to 
Fir t Amendment freedoms. Although a rasua.l link be-
tween exposure to obscenity and adverse consequences 
on the process of growing up is yet to be established. it 
is, neverthele~s, still true " 'that a casual link has not 
been disproved either.'" I d .• at 642. 1' A complete I 
prohibition on distribution to the young would not be 
defensible on this state of scientific knowledge, but cer-
Hl Cf. Ginsbrug Y. N('w 1·o1'k, 390 U. S. 629. 649-G!SO (HHlR) 
(STEWART, J., concurTin~) ("a Stntr mny prrmi~~ibly detrnninr that, 
nt lea~[. in some precisely drlinrnlecl m·eas, a child ... is not j)ORscssccl 
of that full caparily for individual choice which is thr prr~upposition 
of First Amendment gnnmntf'rs"). 
17 Sec Report of the Commi~Rion on Obscenity nnd Pornography 
56-57 (1970): "rEJxteno,:ivf' Pmpirical inve~tigationR do not indicnte 
any cnusal rf'lnt ion~ hip bet wern exposure to or u~e of explicit HOXtwl 
materials and such Rocia l or individunl Jwrms surh as crime, de-
linquency, sexual or non~f'xual deviancy, or sf'verc emot ionnl dis-
turbances. Thr ab~cncc of cmpiricnl evidence sup 1ortin such :1 I 
causnl relation~hip also a )j) 1rs to JC rx )O~ure of children to rrotic 
rna teria s. However, insu icirnt rcsearch is Jll'c~ent y avnilablo on 
tlw m eet Oll tJw expOHlii'C of chldrcn to 8exua!Jy explicit mntcrials t 0 
enable us to reach conclu~ion~ with the same de~rec of confidmcc 
as for adult rxposurc. Stron~ ethical fef'ling~ again::;t experimentally I 
exposing children to sexually explicit rna tcrials considerably reduccd 
the po~::;ibilily of gathering the neccs,.:ary data and information rc-
gnrding young persons." 
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tainly a ban on dissemination without parental consent 
"·ould be!b 
We need not and should not at this tin1e clct.ail the 
reg ~Iator schemes for the control of offensive exposure 
an l listribution tp 1e young t 1a wou pass consti-
tUtional muster. That must await concerete legislative 
attempts to deal with those problems. It is sufficient ( 
at this point for us merely to provide the broad consid-
erations that must constitutionally be brought to bear 
on their analysis. In my judgment. these considerations 
are as follows: 
18 See id., at 57: "In view of the limited amount of information 
concerning the effect~ of ~exunlly explicit material~ on children, other 
consideration~ ha ,.e a~~umed primary importance in the Commis-
sion's deliberation~. The Commi~~ion has been influenced, to a con-
Riderablc degree, b~· itB finding that a large majorti~' of Americans 
believe that children should not be exposed to certain sexual ma-
terials. In a deli tion. 1 he CommiHsion takes the view that parents 
should be free to make their own conclusion~ regarding the su itability 
of explicit Sl'Xual materailB for their children and that it is appro-
priate for legislation to aid parents in controlling the acN'SS of their 
children to such mnterials during their formative years. The Com-
mission recognizes that legi~lation cannot possibly isolate children 
from such materiab entirely; it also recognizes that exposure of 
children to sexual materials mny not only to no harm but. mny, in 
certain instanee~, actually facilitate much needed communication be-
tween parent and child oyer sexual matter~. The Commission is 
aware, as well, of the con~iclernble danger of crenting an unnatural 
attraction or enhnmed intcre~t. in certain materials by making them 
'forbidden fruit' for young person~. The Commission belie,·es, how-
ever, that these considerations ran and should be weighed by in-
dividual parents in determining their attitndrs toward the exposure 
of their children to sexual materials, and that legislation should nid, 
rather than undermine, such parental choice." The laK sustained 
in Ginsburg v. New York, it ~bo uld be stressed, sought only to sup-
port the parent's judgment in this regard; it did not attempt to 
impose an outright ban on the consumption of :my materials by 
children. Sec 390 U. S., at 369. 
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First. The definition of obscenity proscribed from -unconsented display must be as precise as words will 
allow and not include protected expression. The precise 
terms and reach of the definition in this context, how-
ever, must depend upon the circumst.ances of the un-
consented exposure at issue. As this Court indicated 
in Cohen Y. Calijo1'nia, 403 U. S. 15 (1071): 
"Of course, the mere presumed presence of unwit-
ting listeners or viewers does not serve automatically 
to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving 
offense. See, e. g., Organization for a BeLter Austin 
v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415 (1971). While this Court 
has recognized that government may properly act 
in many situations to prohibit intrusion into the 
privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas 
which cannot be tota.lly banned from the public 
dialogue, e. g., Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 
728 ( 1070), we ha vc at the same time cousistcntly I 
stressed that ',ve are often "captives" outside the 
sanctuary of the home a.nd subject to objectionable 
speech.' !d., at 738. The ability of government, 
consonant with the Constitution, to shut off dis-
course solely to protect others from hearing it is, 
in other words, dependent upon a showing that 
substantial privacy interests arc being invaded in 
an essentially intolerable manner. Any broader 
vimY of this authority would effectively empower 
a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter 
of personal predilections." 
l 
Thus, the homeowner may be accorded unreviewable dis-
cretion in insula.ting himself fron1 mailed advertisements 
for matter he deems to be obscene. Rowan v. Post 
Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728 (1070). Cf., e. g., Kovacs 
v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (Hl40). The passer-by on the 
street, on the other hand, is entitled to far less protec-
tion. "[T]hc streets are natural and proper places for 
70-n-MK\'IO (A) 
l\IILLER v. CALIFORNIA 25 
the dissemination of information and opinion " 
Schneider\'. Stale, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). Cf. P?Jb-
lic Utilities Cmmn'n Y. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451 (1952). 
At a minimum, these principles require, in practical 
application, that the definition of obscenity han·ed from 
public cli8play be restricted to pictorial or thrce-climcn-
si.Q!l_al reprcscntati~ fundar~ci1ta lfy offunsivc sexual 
acts that go beym1d the mere depiction of nudity, sec, 
Felton v. City of Pensacola, 300 U. S. 340 ( 1968); Sun-
shine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U. S. 372 (1058), 
and that arc described with particularity (for example, 
human sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, and 
so forth).'" 
Purely t xtual materials must be "·holly excluded 
ft~ t_le j efinition. nc eec, researc 1 c 1sc oses no case 
in whlch this Court has sustained a determination of 
obscenity of a book, except for M ishldn v. New Y orlc, 
383 U.S. 502 ( 1966). But even there the books at issue 
generally had "covers with drawings of scantily clad 
women being "·hipped, beaten, tortured, or abused." 
Id., at 505. This experience reflects the impossibility I 
of defining obscene language--a conclusion buttressed 
by this Court's decision only last Term in Cohen \'. 
Califomia, supra. The Court there overturned a convic-
tion for disturbance of the peace by \\'Caring in public 
a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." "[V-Ier-
bal tumult, discord, a.nd even offensive utterance," the 
Court reasoned, " ... are ... , 1\'ithin established limits, 
in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring 
values IYhich the process of open debate permits us to 
1 " Sec, e. g., § 8 (d) (i) of the modd ~tatr stntutr rccommendrd 
b~· the Prr~idrnt'~ Commi~~ion on Ob;rrnit~· nnd Pornogmphy set 
out in thr :1pprndix to thi~ mrmorandnm. Under this nppro:wh, it 
~houlcl br nolrcl, tbrrr is no nrrd for the Roth requirement that 
matrrial~ br "tnkrn a~ a wholr," 354 U.S., nt 4S9, in thr eynltwtion 
of thrir obscrnit~·. Rabc v. Washington, - U. S. -, - n. 2 
(1972) ( eoncurring opinion). 
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achieve." 403 U. S .. at 24-25. More particularly, the 
Court held that distinction<>. a.ccording to the offensive-
JJess of 'vorcls are "inherently boundless." ld., at 25. 
"For, while the particular four-letter word being 
litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most 
others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that 
one man's vulgarity is another's lyric. Indcccl, we 
think it is largely because governmental officials 
cannot make principled distinctions in this area, 
that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and 
style so largely to the individual." Ibid. 
Accordingly, the Court rcfmcd to "indulge the facile 
assumption that one can forbid particular words without 
also running a substantial risk of "'Upprcssing ideas in 
the process." ld., at 26. 20 
Cohen, of course, was not an obs.Q.cnit~ caf e, sec id., 
at 2'o,""nor did the statute undc1:;--which the prosecution 
was brought reflect a specialized concern for the "plight 
of the captive auditor." I d., at 22. The reasoning of 
that decision is, neverthelcs, fully apposite here. The 
im )0Ssibilit of "wincipled distinctions" in the area 
of offensive utterance 1s m no wa w 1en the 
20 The Court also observed, 403 U.S., at 26: 
"[M]uch linguistic cxprc~~ion ~rrves a dual communicative func-
tion: it convrys not only idras cnpnble of rebtivdy precisr, drtached 
explication, but o1 hcrwise inexpressible rmot ions as wrll. In fact, 
words arr oft rn chosen a~ much for 1 hrir emoti\'C' as their cognitiYc 
force. We ennnot sanction the view thnt the Con~titution, while 
solicitious of thr cognitiw content of individunl speceh, has little or 
rd~lummoly!N rirriiioitn: noml io 
no regard for that rmoti1·e function whch, practically speaking, may 
often be the more important clement of the ovrrall mess:1gc sought 
to be communicated." 
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even m the con text of a statute limited to the pre-
vention of public exposure to obscene matter the risk 
of abridgement to the communication of offensive ideas, 
wholly protected by the Constitution, see e. g., Kings-
ley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684 (1959), far 
outwe.ighs the inconvenience and annoyance from the 
display of "obscene" literature. "1 Words. as we all know, 
are the foremost medium of ideas. Conversely, the of-
fensiveness of exposure to "obscene" books is, to a sig-
Ilificant extent, within the control of the beholder. 
Unlike pictorial or three-dimensional depictions of sexual 
acts, 'vritten descriptions may bring offense only gradu-
ally as the viewer chooFes to continue reading. 
Second. Similar considerations obtain in the case of 
the-rcgtilation of distribution of obscene materials to 
juveniles. It is, of course, no "answer to an argument 
that a particular regulation of expression is vague to 
say that it was adopted for thC' salutary purpose of 
protecting children. The permissible extent of vague-
ness is not directly proportional to, or a function of, 
21 Rre Rrport of the Commi~~ion on ObRrenity and Pornography 
GO-fil (1970): "The moclrl sbte stntutr rrcommcnclcd by the Com-
mis~ion (which would al~o br suitable for rnnrtmrnt in appropriate 
instancr~ by lora! government unit~ and by thr frderal government 
for area~ whrrr it haR general lrgislative juri~dirtion) prohibits the 
display of certain potentially offrnsi,·r srxnally explicit pictorial 
material~ in places easily visible I' rom public t borough fares or the 
property of others. Vrrbal material8 arr not included within the 
rerommenclrd prohibition. There apprars to be no satisfactory way 
to define 'ofTrnsive' worchi in lcgislativr in order to make the param-
eter~ of prohibition upon their cli~pla)· both clrar and suJiiciently 
limited so as not to encbngrr the communication of me.:;sag;rs of 
serious social comrrn. In addition, thr fact thnt thNe are few, if 
any, 'dirty' words whirh do not already apprar fairly oftrn in con-
ver~ation among man~· Amcri<"ans nnd in mmc ,·rry widely di~tributecl 
book~ and filmH indicntr~ that suc·h word~ arc no longer capable of 
cmiHing t hr very high clegrrr of ofTen~e to a large number of persons 
whirh would justify ~uch legi~lative interference." 
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the extent of the power to regulate or control expression 
with respect to children." Inter-Stale Circuit, Inc. v. 
Dallas, 390 U. S. 67G, 689 ( 1968) . Sec also Rabeck v. 
New Yorl-c, 391 U. S. 462 (1968). This is so in part 
because "[t]he vices [of vaguenessl-the lack of guid-
ance to those who seek to adjust their conduct and to 
those who seck to administer the law, as vvell as the 
posf'lible practical curtailing of the effectiveness of ju-
dicial review-are the same," whether the regulation is 
directed at the protection of children or adults. Inter-
state Ci1·cuit, Inc. v. Dalla.s, supra, at 689-690. It is 
also so because the young as well as the old have First 
Amendment rights, sec Wisconsin v. Yoder, - U. S. 
-, - (dissenting opinion); Rowan v. Post Office 
Dept., 397 U. S. 728, 741 (1970) (concurring opinion); 
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), 
even if these arc subject, to some degree, to qualification 
by government. See p. -, supra. 
As a result, the same rca~ns that COlQpel the funita-
tions described above on the definition of obscenity p ro-
I1i5itcd from public disl?lay also dictate equivalent ;;= 
sti~"ction;-r;:;-;5sccnity 1~·s for .jl.tveiuTes. Here. again, 
tlic definition must f~ 071 pictcm al or thre('-dillwn-
sional representations of fundamentally offC'nSi\·e eexnal 
acts that extend beyond the mere dipiction of nudity 
and that arc defined with particularity.~" Purely textual 
materials must be exclucl0cl. The impossibility of suf-
ficicntspecificit~ anydcfinition beyond theE=e limita-
"~There i~, hmYrYrr, onr importnnt difTcrcnrc. Unlike thr raRe 
of obscenity pro~rribed from 11ublir diRpl:l)', ~ce n. 19, SU]J?"a, the 
dcflnition hrrc muR( proYidr thnt thc mntcrinl :dlcgcd to bc obRcene 
be judged :tli a wholc. A it hough this, of rour::;P, adds n mcnRurc of 
nnrertninty to thr definition, there nppcnn; to be no other wny to 
bc no othrr wny to nN,.;ure thnt the yonng nrc not dcnird nccc~s to 
socinlly valunblc mnteriak Sec, e. g., § 2 (d) (ii) of thc model 
~tate statutP reromnwndecl by the Prc~idrnt'~ Commission on Ob-
srrnity and Porr10grar1hy sct out in the :q1pcndix to this mcmornndum. 
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tions is a fact our current information on the effects of 
exposure to erotic material cannot just;ify brushing aside.2 " 
v 
In sum, I believe it is time for us to let the Nation 
know that the First and Fourteenth Amendments pro-
hibit federal and stat~es1gnea "·holly to s1tppress 
o~ancT" sanction only laws preciseiY drawn _!:o 
control its diss0mination through safeguards agaii1st of-
fensive expot:ur<' to unwiJJing individuals and distribution 
to children without parental consent. Under these laws 
govemment could prohibit pornograplwrs from puffing 
fundamentally offensive pictorial or three-dimensional 
depictions of sexual acts beyond offering "adult mate-
rials" and prohibit their sending samples except upon 
request. They could also require the bookseller or maga-
zine !'tand to enclo~e such materials out of sight of cus-
~:l Srr n rport of t hr Commi~'ion on Obscrnit)' and Pornography 
58 (1070): 
"The Commi~~ion brlir,·r~ that on!)· pictorial material ~hould fall 
within prohibition" upon ~air or commercial diRplay to young per-
~onR. An attrmpt to definr prohibited t!'xtual materi[!Js for young 
prr~on~ with thr Rmnr degree of sprrifirity ns pietori<il materials 
\roulcl, thr Commi"~ion belirl'r~. not hr nch·iRnblr. Many worthwhile 
textual \rorks, containing eonsiderable Yalue for roung pcr"ons, trent 
sex in an explicit manner and arc pre~ently available to young per-
sons. There npprtm< to be no sat is factory way to distinguish, 
1 hrough n workable legal definition, bel wrrn 1 hrsr works and those 
which lll:l)' be deemed inappropri;~tr by ~ome prr~on~ for com-
mercial diRtribntion to young prr~on~. AR a result, thr inclusion of 
textu<il matcrinl within jiii'CJJile lrp;i~lali1·c prohibitions would poRe 
ron~idcrnble ri~k;; for denier~ and cli~lributors in determining what 
hook" might lrgall)' br sold or di~pl<i)'ed to young J1C'l'Rons and would 
thus inhibit the entire distribution of verbal mntcrinls by thme 
denier~ who do not wish 1o cxpo~r themsclvc~ to such risks. Th!' 
"pcculatiYe risk of h3nn to ju1·eniles from ~omr tcxtu3l material 
doe~ not justify t he~e dangrr~. The Commis::;ion bclic,·es, in addi-
tion, that pareJJial concern o1·er the material rommcrcailly m·ail::tblc· 
to children most oftrn apj)]irs to piC'torial matter." 
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tamers in an area prominently labeled "adult materials" 
where only those wanting to do so would be admitted. 
The motion picture exhibitor could be similarly required 
to limit his advertising and admission practices. 
The approach I have outlined does not guarantee a 
solution to what Mr. Justice Harlan called "the intr::lCt-
ablc obscenity problem." Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dal-
las, 390 U. S. 676, 704 (1968) (separate opinion). See 
also Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413,456 (1966) 
(dissenting opinion). It does, however, frankly admit 
that our current doctrines and practices have not ·worked 
and docs seek to accommodate the various interests and 
values that experience has shown to pervade this area 
of the law. I believe that this accommodation may 
bring the stability to our law that we have sought and 
110t achieved-and, furthermore, may do so with mini-
~ 
mal hazards to protected ex12rcssion . If cxpcncnce 
l);ove"S the contiiry, the questi~n can agam be 
re-examined. 
APPENDIX* 
Drafts of Proposed Leoislat.ion 
A. RECOMMENDED FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
REPEAL OF EXISTING LAWS 
The following federal statutes prohibiting the con-
sensual distribution of "obscene" material to adults are 
hereby repealed: 18 United Stntes Code, Sections 1461, 
1462, 1464, 1465; 19 United States Code, Section 1305; 
39 United States Code, Section 3006. 
B. RECOMMENDED STATE LEGISLATION 
SECTION 1. REPEAL OF EXISTING LAWS 
The following statutes prohibiting the distribution of 
obscene material to adults are hereby repealed: 
[Cite appropriate state statutes.] 
SECTION 2. SALE AND DISPLAY OF EXPLICIT 
SEXUAL MATERIAL TO YOUNG PERSONS 
(a) Purpose.-It is the purpose of this section to regu-
late the direct commercial distribution of certain cxphmt 
sexual materials t~young persons iii order to aiel parents 
in supervising and controlling the access of children to 
such material. The legislature finds that whatever social 
value such material may have for young persons can 
adequately be served by its availability to young per-
sons through their parents. 
(b) Offenses Defined.-A person is guilty of a mis-
demeanor if he 
(i) kno\Yingly disseminates explicit sexual material, 
as hereinatfer defined, to young persons or 
-::·Report of the Commi~~ion on Obscenity and Pornography 65-69 
(1970) (fooLnotes omitted). 
31 
70-73-MEMO (A) 
32 MILLER v. CALIFORNIA 
(ii) if ho knowingly @splays explicit sexual ma-
terial for sale in an area to which young persons have 
access, unless such material has artistic, literary, his-
torical, scien tific, medical, educat wna.l or ci"ti'1er similar 
s~J valliCl();· acl ~ 
-rcf Penalty.-Whoever violates the provisions of this 
section shall be liable to !)eft to state option]. 
(d) Definitions.-For the purposes of this section: 
( i) "Young person" means any person Joss than 
years of age; 
(ii) "Explicit sexual material" means any pictorial 
or three dimensional material including, but not lim-
ited to, books, magazines, films, photographs and statu-
ary, which is made up in whole or in domi11ant part 
of depictions of human sexual intercourse, masturba-
tion, sodomy ( i. e., bestiality or oral or anal intercourse), 
direct physical stimulation of unclothed genitals, or 
flagellation or torture in the context of a sexual rela-
tionship, or which emphasizes the depiction of uncov-
en~d adult human genitals; provided however, that works 
of art or of anthropological significance shall not be 
deemed to be within the foregoing definition. 
(iii) "Disseminate" means to sell, lease or exhibit 
commercially and , in tho case of an exhibition, to sell 
an admission ticket or pass, or to admit persons who 
have bought such a ticket or pass to tho premises whereon 
an exhibition is presented. 
(iv) "Display for sale" in an area to which young 
persons have access means display of material for sale 
so that young persons may see portions of the material 
constituting explicit sexual pictoria.l material. 
( v) An offense is committed "knowingly" only if 
(A) the defendant knew that the recipient of material 
was a young person, as herein defined, or had grounds 
to believe it probable that the recipient was a young 
person as herein defined and failed to make reasonable 
... 
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mqumes to determine the age of the recipient; alld if 
(B) (1) the defendant was aware of contents of t.hc 
material clearly within tho definition of explicit sexual 
material contained in part (ii) of this subsection, or 
(2) hacl reason to know that the contents of the material 
wore likely to fall within the definition of explicit sexual 
material and failed to examine the material to ascertain 
its con tell ts. 
(e) Dofenses.- It shall be an affirmative defense to 
a prosecution under this section for the defendant to 
show: 
(i) That the dissemination was ml!de with the fOn-
sent of a parent or guardian of the recipient, that the 
dclenclant was misled as to tho · existence of parental 
consent by a misrepresentation of parental status, or 
that the dissemination was made to the recipient by his 
teacher or clergyman in the discharge of official 
responsibilities; 
(ii) That the recipient was married, or that the 
defendant was misled in this regard by a misrepresenta-
tion of marital status. 
(f) Exemption for Broadcasts.-The prohibition of 
this section shall not apply to broadcasts or telecasts 
through facilities licensed under the Federal Communica-
tions Act, 47 U. S. C. Section 301 et seq. 
(g) Limitation Upon Effective Period of Legislation.-
This Act shall be effective for six years from the date 
of enactment and shall becorne 11u1l and void thereafter 
unless reenacted. 
SECTION 3. PUBLIC DISPLAYS OF EXPLICIT 
SEXUAL MATERIALS 
(a) Purposo.-J t is the purpose of this section to 
prohibit the"w n' public display of certain explicit sexual 
mater1:;J.s, in order to prot,oct })ersons from potential 
o'ffens e thwugh "ill.voluntar:i exposure to such materia.ls. 
(b) Offense Defined.-A person is guilty of a mis-
70-73-MEMO (A) 
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dem.eanor if he knowingly places explicit sexual material 
upon public display, or if he knowingly fails to take 
prompt action to remove such a display from property 
in his possession after lea.rning of its existence. 
(c) Penalty.-Whoever violates the provisions of this 
section shall be liable to fleft to state option l. 
(d) Definitions.-For the purposes of this section: 
(i) "Explicit sexual material" means any pictorial 
or three-dimensional material depicting human sexual 
intercourse, rnasturbation, sodomy ( i. e., bestiality or 
oral or anal intercourse), direct physical stimulation of 
unclothed genitals, flagellation or torture }";; the cont~t 
of a sexual re!a1ionship, or emphasizing the depiction of 
adult human genitals; provided, however, that works of 
art or of anthropological significance shaH not be deemed 
to be within the foregoing definition. In determining 
whether material is prohibited for public display by this 
section such material shall be judged \vithout regard 
to any covering which may be affixed or printed over 
the material in order to obscure genital areas in a depic-
tion otherwise falling within the definition of this 
subsection. 
(ii) Material is placed upon "public display" if it 
placed by the defendant on or in a billboard, viewing 
screen, theater marquee, newsstand, display rack, win-
dow, showcase, display case or similar place so that 
matter bringing it within the definition of subparagraph 
(i) of this subsection ~ easily visible from a pubjjc 
thorouo-hfare or from the ro ert of others. 
e Exception for Broadcasts.-The prohibition of this 
sect.ion shall not apply to broadcasts or telecasts through 
facilities licensed under the Federal Communications 
Act, 47 U. S. C. Seccion 301 et seq. 
(f) Limitation Upon Effective Period of Legislation.-






MILLER v. CALIFORNIA 35 
of enactment and shall become null and void thereafter 
unless reenacted. 
C. MODEL DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND 
INJUNCTION STATUTE 
(a) Creation of Remerly.-Whenever material is be-
ing or is about to be disseminated in violation of [insert 
citation to applicable legal prohibition or prohibitions], 
a civil action may be instituted by the State against any 
disseminator or disseminators of the material in order 
to obtain a declaration that tho dissemination of such 
material is prohibited. Such an action may also seek an 
injunction appropriately restraining dissemination. 
Such !lct.ion may be initiated by any county prosecutor 
[or other prosecuting official authorized to represent the 
State in criminal proceedings]. 
(b) Venue.-Such an action may be brought only in 
the Court of the county in which any disseminator re-
sides, or which the dissemination is taking place or is 
about to take place. 
(c) Partios.-Any disseminator of or person who is 
about to be a disseminator of the material involved may 
intervene as of right as a party defendant in the pro-
ceedings. In addition to the named defendant, tho 
Attorney General shall undertake to give notice, to the 
producer, manufacturer or importer of the material, and 
the wholesale distributor (if a.ny), that they may exer-
cise this right. 
(d) Procedure.-[The court of initial jurisdiction] 
shall give expedited consideration to actions brought pur-
suant to this section. A hearing shall be held within 
days of the filing of htc complaints and final judgment 
da.ys of the filing of the complaints and final judg-
ment rendered within days of the terminatio11 of the 
hearing. Appeal from the decision of the [court of ini-
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tial juriscl.iction] lies only to the [highest court of the 
jurisdictionJ. A notice of appeal shall be filed \\·ithin 
days of the final judgment of the [court of initial 
jurisdiction] and the [highest court l shall hear and con-
sider the appeal within days of the filing of a notice 
of appeal and shall render final decision within clays 
after hearing the appeal. A declaration in an action 
brought pursuant to this section shall not be deemed 
final for any purpose until the final decision of the 
[highest court] is rendered or until the time to file a 
notice of a.ppcal from the decision of the r court of initial 
jurisdiction] has expired. No restraining order or in-
.i unction of any kind shall be issued restraining the dis-
semination of any work on the ground of its obscenity 
prior to the completion of the adversary hearing required 
by this subsection. 
Any defendant may assert a right to the trial of the 
issue of obscenity by jury in aet.ions brought purt:uant 
to this section. 
(e) Usc of Declaration.- A final declaration obtained 
pursuant to this section may be used to establif:'h scienter 
or to form the basis for an injunction and for no other 
purposes. The Attorney General may undertake to no-
tify any person of final judgment pursuant to this sec-
tion as a. means of affording such person actual notice 
of that judgment, but such notice shall not have effect 
in establishing scienter if the person to ·whom it is com-
municated was knom1 to the Att.orney Genern.l as a 
producer. manufacturer, importer or "·holesale distribu-
tor of the material involved and was not given notice 
of his right to intervene pur:::uant to subl:'ection (c) of 
this section. 
(f) Definitions.-For purposes of this section: 
(i) "Disseminate" means to sell, lease, or exhibit 
commercially 
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(ii) "Disseminator" means any person who imports, 
produces, manufactures or engages in wholesale dsitri-
bution of any material intended to be disseminated, or 
any person who disseminates any material. 
(g) Inconsistent La·ws Superceded.-All laws regulat-
ing the procedure for obtaining declaratory judgments or 
injunctions which are inconsistent with the provisions 
of this section shall be inapplicable to proceedings 
brought pursuant to this section. 
(h) Prosecution Policy.-From and after the enact-
ment of this Act criminal prosecutions shall be brought 
prior to the obtaining of a declaration under this Act 
only in cases of material which is unquestionably within 
the applicable definitional provisions. In all other cases, 
the provisions of this Act sha.ll be used prior to prosecu-
tion, which shall not be based upon conduct engaged in 
before notice of a declaration obtained pursuant to this 
Act. Prosecutions brought contrary to this subsection 
shall be dismissed by the trial court; the trial court's 
decision in this regard shall not be reviewable in appeaL 
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Question. '~f .ObscefdtJ-· 
·.' 
By Nancy Poland 
Special to The Washington Post 
Francis Aungier Paken-
ham, seventh Earl of Long-
ford, is a peer of the realm. 
He was Leader of the House 
of Lords from 1964-68; First 
Lord of the · Admiralty in 
1951; Minister of Civil Avia-
tion under Clement Atlee; 
Secretary of State for the 
Colonies under Harold Wil-
son; Lord-in-Waiting to King 
George VI. 
He is the only man in 
England, now living, who is 
a double peer, a peer both 
by right of descent and in 
recognition of outstanding 
public service. He is a 
descendant of the wife of 
the Duke of Wellington. His 
wife is Lady Elizabeth Long-
ford and his eldest daughter 
is Lady Antonia Fraser, two 
of England's best (and best 
selling) historians. He is the 
author of seven books, in-
cluding a definitive study 
of Ireland called "Peace by 
Ordeal." 
And 1 he is one of 25 
knights of the Order of the 
Garter, founded 1348, whose 
motto is "Evil to him who 
evil thinks." 
Lord Longford, tall and 
patrician,, strides into the 
grill room of the Coonaught 
Hotel in London, looking 
all these things. To the head 
waiter's "M'Lord?" he re-
plies,_ · "Matti~i," gives an 
abso1utely dis11rming smile, 
and settles back to talk 
about pornography. 
Pornography has made 
him a popular public figure 
in England. 
And not so popular. 
He is chairman of an un-
INSIDE 
• Perkins H a r n l y makes 
$50 a week as a cafeteria 
worker. Bnt he expects to 
make $800 to $500 on each 
of his watercolors, which 
he paints after work. Story, 
Pap,e F3. 
• Tl7 olf Trap Fa r m Park 
"is one of the loveliest set· 
ting.~ for entertainment in 
the world," writes critic 
Paul Hume. Tl7 olf Trap's 
second season opens Fri· 
day. Story Page F4. 
Official Study Group on, Por-
nography. The study was in-
spired by ''0! 'Calcutta!" 
Longford saw the sex revue, 
and walked out, reSolved to 
· look at the . "whole question 
of obscenity/' The group will 
issue its report to t'he na-
tion in September. 
Besides provoking indigna-
tion, which doesn't surprise 
him in the least, the study 
has also made him a pop 
hero, which delights him. 
"To be known so well is 
stimulating, at my time of 
life," he admits. "It is stimu-
lating to make contact with 
people: One doesn't make 
contact in the House of 
Lords." 
One of the contacts he 
cheri!ihes is a 12-year-old boy 
who recognized him from 
pictures: "Oh, you're the 
chap who wants to stop the 
strip clubs!" Then there was 
the taxi driver who, outside 
the Connaught, s pot t e d 
Longford and called: "I'll 
take you! Maybe I'll get a 
dirty book?" 
Lord Longford is aware of 
the delicacy of his position. 
"There is a strong feeling in 
England that things have 
See LONGFORD, F6, Col. 1 
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Lord Longford: Taking a Look ~t Obscenity 
LONGFORD, From Fl 
gone too far, and there is 
just as strong a feeling 
against interference. But 
porn~graphy is a subject 
,that people want discussed." 
He is not simplistic. He is 
the first to admit that any 
public inquiry into pornog-
raphy, even defining the 
term, "creates mosrt difficult 
questions." The greater the 
debate, "the wider the im-
pact.'' 
"Some people would say 
I have done positive harm 
by arousing all this interest 
in pornography.' I don't ac-
cept that view myself be-
cause in the nature of 
things, if you are going to 
attack an evil you have to 
refer to it and describe it. 
People- have to know the 
battle's on. But it can be 
argUed that all this talk 
about pornography has put 
it in people's minds." 
The English pr,ess has co-
operated. The porn commis-
sion is high on publicity. It 
ranks second to Northern 
Ireland in notoriety. Last 
fall it went to Denmark to 
study obscenity in a country 
which no longer exercises 
control of any kind. Long-
ford led and the press chap-
eroned. There were pictures 
in London papers of nude 
gir~s in sex clubs. But the 
pil!ture that aroused indigna-
tion was one of Longford 
and a shapely girl member 
of the group returning 
through customs with stacks 
of erotic books and maga-
t:ines (for research). 
"' Lord Longford is no arche-
type reactionary reformer. 
f. former Oxford don, he 
lunches at the Playboy Club 
I.n London and speaks from 
the pulpit of Coventry Ca-
thedral. He calls himself "a 
fellow-traveling member of 
Women's Lib." 
At Coventry, he declared 
himself for the permissive 
society when it meant a 
"more humane approach to 
the outcasts of society, such 
l!.s unmarried mothers, drug 
.addicts, and prisoners." 
But when a state encour-
aged sexual promiscuity, 
~indulgence, the abroga-
• of moral principals, 
'~e was "utterly and un-
'ngly against it." 
\ Longford is a prac-
...-Jlitican. "We really 
.... st convince the nation 
BY Fay Godwin 
Lord Longford 
that we do care for human 
liberty at least as intensely 
as the most ardent human' 
ist," he says in response to 
critics who accuse his study 
group of seeking to limit 
freedom of expression. 
He left his post as Leader 
of the House of Lords in the 
last Labor government to 
oppose the Abortion Act. He 
still is defending his posi-
tion. Opponents of abortion 
are a minority like Jews or 
Catholics or Irish National-
ists, he argues, and minori-
ties need leaders. 
He does not call pornogra-
phy a minority issue in Bri-
tian, nor himself its "suita-
ble" leader. 
"Whoever became a 
leader on that subject would 
be corrupted, he says 
quickly, not in the sense of 
acquiring a taste for pornog-
raphy. I mean, it would be-
difficult to give a lead with-
Ol,lt becoming self-right-
eous.'' 
"To go around pronounc-
ing evil and smut and filth, 
I think would turn one into 
the most dreadful prig, 
really. The spiritual danger 
of that kind of campaign 
would be shattering. But in 
terms of leadership, what 
really matters is the atti-
tude of the young.'' 
There are young people 
on the commission, and such 
disparate older members as 
pop singer Cliff Richard and 
DaVlid Holbrook one of 
England's leading human-
ists and scholars. 
Recommendations await 
the commission's report, but 
Lord Longford offers some. 
Sensitive to the politician's 
art of the possible, he feels 
there would be "great resist-
ance to the re-establishment 
of a censorship board in 
England and so I doubt we 
would recommend one. An 
idea to put forward is 
a strengthening of the law to 
prosecute offenders, a law 
to serve as a "restraint, with 
offenders being tried before 
a judge and jury." 
Does he really think thl:! 
public would support such 
restraints? Lord Longford 
surveys the Connaught 
Hotel scene, almost a cari-
cature of proped respectabil-
ity, and says slyly, "I think 
we'd get a good verdict 
here; that gentleman there? 
And his lady, certainly." 
In Soho and such places, 
where the porn shops flour-
ish, there might be "heavy 
financial penalties" for porn _ 
brokers. Publishers and 
producers he thinks would 
be less likely to purvey porn 
if public opinion discour-
agead them. 
The commission's report 
will include a section on vio-
lence. Recently The London 
Sunday Mirror ran a series 
attacking violence in . the 
arts; recently three films-
"Straw Dogs," "The Devils," 
and "A Clockwork Orange" 
-were banned by local au-
thorities from theaters out-
side London. 
Longford recognizes the 
strange dichotomy in publdc 
thinking here. "Violence is 
not condoned but sex is: but 
when people begin to ques-
tion violence in the arts 
they begin then to question 
all around. They are, I 
think, beginning to question 
whether absolute freedom is 
a complete right." 
But isn't obscenity rela-
tive and does not the whole 
argument against restriction 
turn on this point? Fashions 
change: would Oscar Wilde 
\ go to prison today, or would 
any decent society ban 
"Lady Chatterley's Lover"? 
Can any law fairly reflect 
changing attitudes: what we 
now condone we con· 
demned? 
As a ca,se in point, I 
showed Longford a Wash-
ington Post editorial on the 
imprisonment of Ralph 
Ginzburg. Ginzburg went to 
jail recently for prurient 
material he mailed in 1962. 
Longford insists there 
must be, through the law, 
and a strong law if possible, 
a "constant" from which a 
jury may decide any individ-
ual case brought before it. 
He thinks the "relativity" 
of public opinion is not a 
valid argument. "It is a very 
difficult question: one has 
to face this fact that stand-
ards change. Standards do 
depend on public opinion. 
But 1! you have any decision 
of law, so the jury is the ul-
timate voice. Juries, in their 
opinion, also change and 
thus there. is not absolute 
justice. The opinion may 
change, but changing opin-
ion cannot impinge upon 
justice. The opinion of the 
time is in the jury. Justice 
may be fallible. However, 
opinion does express itself 
to the times through the 
jury." 
Lord Longford is chair-
man of Sidgwick and Jack-
son, publishers. He has an 
office near the British Mu-
seum. There are no eleva-
tors there, you walk up to 
see the chairman. His office 
isn't plush. It has bare white 
walls and a not-new red car-
pet and a loudly ticking 
clock. There are books and 
pictures of his wife and a 
bottle of sherry, but other-
wise the office is so austere 
it is monastic. 
On his desk, on the day I 
was there, was a most 'unu-
sual letter. The ietter was 
from "Her Majesty's Prison, 
Albany, Newport, Isle of 
Wight." It was eight care-
fully written pages. It began 
"Dear Frank" and was 
signed "Ian Brady." 
Brady kidnapped two chil-
dren, tortured them, and 
carved up their bodies. Lord 
Longford is the founder and 
president of "The New 
Bridge," a society which 
helps prisoners. Ian Brady 
and Myra Hindley 1 his ac-
complice, are two he helps. 
He has asked the Ministry 
of Health to transfer Brady 
to a prison where he can 
receive mental care, but the 
request has been refused. 
''Brady is an extraordi-
nary chap," Longford says. 
"He is a strange, solitary 
character who likes being 
alone and reading. He's for-
ever reading Tolstoy and 
Dostoevski." 
Prisoners in England, 
Longford says, are no longer 
victimized: "they are forgot-
ten." ' 
Longford's concern is a 
Christian commitment to 
the "outcasts" of society. 
But there is something 
more, and he is honest 
about it. "There is excite-
ment, novelty, c~riosity in 
knowing the unknown." 
When LongfO~ religned 
from the Cabinet in 1968 
when the Labor Govern-
ment postponed a bill rais-
ing the school-leaving age 
from 15 to 16, he opened a 
place in Soho for young 
drifters. He had no training 
in social work and his 
friends thought he was mad. 
The office was so small ne 
and his secretary couldn't 
both get into it at the same 
time. They helped about 60 
young people that first year. 
Last year 1,300 men and 
women between the ages of 
15 and 25 came to New Hori-
zon Center. The common de-
nominator is need. Many are 
"drug disturbed." New Hori-
zon now has a staff of 10 
paid workers and is housed 
in a derelict orphanage just 
off Drury Lane. 
John Profumo is on the 
board of directors. Profumo 
was the Tory Cabinet Minis-
ter involved in the Cliveden 
scandals which embarrassed 
H a r o 1 d Macmillian and 
made Christine Keeler fa-
mous. Profumo's life style 
was the reverse of Long-
ford's. 
But, says John Snow, the 
24-year-old coordinator at 
New Horizon, "Longford in 
fact went out of his way to 
bring Profumo into social 
work and here to New Hori-
zon." 
Frank Longford is hard to 
pin down. He was a Conserv-
ative who, at Oxford at age 
30, when intellectuals were 
going Marxist, became a So-
cialist. Four years later he 
became a Roman Catholic. 
In 1939 he enlisted in the 
Territorial Army as a pri-
vate. When War was de- r 
clared, he had a nervous 
breakdown. 
"It has enabled me to un-
derstand the outcasts and 
the afflicted. When I've 
been absolutely unequal to 
a situation of stress or dis-
tress, I have been l;llade 
equal to it by this experi-
ence of having, myself, been 
one of the afflicted." 
The Longford family is 
known as the "publishing 
Pakenhams." Three years 
ago Lady Longford wrote a 
life of the Duke of Welling-
ton; Lady Antonia Fraser 
wrote "Mary Queen of 
Scots;" a son, Thomas, wrote 
"The Year of Liberty" about 
Ireland; Lady Rachel Bil-
lington, another daughter, 
published a novel. That year 
Lord Longford brought out 
a little volume of philosophy 
and theology called "Humil-
ity." 
J4,-. 
Memorandum to the file 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Bill Brennan 
Obscenity Cases 
(Notes on Court Conference) 
October 24, 1972 
Our problem differs from England as we have the First 
Amendment. 
Roth established that obscenity is not protected by the 
First Amendment. It also established that all erotic expression 
has protection unless it is obscene 0 Finally, whether expression 
is obscene is a constitutional question which we cannot delegate 
to juries. (Bill cites John Harlan and also Bill says Redrupt 
so held unanimously 0 ) 
have 
Since Roth, there kxx never been five votes in accord as 
to what the definition means. 
This has resulted in two problems: (i) vagueness for 
parties, and (ii) institutional uncertainty on part of law enforce-
ment and legislature. 
Stanley departs from Roth 0 Its principle is contrary to 
Reidel and 37 Photographs: Bill, who joined these two cases, 
now would overrule them. 
• 
-2-
Bill now thinks state may control erotic material rather 
than suppress it. This control may be rational state action if it 
applies only to minors and non-assenting adults. 
'J(~.M.~c. .. :l&/ ~ Bill would redefine in specific terms - e.g., de scrip-
· tion of proscribed material (e.g., actual or simulated intercourse). 
He referred to Oregon statute. 
aez:.~ ,.:_.; Bill would allow states or Congress to proscribe obscene 
~~ 
 ~ live shows even for adults. This is conduct - a view shared by 
J-t4-«••'-4-u~. Douglas. But Bill distinguishes motion pictures from live shows -
arguing that a movie is "expression" not conduct. 
As to minors, Bill has modified views expressed in his 
memo. He now likes Harlan's dissent in Jacabellais which suggests 
"standards" Bill would now accept as to minors. This would en-
able this Court to review only the standards and not the particular 
expression. 
(But how does this position square with Bill's view that 
we cannot delegate to anyone the responsibility of de-
termining what is obscene 7) 
Would not require expert testimony. 
-3-
Potter Stewart 
Would draw no distinction between live shows and 
movies. 
Cases before us all involve ::Fburteenth Amendment state 
action. It is settled that First Amendment has been incorporated. 
Two of the cases next week involve Federal statutes. Harlan 
and Jackson thought that in obscenity cases the First Amendment 
was not adopted in its entirety. Potter thinks we would have to 
overrule long line of cases to accept Harlan's view. 
States may regulate and protect minors. 
States also may protect unwilling public from what may 
be an' assault" on their sensibilities. 
Byron White 
Thinks we have over-emphasized the obscenity issue. 
If in legislature, he might eliminate most obscenity 
laws. But as judges, we must decide whether all state and Federal 
obscenity statutes are invalid. 
Specific definition - of acts (intercourse) - of hard core 
would help. 
-4-
There should be national standards for definitional 
purposes - but allow juries to apply community standards within 
the definitional standards. 
In general would adhere to Roth. 
Would not overrule Roth but would redefine obscenity 
in terms of specifics. 
Would make no distinction between adults and minors 
or consenting and non-consenting. If definition is sufficiently 
explicit - even narrower than Oregon statute - he would allow 
states to regulate as to everyone. 
* * * * 
have 
There kxx never been five votes for the Jacabellais 
and memoirs for "redeeming social value." 
Thurgood Marshall 
With Brennan. 
Likes Oregon statute. 
-5-
Harry Blackman 
Closer to White and Chief than to Brennan. 
Emphasized key role of jury as reflecting community 
judgments. 
Would not overrule Roth. Would re-examine definition. 
Does not agree that printed text cannot be regulated. 
What about Suite 69 ? 
But is intrigued by Brennan's "privacy" rationale. 
Bill Rehnquist 
Not sure that Harlan's view is wrong. Certainly up 
to time of the Fourteenth Amendment, states were free to regulate 
obscenity. 
Would reaffirm Roth with greater specificity. 
We should vote to deny cert more regularly than we have 
in past. 
MY NOTES FOR CONFERENCE ON OCTOBER 24, 1972 
Complement Bill and Chief 
At time First Amendment was adopted, no one then 
thought that it protected obscene expression from legislative 
regulation or control. 
I agree with Roth formulation that obscenity is not 
protected expression. 
I think I would have voted with majority in Stanley -
accepting its disclainer that it was undercutting Roth. 
The problem that has confounded everyone is how to 
define obscenity - vagueness, etc. I would not overrule Roth 
but would redefine in terms of specific standards. 
Definitions can be made specific - except as to books. 
Some sort of administrative procedure would help on 
vagueness issue. 
Am closer to Chief than to Bill -but am unsure on several 
points and will await next drafts of opinions. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I. The Obscenity Problem 
The obscenity cases argued last week again put before thi s Court 
what Justice Harlan aptly described as "the intractable obscenity 
problem. " Interstate Circuit, Inc . v . Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704. 
As I have said in my previous memoranda, I do not see any easy 
Judicial "solution, 11 short of abandoning this Court 1 s responsibility 
to the Constitution by adopting the absolutist approach which,for me)is 
an abdication of the judicial function. As in other major areas of First 
Amendment controversy relating to free expression, this Court will 
inevitably be required to make difficult judgments . 
It may be useful to summarize again the elements of the obscenity 
problem presented by the pending cases . First, there is the need to 
' • 
2. 
define the scope of the first amendment protection, a need well-
documented by Justice Brennan's comprehensive memorandum on 
Miller (No. 70-73), which was in a sense a response to my memo. 
With Justice Brennan, I find the policy of Redrup v. New York, 386 
U.S. 767, unacceptable. See Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (dissent). 
It is neither sound nor feasible for this Court 1 s assuming the role of 
an unreviewable board of censorship for the 50 States, subjectively 
judging each piece of material brought before it. Again, with Justice -
Brennan, I believe that obscene materials in some situations are not 
protected by the First Amendment, but that this Court has failed to 
establish clear standards by which other courts can separate protected 
.,------ ~ ._,&wz ---
from unprotected materials • 
....--. s""' ...... -. 
Our inability to develop a workable rule up to now is not, however, 
a reason to abandon our responsibility and to declare that the First 
Amendment protects everything. For me, the First Amendment was 
) made to protect commerce in ideas, not pornography. Clarifying the 
standards and procedures which should be used to determine what is 
"obscene, 11 in the sense of being constitutionally unprotected, is a first -priority. 
- -
' I ' 
3. 
Secondly, the cases argued last week present the specific question of 
when :E'irst Amendment protection can be expanded by adding an element 
of 11 privacy. 11 In Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, this Court determined 
that a person may not be prosecuted for possession of obscene materials 
in the privacy of his house. As my memoranda in U.S. v. Orito, No. 
70-69, and 12 200 Ft Reels (No. 70-2) indicate, I am prepared to con-
sider extending this right to materials carried on the person or trans-
ported in personal luggage and intended for personal use only, provided, 
first and foremost, we stop the noxious flood of 11hard core 11 in the non-
private area. But it is not obvious to me that such 11 privacy 11 should be 
stretched to include 11hard core 11 commercial book dealers (see Alexander, 
._..,......~ 
No. 71-1315, and Kaplan, No. 71-1422) and 11hard core 11 theatres (see -
Paris Adult Theatre, No. 71-1051). Just because married human beings 
are free from any governmental inquiry into their private relations under 
Griswold v. Conn .. , 381 U.S. 479, and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 
does not mean they have such rights in town square or a commercial 
theatre,( and for me there is no difference --both are public) nor does it 
) 
authorize prostitution. 
commercial exploitation and (b) the rights of privacy must be defined. 
The distinction between (a) public display and 
To ignore this distinction overrules our recent decisions in U.S. v. 
4. 
Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 355, and U.S. v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 
402 U.S. 363, 376-377, (Opinion of Justice White), 378-379 (Justice 
Stewart concurring. ) But if we can solve the broad problem, I think 
we might safely consider some relaxation on Reidel and Thirty-Seven 
Photographs. 
Finally, the arguments last week raised a challenge to the power 
of the States ~to regulate commerce in obscene materials between 
consenting adults. Two of the cases to be re-argued next week, Orito 
(No. 70-69) and 12 200 Ft. Reels (No. 70-2), raise similar challenges 
to the power of Congress. I agree with Justice Brennan that when 
obscenity is thrust upon unwilling adults, or is exposed to children, 
there are state interests which are both legitimate and compelling. 
But are these the States' legitimate concerns? Does the State not have 
a responsibility to its citizens with respect to the environment created 
by 250 11 hard core 11 so-called 11adult bookstores 11 as in Los Angeles? 
Are States powerless to regulate commerce between consenting adults 
which rots the commercial environment of the heart of a great city, as 
in San Francisco for example? 
The Hill-Link Minority Report of the Presidential Commission on 
Obscenity and Pornography (pg. 391-397) points out evidence that use of 
7 
5. 
pornography may encourage sexual deviation and sexual crimes. It 
also gives statistics demonstrating an alarming rise in the rate of rape 
in America during the same period as a major expansion of commerce 
> 
in pornography (1960-1970). Is this Court prepared to decide that these 
.. ......., 
possible correlations are groundless, the more so since the minority 
view comports with ordinary human experience and common sense? 
If these correlations are significant, are States powerless to protect 
the public environment? Finally, is this Court prepared to say that the 
moral climate of a city is unaffected by commercialized obscenity, or 
that the general welfare is totally unrelated to morality standards and 
common decency? 
Unless we hold that all obscenity is ~ ~ constitutionally protected, 
I believe that it is impossible to answer the questions before us without 
consideration of the power of a State or of Congress to prevent pollution 
of the public "environment. 11 Otherwise the is sue of "commercial" re-
lations between consenting adults will appear again, this time in the form 
of ''private" commercial prostitution, ''private clubs'' with LaRue-type 
entertainment. Outside the privacy of the home, is there a true privacy 
issue in commercialized pronography that is open to the public? 
. ~· 
6. 
II. The Scope of First Amendment Protection: The Perils of 
Absolutism 
For me the First Amendment was made to protect commerce in 
ideas. The assumption that restricting obscenity and pornography will 
throttle the free flow of such ideas will, in the course of time, (if it is 
not already clear) be seen as one of the greatest frauds ever perpetrated. 
For the first 100 years after the adoption of the Constitution, our 
Republic witnessed great freedom of speech and at the same time a 
very strict censorship of obscene materials. No historian claims that 
the latter ever jeopardized our progressive political system. 
Of course we must have a "national commitment to the principle 
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open ••• 11 
But what does that have to do with Roth obscenity? It demeans the high 
purposes of the First Amendment and debases the currency of the history 
of the struggle for free expression to equate robust and free debate with 
filth that, in turn, debases one of the high values of human existence 
and demeans human beings to the level of animals . We can concede that 
some benefit has resulted from the demoliton of Victorian prudery without 
accepting the notion that the absolutism of the First Amendment precludes 
any control of public obscenity . 
7. 
It has been often pointed out that the Constitution must be interpreted 
to preserve its elasticity and capacity to cope with new conditions. The 
power to deal with unforeseen problems of the future in an evolving 
societ y ought not be precluded by an absolutist approach. Much of the 
survival and success of our .A:m.erican institutions rests on the viable 
nature of constitutional terms. One of the strengths of Roth is that it 
permits legislatures to make choices about dealing with obscene materials 
within a constitutional standard which itself develops and shifts with 
changes in society. Many elitists dislike legislatures, suspect juries, 
and want Courts to govern everything. But we have prized these institutions 
over the years for ability to respond to change and concern among the 
people, even if crudely and belatedly. Legislatures and juries are among 
our most sensitive and flexible institutions. See U.S. v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 
351, 357. But when we embalm concepts in a constitutional holding, we 
stop the evolution of the law. 
Some have long and ably argued the view that all obscene materials 
are constitutionally protected. That, of course, makes life quite simple, 
because absolutism removes all choice and all responsibility from society. 
Everything goes; nothing can be governed or regulated. This "solution" 
' ' 
8. 
was also chosen by the student first prize winner of the National College 
Essay Competition who said: 
"In either event, permitting obscenity to find its own 
position in the open market of competitive capitalism is the 
only truly definitive solution. It is the American Way." 
Obscenity: Censorship or Free Choice? (1971). 
This is an appropriate solution for sophomores) but not for a mature, 
free people who must be trusted with the responsibility for choice. It is 
precisely this spirit of absolutist social laissez faire which is now under 
attack for destroying our natural environment and,for me, environment 
1s more than trees, grass, lakes and rivers and the physical atmosphere. 
Justice Brennan's memo on Miller agrees that not all obscenity is 
protected by the First Amendment, but concludes that obscenity must not 
be wholly suppressed in the absence "of a demonstration of some 
subordinating>:~ governmental interest requiring that result." I heartily 
agree that "prevention of offensive exposure to unwilling individuals and 
dissemination to juveniles 11 are legitimate state interests. But I do not 
see how this "solution" resolves the First Amendment difficulties. As 
I Justice Douglas points out in his memorandum on Miller (No. 70-73) at pg. 6, it is still necessary to define what is "obscene. " The standards 
proposed by Justice Brennan may turn out to be "as elusive to define 
>!~I wonder whether this is a typographical error in Bill Brennan's memo. 
Should "subordinating" not be "overriding." 
9. 
and apply" as the old tests that have so dismally failed. It is also now 
necessary to define the "governmental interest" Justice Brennan is 
referring to. 
Justice Brennan's memo states that this Court: 
" ••• need not and should not at this time detail the regulatory 
schemes for the control of offensive exposure and distribution 
that would pass constitutional muster. That must await con-
crete legislative attempts to deal with those problems.'' 
I He ~es on, howeverC§ specificallyzrestrict such legislation "to 
l pictorial or three-dimensional representations of fundamentally offen-
sive sexual acts that go beyond the mere depiction of nudity ••• ", 
except when the privacy of the home is concerned. Rowan v. Post 
Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 741. Thus, while disclaiming any legis-
lative intent, Justice Brennan's memorandum in effect allows only two 
legitimate state interests and sharply restricts the way these interests 
can be protected. Although this approach allows more latitude to the 
States than that of Justice Douglas, it is ultimately a highly inflexible 
approach which never really solves the problem of what is ''obscene." 
Moreover, it has all the hallmarks of an advisory opinion. 
As indicated in my memorandum on Miller (No. 70-73), I believe 
that the answer is more flexibility for the triers, rather than less. I 
10. 
would indicate that the tripartite test in the plurality opinion in 
Memoirs v. Mass., 383 U.S. 413, is adequate to separate 
protected from unprotected materials. But other "tests" that a State 
might adopt could be equally satisfactory, as long as they convey the 
essential idea that a state law must be clearly focused on materials 
which portray sexual activities in a fundamentally offensive way, as 
distinguished from communication of ideas in works having literary, 
artistic, political, or social value 
1
as people have commonly used those 
terms. I£ a state statute is reasonably limited in this regard, by its 
terms or as interpreted, then First Amendment values, as applicable 
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, are adequately served 
by the additional freedom of appellate courts, including this Court, to 
conduct an independent review of t~he record when necessary in par-
ticular cases of egregious abuse by state action. See Memoirs v . 
• 
Mass ., 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Roth v. U. S., 
354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (concurring and dissenting opinion). Chief -
Justice Warren and Justices Harlan and Jackson perceived the danger to 
orderly social progress which results from enforcing a single rigid 
11. 
standard on the fifty States, choking o££ sources of valuable experimen-
tation and flexibility in overcoming our national problems. Memoirs v. 
Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 456 (dissenting opinion). Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 
U.S. 184, 200-201 (dissenting opinion), 203-204 (dissenting opinion). 
Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 496 (dissenting opinion). Beauharnais v. 
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 294-295 (dissenting opinion). (Justice Blackmun 
and I joined this company in 1969-71. 
I remain unconvinced that materials must be "utterly without re-
deeming social value" to be obscene. Compare Memoirs v. Mass., 
383 U.S. 413, 418 • . Throwing a bit of Shakespeare into a book like 
Suite 69 (See Kaplan, No. 71-1422 ), does not miraculously transform 
it into protected communication. I agree with Justice White that 
"redeeming social value" and "social importance" are not "independent 
tests of obscenity," but (to the extent anyone knows what this "test" 
means) are "relevant only to determining the predominant prurient 
interest of the material." Memoirs v. Mass., 383 U.S. 413, at 462, 
(White dissenting). See also Memoirs, supra, at 445 (Clark dissenting). 
Our past lack of success in achieving a workable definition of the 
scope of the First Amendment in this area may have been the result of 
12. 
setting out on the impossible task of simplifying an inherently complex 
problem. This past failure should be no e4cuse for now enforcing the 
States into a constitutional strait jacket, as I believe the approaches of 
Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan would do. 
However, I agree with Justice Brennan that the new Oregon 
"obscenity" statute, 1971 Ore. Laws. C. 743, § 255-262a, is admirable 
in its specific description of prohibited acts and in its protection of 
juveniles. But in the six cases now before us, we have no statutes like 
Oregon's, and we can hardly write a code for the States or give an ad-
visory opinion as to what kind of state statute would pass muster. Con-
ceivably, a concurring or dissenting opinion could pose this solution for 
the States, and if enough votes supported that view to give it credibility, 
the States might move in this direction. 
I would certainly recoil from the suggestion that the Oregon statute 
marked the outermost limits of a State's legitimate interests and power 
or represents the only acceptable way of framing a state obscenity statute. 
For example, in my view both the A. L. I. Model Penal Code § 251. 4 
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962) and the model state statute proposed by 
the Majority Report of the Presidential Commission on Obscenity and 
13. 
Pornography, 65-69 (1970) would be constitutionally permissible 
alternatives. See Roth v. U.S. 354 U.S. 476, 487 n. 20. 
The three cases argued in October also raise the question of whether 
a "national" standard of obscenity is corratitutionally required. My posi-
tion on permitting local or state-wide community standards of obscenity, 
as opposed to requiring a national standard, has been presented in length 
in my memoranda on Miller (No. 70-73), pgs. 4-16. See also~ v. 
Minnesota, 399 U. 524 (Blackmun dissenting); Cain v. Kentucky, 397 
U.S. 319 (Burgerdissenting); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200-201. 
There never has been a Court majority for a national standard and in this 
diverse country, with a valuable tradition of pluralism, a national standard 
is both impractical to determine and undesirable to apply. Just as horse-
theft in Wyoming may destroy a man's livelihood, while merely threatening 
a luxury in New York, obscenity may have vastly different dimensions as 
a social problem in Vermont, as ·opposed to Las Vegas. It is pointless to 
try to force local legislatures and juries to ignore these differences. The 
people of Vermont should not be compelled to accept something simply 
because it is found tolerable in Las Vegas. 
It may be 'that the dichotomy in the debate over "community" or 
11 national 11 standards is reduced to a matter of semantics in actual 
14. 
operation. Unless we require, as I would not, that the parties put in 
evidence of standards, the jurors will apply what they consider the 
community standard to be at the time for it is the one they know. In 
reality, they may apply a ''boiling point standard'' or a ''tolerance'' 
standard, but in all events it will inevitably be subjective. The alleged 
expert testimony submitted in the cases we have seen is stilted nonsense 
from -- as one lawyer put it -- ''hired guns. 11 
Kaplan (No. 71-1422) and Paris Adult Theatre (No. 71-1051) 
raise this exact issue of whether a jury may properly apply the Rot h 
test without affirmative ''expert ' ' evidence . Very recently we declined 
to review a case which held that affirmative expert testimony for the 
State on contemporary community standards was not required when the 
alleged obscene materials were in evidence . Wisconsin v. Amato, 49 
Wis. 2d 638, cert. den. , 405 U . S . 981 (Jan. 24, 1972). See U.S. v. 
Wild, 422 F . 2d 34 (CA 2), cert. den., 403 U.S. 940, (as to the prin-
cipal role of the materials themselves as evidence. ) In the last analysis 
the related questions o£ whether materials predominantly appeal to the 
prurient interest o£ the ' 'average adult" in a fundamentally offensive way 
and whether materials represent communication of literary, artistic, 
political , or social value are pr operly left, under Roth, to the experience 
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of the trier of fact, as confronted with the materials. We have said 
for generations that the genius of our jury system is its use of a cross 
section of the community to whom we entrust the gravest decisions. 
Obviously, if the communication itself cannot be put into evidence, 
as would be the case in LaRue-type "dances," its nature would have to 
be described by affirmative evidence sufficient to determine that it was 
obscene. "Pandering'' by the dealer, or the dealer's own description 
of his wares, could be part of such affirmative evidence. Ginzburg v. 
U.S., 383 U.S. 463, 470-473, ABookv. Attorney-General, 383 U.S. 
413, 420. But, in this field of human knowledge, requiring "expert" 
testimony is absurd. What "qualifications" must such an "expert" 
have? 
Alexander. (No. 71-1315) raises the additional issue of whether a 
jury trial is required by Roth in civil proceedings involving a determina-
tion of obscenity. Nothing at Roth hints at such a right. The civil 
proceeding in Alexander was a special statutory remedy provided by 
Va. Code § 18. 1 - 236. 3. Nothing in the Constitution requires a jury 
trial for a statutory civil remedy unknown to common law in 1791. The 
trier of fact in Alexander, the trial judge, properly employed the standards 
established by the plurality in Memoirs v. Mass., 383 U.S. 413. 
16. 
III. Commerce and the Stanley Right to Privacy 
It has been decided by this Court that the First Amendment takes 
on expanded dimensions in the privacy of a man's house. Stanley v. 
Georg 'ia,394 U.S. 557. In my view, Stanley did not rest on an un-
restricted "right" to receive materials devoid of Intellectual content. 
In that case First and Fourth Amendment rights overlapped, together 
providing more protection to the hon'l.e library than either amendment 
could provide alone. See Note: "Still More Ado About Dirty Books 
(and Pictures)," 81 Yale Law Journal 309 (1971). Purely private 
conduct, unlike any .conduct in places open to the public, has a re-
stricted capacity to harm the moral tone of society by example or 
influence, and enforcement of laws to regulate private conduct invariably 
intrude on the. privacy of the hone and family in a way that offends the 
spirit, if not the letter, of our Constitution. See Griswold v. Conn., 
381 u.s . 482 . 
I could find it tolerable to expand the special protection of Stanley 
to materials carried for demonstrably private, personal (non-commercial) 
purposes on the person and in personal baggage, as my memoranda in 
U.S. v . Orito (No. 70-69), and U.S. v . 12 200ft. Reels (No. 70-2) 




seller -- can invoke a Stanley right to privacy. This Court has only 
recently rejected such an expansion of Stanley in U.S. v. Reidel, 402 
U.S. 351, and U.S. v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363. In oral 
argument, counsel for California in Kaplan (No. 71-1422) estimated that 
there were over 250 adult book stores in the Los Angeles area alone. 
To bar the regulation of such large scale commerce in the name of a 
special right to privacy under Stanley would require holding that a 
panderer has a vicarious "constitutional" right through his potential 
customer's "right. 11 The reasoning behind this eludes me. Griswold v. 
Conn., 381 U.S. 482, is not remotely in point on this kind of "privacy, 11 
purveyed by pimps. 
IV. The Power of Government to Regulate Public Moral Pollution 
Americans, as a "refugee" race, have in our origins and growth 
always had a healthy suspicion of any governmental infringement on 
individual freedom. But almost all laws curtail some freedom of 
individuals for the purpose of promoting a common good, and these laws 
reflect the basic moral assumptions and values accepted by our society. 
There is an inevitable need to strike a balance between freedom and 
necessary authority. See Devlin, Enforcement of Morals 102 ( 1965 ed. ). 
Mill, On Liberty, 7 (1955 ed. ). 
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This Court in Stanley, 394 U.S . 557 at 566 , repudiated any 
legitimate state concern in the "control [of] the moral content of a 
person's thoughts," and I agree . But I suggest that Justice Brennan's 
memorandum in Miller (No. 70 - 73) makes the unwarranted assumption 
that, outside of "mind control, " the only legitimate state interests in-
volving obscenity are prevention of exposure to non-consenting adults 
and juveniles . To me this is not too far from saying that those who 
pollute the atmosphere can tell the rest of us not to breathe. 
Justice Brennan cites large sections of the Majority Report of the 
President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, for the proposition 
that "explicit sexual materials [play no] significant role in the causation 
of delinquent or criminal behavior ... " (Miller memo, supra, at 17, 
note 11) . This conclusion is hotly contested. The Hill-Link Minority 
Report gives evidence to support contrary conclusions , including evidence 
that use of pornography may encourage sex crimes and sexual deviation. 
Report of the Presidential Commission, pgs . 391-397 . It also found 
evidence (the Abelson Survey) that most commercial pornography, 
although bought by elders, ultimately finds its heaviest "use" in the hands 
of juv eniles and young adults [women aged 15 to 20,· men aged 15 to 29]. 
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Report of the Presidential Commission, pg. 401. In addition, the 
Keating Minority Report and the British Longford Report attack the 
impartiality and the methodology used by the Majority Report of the 
Presidential Commission, on which Justice Brennan relies. 
In its conclusion, the Hill-Link Minority Report made the following 
statement: 
"Because of the extrem.e complexity of the problem and 
the uniqueness of the human experience it is doubtful that we 
will ever have absolutely convincing scientific proof that por-
nography is or isn't harmful. And the issue isn't restricted to, 
'Does pornography cause or contribut.e to sex crimes?' The 
is sue has to do with how pornography affects or influences the 
individual in his total relationship to members of the same as 
well as the opposite sex, children and adults, with all of its 
ramifications. 
''The 'burden of proof' or demonstration of no harm in a 
situation such as this is ordinarily considered to be on the 
shoulders of he who wishes to introduce change or innovation. 
It might be noted that in areas where. health and welfare are at 
issue most government agencies take extremely conservative 
measures in their efforts to protect the public. In the case of 
monosodium glutamate which was recently removed from all 
baby foods by government order, the evidence against it, in 
animal studies, was quite weak. However, because the remote 
possibility of harm existeq., measures were immediately taken 
to protect children from consuming it. 11 [Emphasis added.] 
[The Report of the Presidential Commission, supra, at 411-412.] 
The Hill-Link Report is not alone in its concern about the long-
range effects of pornography on the values which hold our society 
together. Leading humanists have expressed a similar concern. 
·'" 
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Professor van der Haag of N.Y . U. has said: 
"It is silly to insist that unless criminal sex acts can be 
traced directly to consumption of pornography by the criminal, 
pornography must be harmless . Lack of evidence for harm-
fulness is not evidence for harmlessness . Moreover, there is 
no reason to assume that the de-identification supported by 
pornography will directly find sexual outlets. Finally, the 
influence of pornography is usually diffuse and often indirect, 
as is the case o£ Marxism or religion. Most persons do not 
emulate pornography directly, or habitually use it to stimulate 
themselves. Yet pornography has a cumulative influence on 
the lives of this third group by affecting public morality and 
also everybody ' s personal attitudes, values and ambitions. 
Any model of action attractive to some part of the average 
person when presented often enough will influence and make 
what is modelled -- be it anti- semitic, or sadistic, or 
Communist -- more acceptable . Extolling either martial or 
pacific virtues will make either of them more acceptable; and 
so will the inviting presentation of sexual vices." [Censorship: 
For and Against, 156-157 (1971 ed. )] 
Professor Max Lerner of Brandeis adds: 
" •.• The staff and majority of the Commission on Obscenity 
and Pornography may be wrong or right in their conclusions 
that there is 'no evidence to date' of a ' significant role' played 
by explicit sexual material in criminal behavior or in any other 
social ills; but the Hill-Link dissent which retraverses the same 
data gives (I quote from a perceptive piece by Murray Kempton) 
'a most convincing portrait of a commision majority which 
winnowed the chaff that gave scientific color to its thesis from 
the chaff that might bring it into dispute."' [Censorship: For and 
Against, supra, at 192 - 193 . ] 
I resist the bland and easy assumption that obscenity is only harmful 
to children or that it is merely a nuisance t o unconsenting adults. To 
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compel public toleration of pervasive commercial pornography, an 
activity deeply at odds with fundamental sexual morality and with human 
dignity, cannot, in my view, fail to have a destructive impact on the 
totality of the environment in which we live. In any event, the issue 
before us should be whether or not Roth obscenity is protected by the 
First Amendment. If it is not, this Court has no business restricting 
state governments solely on the basis of~ unprovable assumptions 
about the impact of ''hard core" material, thus ignoring the states' 
obligation to preserve a decent social environment for the people they 
represent. 
Of course, none of us "know 11 all about "obscenity, 11 including the 
alleged "experts 11 who have written on the subject. It is not a "knowable 11 
subject. Our · conclusions must rest on certain assumptions that have 
guided civilized people for thousands of years, but these assumptions have 
consistently been rejected by this Court in favor of individual notions that 
have never commanded a majority. These assumptions are not demon-
strable, but they have centuries of history and experience behind them. 
I£ good plays, good books, good art, the company of decent people as 
teachers and exemplars are the determinants of character -- as we have 




foisted on people of all ages in movies, magazines and books, will not 
have a comparable impact? As Professor Bickel of Yale Law School 
has rightly stressed: 
"Take these assumptions [of privacy], and still you are 
left with at least one problem of large proportions. It con-
cerns the tone of the society, the mode, or to use terms that 
have perhaps greater currency, the style and quality of life, 
now and in the future. A man may be entitled to read an obscene 
book in his room, or expose himself indecently there ... We 
should protect his privacy. But if he demands a right to obtain 
the books and pictures he wants in the market, and to foregather 
in public places -- discreet, if you will, but accessible to all --
with others who share his tastes, then to grant him his right is 
to affect the world about the rest of us, and to impinge on other 
privacies. Even supposing that each of us can, if he wishes, 
effectively avert the eye and stop the ear (which, in truth, we 
cannot), what is commonly read and seen and heard and done 
intrudes upon us all, want it or not. [22 The Public Interest 25 
(winter, 1971, 25-26.] 
We have been told that the blame for the crime and drug abuse in the 
core areas of our cities must rest on us, because we have allowed the 
children of the poor and disadvantaged who live there to grow to maturity 
in the depraved moral climate of the ghetto. We ought not to ask to have 
it both ways. I accept the proposition that the moral climate "bends the 
twig," but I think we must apply this across the board, not just when it 
is a convenient crutch. 
Without the possibility, as I see it, of any affirmative national 
standard of decency, the sleazy commercial exploitation of one of the 
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highest values and cherished relationships of the human race has indeed 
created a national atmosphere debasing our common humanity. 
It simply cannot be that the First Amendment should be read to make 
us an impotent society in terms of total surrender in dealing with this 
intangible pollution of the national atmosphere. For me this is as much 
the function of government as containing any other environmental pollution. 
If this means that we follow the Jackson-Harlan thesis of a "graded" appli-
cation to the States of the First via the Fourteenth Amendment, that is a 
course I am prepared to explore. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, at 
203-204 (dissenting opinion), and Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra, at 294-
295 (dissenting opinion). I consider some such approach essential if this 
country is to avoid an amendment of the First Amendment -- a development 
that could, in the long run, be an ominous threat to liberty. 
I have read that the waters of£ the city of Hong Kong are the most dan-
gerous in th~ world because, for centuries, ,there have been no pollution 
controls. Yet the thousands of people who live on boats on those waters 
bathe in that water, cook with, and do not die. They have developed a 
tolerance for waters that would promptly destroy most mortals. Can it 
.. 
24. 
be that the Constitution compels the States to let the m.oral climate 
and intellectual environment descend to that level of tolerance? 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.§u.prtutt <qo-u.rt o-f tltt ~tb ~taftg 
2Jiru;fringtrut. :!fl. <q. 2llbfJ!.~ 
November 27, 1972 
Re: Obscenity Cases 
Dear Chief: 
Herewith are my very rough and tentative ideas in 
response to the recent circulations by Byron and Harry 
on this subject: 
1. I agree with Byron and Harry as to Orito and 
Reels. 
2. I agree that we should ·retain Roth without the 
Fanny Hill gloss. While it may be desirable and possible, 
as Byron suggests, that the Court define the boundaries 
of that type of material which may be proscribed, I would 
have some difficulty being quite as specific or categorical 
as he seems to be in his November 16th memorandum. I would 
think that if the opinion gets this specific, it should do 
so by way of example, rather than in an attempt by dicta to 
exhaust all possible candidates for this class. 
3. I agree with Byron and Harry that while of course 
the standard laid down by the Fourteenty and First Amendments 
is a national one, the very definition embraced in Roth 
of "community" standards suggests that there is a role to be 
played by local jurors in applying the standards of the 
community as embodied in the Roth test. Certainly we should 
not lay down any constitutional standard which would 
encourage expert witnesses on both sides -- "opposing 
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bands of oath helpers" as I believe Wigmore called them --
to dominate the trial of an abscenity case. 
4. I would not go as far as Byron indicates he would 
in requiring a prior adversary hearing in connection with 
obscenity seizures. I would treat Marcus and Books as 
dealing with seizures for the purpose of suppression, rather 
than for evidence, and permit seizures for the latter 
purpose of one copy of the material in question to be 
carried out under normal Fourth Amendment procedures. ~n 
the case of movies, where the single copy is all that the 
proprietor has, this obviously raises the question of on 
whom the burden should fall when, even though the seizure 
is only of the amount necessary to permit prosecution, it is also 
sufficient to prevent at least temporarily the further 
distribution of the product. I do not believe the 
Constitution prevents it from being put on the distributor, 
if the state so chooses. 
5. While we will undoubtedly be making ultimate 
constitutional judgments under the constitutional standards 
outlined, as we would in applying Bill Brennan's alternative 
approach, much of this will be done in the exercise of our 
discretionary certiorari jurisdiction. Once the reasonably 
clear standards have been enunciated -- if that is possible 
in this area -- I would make the test of granting or denying 
certiorari, so far as my own vote is concerned, depend on 
whether or not the lower court seems to have conscientiously 
tried to apply the standards enunciated by this Court, 
rather than whether I agree with the result reached by 
the lower court. 
Sincerely, ~ 
· ~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
j\u.prtmt <Q:Ll1trt llf t~t ~tb .:§hrltil 
~htilJringto-tt, ~. <q:. 20~}1~ 
January 15, 1973 
Re: Obscenity Cases 
Dear Chief: 
I am substantially in accord with the proposed analysis 
contained in your circulations in these cases. I take it 
that in Orito and Reels the judgments in each case would be 
reversed if your view prevails, since as I understand it it 
was assumed for purpose o~ decision by both District Courts 
that the matter in question was obscene. 
Sincerely~~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
Dear Chief, 
~uvumt ~~urt of tqt 'J!ittitt~ .itatts 
~ttsfringhm. lQ. ~· 2!!~'!-~ 
November 13, 1972 -
Re: Obscenity Cases 
Responding to your memorandum of this date, 
I am as of now in general agreement with Bill Brennan's 
circulation of last Term on the general problem (with cer-
tain qualifications), and with your circulations of last Term 
in Orito and 12 Reels. I would prefer, however, not to 
definitely make a commitment in advance · of seeing what is 
finally written. Indeed, it is my understanding that at least 
two members of the Court do not agree with either you or 
Bill. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTI C E LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
~n:vrcmc <qonrt of tltt 'Jffnitc~ ~ta:t.c£f 
~IH>Irhrgt01t, !D. <q. 2.0~J1~ 
November 14, 1972 
Re: Obscenity Cases 
Dear Chief: 
Responding to your memorandum of November 13, I confirm 
my statement at the Conference to the effect that I am generally in 
agreement with your approach on the basic problem. I may have some 
suggestions to make, but these would be within the framework - I think -
of your general approach. 
As to Orito and 12 Reels, I was inclined to accept the analysis 
in the memorandum which you circulated last spring. Recent discussions 
in our Conference, however, have caused me to give further consideration 
to these two cases. Orito, involving the Government's admittedly broad 
power "at the border," is not as difficult for me as 12 Reels. The latter 
is not easy to distinguish from Stanley. Yet, if we go beyond the "home" 
under the Stanley doctrine it is difficult - as Bill Brennan has argued 
eloquently - to know where to stop. 
I consider the overriding problem to be a disposition of the 
Miller type case in which at least five members of the Court can join. Al-
most any such disposition would, I think, be preferable to the present in-
tolerable confusion and uncertainty - with the Bar and the public not know-
ing where the Court stands. Accordingly, and while I must await circula-
tions of draft opinions before making a final decision, I am inclined to sup-
port your general approach to the problem. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 







.juprtutt <!fgud gf tlrt 'Jjtttitt~ .itatts 
~aslthtghnt. J!. <!}. 2llbi't~ 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE November 13, 1972 
Re: Obscenity Cases 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CO~FERENCE: 
Apropos of the above cases, it was agreed at Conference 
that the time had come for 11 a division of the House'' so 
that some specific writing can begin. 
Bill Brennan and I have each tried to articulate a general 
approach on what seems to me the basic problems in 
Miller v. California and comparable cases. I still con-
sider Orito and 12 Reels problems peripheral and far less 
important in the whole scheme. Millions of people are 
offended and injured by the public displays; only a small 
number of true 11 Stanleys 11 are skulking around and I can 
11 take or Leave 11 their aberrations. 
If we treat the broad problems of Miller et alas Part I 
and the Orito-12 Reels as Part II, it would now help Bill 
and me if you would indicate that you 11 generally agree11 
with Bill or with me. 
We can then begin top t the pieces together. 
Regards, 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ~tt~ated: JAN 1 0 1973 
No. 70-73 
Marvin Miller, Appellant, 
v. 
State of California. 
On Appeal from the Ap-
pellate Department, Su-
perior Court of California, 
County of Orange. 
[January -, 1973] 
Memorandum from MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER. 
This is one of a group of "obscenity-pornography" 
cases being revie\ved by the Court in a re-examination 
of standards enunciated in earlier cases. 
Appellant conducted a mass mailing campaign to ad-
vertise the sale of illustrated books, euphemistically called 
"adult" material. He was convicted, after a jury trial, 
of violating California Penal Code § 311.2 (a), a mis-
demeanor, by willfully and knowingly distributing ob-
scene matter.1 His conviction was specifically based on 
1 The California Pcu:1l Code reads in relev:tnt part: 
"§ 311.2 Sending or bringing into state for sale or distribution; 
printing, exhibiting, di~tributing or possessing within 
state 
"(a) Every person who knowingly: ~ends or cause~ to be ~ent, 
or brings or causes to be brought , into this sta tr for ~a le or diHt ribu-
tion , or in this state prepare~, publi~hrs, prints, exihibits, di~tributes, 
or offer~ to distribute, or has in his po~~e~sion with intent to di~­
tribute or to exhibit or offer to clistributr, any ob~rene matter, is 
guilty of a mi~clemeanor. 
"§ 311. Definitions 
"As used in this chapter: 
" (a) 'Obscene maHer' mean~ mat!Pr, taken as a whole, the pre-
dominant appeal of which to the average pen.;on, applying ron-
temporary standards, is to prmiPnt interest, i. e., a shameful or 
morbid intcrc~t in nndity, sex, or excrrtion; and is matter which 
r 
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his conduct in causing five unsolicited advertising bro-
chures to be sent through the mail in an envelope ad-
dressed to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California. 
The envelope was opened by the manager of the restau-
rant and his mother. They had not requested the bro-
chures; they complained to the police. 
The brochures advertise four books entitled "Inter-
course." "Man-\Voman," "Sex Orgies Illustrated,'' and 
"An Illustrated History of Pornography," and a film en-
titled "Marital Intercourse." ·while the brochures con-
tain some descriptive printed material, primarily they 
consist of pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting 
men and women in groups of two or more e11gaging in a 
takl'n as a \rlloln gor~ ~ubtanl iall~· br)·oncl cu,;tom;tr)· limits of 
eandor in drsrription or rrprr~rnt:1tion of such mattrr~: and is 
mattrr whirh t:1krn ns " whole i~ uttrrlr without rrdrcming ~o('i:il 
impmtancr. 
'' (1) The predominant appral io pruril'llt intC'rr~t of the m:il ter 
is judged "·ith rrfrrrmr to :1\"CntgC' adults unles:-< it apprar~ from 
the nature of thr mnttrr of thr rirrwnslanrrs of its dis~rmitwtion, 
distribution or C''l:hibi1ion, that it is designrd for cle:Hl)· drfined 
dc,·innt sexu:1l groups. in whirh rase . thr prrdomin:111t itppral of 
thr mattrr ~11.111 br judgnd \rith rrfrrrncr to its intf'ndrd rrripirnt 
group . 
.. (2) In prosrrulions undrr thi." rhaptrr, whrrr l'irrum~tntH·r~ of 
production, prr,;rntation, ~air, di,s<•min:llion. di,:trilmti()n. or puhliril)' 
indien tc t hal mat I er j,; bring rommerrinll)· C'l:p!oited by the drfrnd-
:.nl for the sake of its pntriPn1 appral, ::;ucl1 r\·idrnrr i~ proh<1ti1·r 
with rrspert to thr l1[1tnrr of the m:tilrr and ran .iu~tif~· thr ronrlu-
~ion that. thr mattrr i,; uttrrl.1· without rrclC'rming ~or>i:tl import:Jnce. 
"(b) 'l\'fnltrr' n!rnns nn~· book, m:1g:1zinr, ti('\I'~J1:1pcr or othPr 
printrd or written malrrial or nn~· pictun·, dr:l\l'ill!~. photograph, 
motion ]Jirturr, or othrr pictorial rrprr,:rnlntion or an.1· ~tatur or 
othrr figurr, or an~· n·l·ording, transniption or 1mrrhanicnl. dwtnil'al 
or rlrrtric:1l rrproclucl ion or an~· ot hrr artidr~. C'quipmrnl. m:1t'itinrs 
or m:1lrrinl". 
''(c) 'l'rr,;on' nwans nn~· incliYidual, p:1rlnN~hip, firtn, :ls,:o<·i:tlimt, 
corporation or othrr legal rntit~·. 
·'(d) 'Di;-;tribute' mratts to tmn,:frr po:-,:rssion of, whetlwr " ·ith 
or without ronsidrra tion." 
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variety of sexual activities, with genitals often pronn-
nently displayed. 
I 
This ca~e involves the application of a State's criminal 
obscenity l"tatute to a situation in which sexually explicit 
materials have been thru!"t by aggressive sales action 
upon unwilling recipients who had in 110 way indicated 
any desire to recci \'C snch materials. This Court has 
recognized that States have a legitimate interest in pro-
hibiti11g dissemination or exhibition of obscene materials 
partjcularly ,,·hc11 the mode of dissemination carries with 
it a significa11t cla1Jgcr of offending the sensibilities of 
unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles. Stan-
ley \'. Georgia, 394 F. R. 557, 567; Redrup v. N c·w 
1'ork, 386 U. R. 767, 760; Ginzburg v. United States, 380 
U. R. 463, 468--470. Rec Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 
622. 641- 642; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 F S. 77, 88-89; 
Prince v. Ma.ssachusett:s, 321 U. S. 158, 169-170. Cf. 
Butler v. Michigan , 352 U. S. 380, 382-383; Public 
Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 F. S. 451, 464--465. It 
is in this context that we arc called on to define the 
standards "·hich must be used to iclcntify_obscene mate-
rials within the power of the State to regulate. See 
Roth Y. United States, 354 U. S. 476. --
By way of background, it is helpful to recall that, 
apart from the initial formulation in the Roth case, no 
majority of the C'ourt has at any given time been able 
to agree on a standard to determine what is pornographic 
or obscene material subject to regulation under the police 
power. See, e. g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 
(1967). Inste-ad. there has resulted "a variety of views 
among the members of the C'ourt unmatched in any other 
course of constitutional adj uclication." Interstate Cir-
cuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 704-705.~ 
" In thr ab~rnrr of a majorit~· Yirw, thi~ Court wn:s romprllcd 
to rmb~trk on thr prnf'ti('r of per curiam rr,·rr,;:d~ of com·ictions 
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The view attracting the most support at any one time, 
but never a majority, has been the tripartite test articu-
lated by MR. Jus·riCE BRENNAN, joined by Chief Justice 
Warren and Mr. Justice Fortas, in Memoirs v. Massachu-
setts, 383 U. S. 413, 418. That opinion stated: 
"We defined obscenity in Roth in the following 
terms: '[W]hether to the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards. the dominant 
theme of the material taken as a 'vhole appeals to 
the prurient interest.' 354 U. S., at 489. Under 
this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, 
three elements must coalesce: it must be estab-
lished that (a) the dominant theme of the material 
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in 
sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it 
affronts contemporary community standards relat-
ing to the description or representation of sexual 
matters; and (c) the material is utterly without 
redeeming social value." 383 U. S., at 418. 
The case we now review was tried on the theory that the 
California Penal Code § 311 incorporates that three-
stage test. But now the M ernoirs test has been aban-
doned as unworkable by its own author.3 No member 
of the Court today supports that formulatio11. 
We reverse and remand this case in light of standards 
adopted today by the Court. 
for tho dissemination of materials that at len~t fh·c members 
of the Court, applying their separate te~ts, found to be protected 
by the First Amendment. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. 
Thirty-one eases have hern decided in this manllC'r. Tho Redru71 
"policy" is, however, totally \Yithout an~· jn~tificntion exrrpt for 
the necessit~· of circumstances. Sec Walker v. Ohio, 398 U. S. 
43-± (dissent). This Comt should not a::>~ume the role of an un-
reviewable board of censorship for the 50 States, ~ubjoetin:oly jndging 
each piece of material brought heforo it. 
"Sec the opinion of Mit . .JusTICE BHENNAN in Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, infra, at pp. ---. 
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II 
This much has been categorically settled by the Court. 
that obscene, pornographic materials are unprotected by 
the First Amendment, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 
475. We acknowledge the inhere11t dangers of under-
taking regulation of any form of expression. Any step to 
develop a coherent standard that will allO\Y States to con-
trol obscenity and pornographic materials requires that 
state statutes be carefully limited. As a result, we-
now limit tho )ermissiblo scope of ro ulation to materials 
which depict s )ecifically defined )hysical conduct in a 
manner whiCh appeals to the prurient 111 erest.4 sta e 
oflense mus also e unite to materials that portray 
such conduct in a fundamentally offensive way, as dis-
tinguished from communication of ideas in works having 
literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 5 The basic 
guidelines for the trier of fact, in considering both 
prurience and fundamental offensiveness, must be 
whether "the average person, applyinl}- contemporary 
community standards" would find: / ( 1) that "the 
dominant theme of the regulated materials taken as a 
whole" ap )eals to the rurient interest, Roth, supra, 
354 U. S., at 489, and (2) that the materials portray -sexual conduct in a fundamenta y offens1ve w f a 
state aw t at regu a os o scene or pornographic rna-
4 See, e. g .. Oregon Lnw::; 1971, c. 743, Art. 29. § 255, ns an example 
of a state law directed at carefully definrcl phy::;ical conduct, as 
opposed to expres~ion. Other ~tate formulntions could be· equally 
Yalid in thiR respect. In giving this example, we do not wish to be ~ 
unclcr~tood as approYing of it in other rp::;pcrt~ uor n" c"tabli~hing -'"" ~ 
its limits as the rxtrnt of state power. -r Vl~.C.. 
" \Yc cl,a. 1~ 10 utterly without rrdecming ~ocial Yaluc"· 
test of Memoirs. supra, 383 U. S., nt 41S. Adding a snippet of 
f:lhake~pearc, a commentary on \Var nml Peace or some plat it udcs 
on the brothrrhood of man, doc~ not change the charac-ter of ob~ccnc 
material~. Sec !11ernoirs, &upra, 38:l U. S., at 460 (Wnl'l'E, .J.r 
cli,~cnting). 
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terials is thus limited, as \\Titten or construed, then First 
Amendment values as applicable to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. arc adequately served by 
the ultimate ])O\Yer of appellate courts, including this 
Court, to conduct an independent revie"· of constitutional 
claims. ''"hen necessary in particular rases of abuse. Sec 
ll1 emoirs v. M nssachusetts, 380 U. S. 413. 453 (dissenting 
opinion); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. R. 184,203 (dissenting 
opinion); Roth v. Uuited Stales, 354 "G. S. 476, 496 (ron-
cmTing and dissenting opinion). 
It is not our function to propose 1werise regulatory 
schemes for the States. That must a\\·ait concrete legis-
lative efforts. It is possible, however, to give illustrative 
examples of " ·ha·r 1s cleru·ly un )rotectccl. 
(a) Fundamentally offensive and prurient representa-
tion~. pictorial or thrrc-dimensional, of ultimate sexual 
acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, are 
unprotected. 
(b) Similar representations of masturbation, excretory 
functions, and lewd. suggestive or inviting exhibition of 
the human body arc also unprotected. 
Mere nudity. ho\Yevrr. is not neccs~arily un11rotected. 
There is nothing inherently obscene or pornographic about 
the human body itself. as some great "·orks of art demon-
strate. Sec. e. g., Fellon , .. City of Pensacola, 390 U. R. 
340. N' or docs the mere fact that mat0rials are sexually 
oriented make them unprotected. "IS .!ex and ob-
scenity are not synonymous .... '' Roth Y. [ 7nited 
States, 354 U. S. 476. at 484. 
This does not mean that sex and nudity may he ex-
ploited without limit on film. in picturrs. or in live per-
formances, any more than it can be exhibited without 
limit in open public places." At a minimum, such exhi-
'' Y'i'hilr lYe nrr not prr~enlrd lwrr IYilh the problem of rrgul:tt ing 
lrwd ph~·~irnl rondtH·t il~df, it i,..; ciP:tr that thr StalrH hnw ('l·c·n 
morr power,; to rrgulnte liOili'Nbnl, phy~irnl conduct th:tn to ,;up-
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bition must have an artistic or scientific justification. 
Medical books for thr education of phyf'icians and related 
persollncl, for example, necessarily usc graphic illustra-
tions of huma11 anatomy. Conceivably some usc of the 
unclothed body ,,·oulcl be appropriate in both graphic 
arts and theatre. but here the basic trst again must be 
wlwthcr "the dominant theme, taken as a whole, appeals 
to the prurient interest," and \Yhether the material is 
"fundamentally offensive." In resolving the inevitable 
questions of fact and law, we must continue to rely on the 
jury system, together with the safeguards that judges, 
rules of evidence, the presumption of in norcncc and othrr 
protective features provide; as v;e do with rape, murder 
and a host of other offenses against society and its 
in eli vicl ual members. 
III 
Under a national Constitution. fundamental First 
Amendment limitations on the powers of the States clo 
not vary from community to community, but this docs 
not rnean that, there are or should be uniform national 
standards of "prurient appeal" or "fundamental offen-
siveness." These are e8sentially uestions of ~t, and 
this Nat ion is simply too big am eli verse to reasonably 
expect that such standards could be articulated for all 
50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the 
prerequisite consensus exists. 'When triers of fact are 
asked to decide \vhether "the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards" \\'Ould consider cer-
tain materials "prurient," it \\·ould be unrealistic to re-
11rr~s picl orin! or thrrc-dimrnRion:ll rrprr,.,cut at ions of 1 he same 
hrha1·ior. Such Htatc rcgnl:ltion '·i,; sniJieirntl,l- .iu~tifircl if ... it 
further:< an important or subHLtnlial p;o1·rrmnrnt inlrre~t; if the· 
go1·rnm1rnt intC'f<',;t is unrrl:ttrcl lo IIH' snpprr~~ion of frrc rxprrs-
~ion; and if ihc incidcnial rr~t ri(·(ion~ on a11Pgccl Fir~t Amendment 
freedoms i~ no grcnicr thnn i~ c~~cntial to the furthrrancc of that 
intPrr~t." 'Cnitcd States \'. O'Brien. 891 U. S. 307, 37()-377. Soc· 
California v. Laltue,- U.S.-. 
•' 
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quire that the ans,,·er be based on some abstract 
formulation. The adversary system, with lay jurors as 
the ultimate factfinders in criminal prosecutions, has his-
torically permittrd jurors to draw on common human 
experirnce and on standards of their community, guided 
always by limiting instructions on the law. To requirC' 
a State to structure obscenity proceedings around evi-
dence of a national "community standard" would be an 
exercise in futility. 
As noted before. this case was tried on the theory that 
the California obscrnity statute sought to incorporate the 
tripartite test of M cmo'irs. This, a "11at.ional" standard 
of First Amendment protection enumerated by a plurality 
of this Court, was correctly regarded at the time of trial 
as limiting state prosecution under tho controlling case 
law. The jury, however, was explicitly instructed that, 
in determining whether the dominant theme of the ma-
terial "taken as a whole appealed to the prurirnt inter-
est" and in determining whether the material "goes 
substantially beyond customary limits of candor and 
affronts contemporary standards of decency," it was 
to apply contemporary community standards prevailing 
in the State of California. Thus, during the trial, both 
the prosecution and the defense assumed that the rele-
vant "community standards" in making the determina-
tion of obscenity were those of the State of California, 
not of the United States of America at large. Defense 
counsel at trial never objected to the testimony of the 
State's expert on community standards or to the in-
structions of the trial judge on "state-wide" standards. 
On appeal in the Orange County Superior Court, Ap-
pellate Department, appellant for the first time con-
tended that application of state rather than national 
standards violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
\Ve conclude that the State's failure to offer evidence 
of "national standards" and the court's charge that the 
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Jury consider state standards, was not constitutional 
error. Kothing in the First Amendment requires that a 
jury must consider such hypothetical ancl unascertainable 
"national standards" when attempting to determine 
"·hether, as a matter of fact, certain materials are obscene 
or pornographic.7 It is neither realistic nor COlJstitution-
ally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that 
the people of Maine or New Hampshire accept public con-
duct found tolerable by Las Vegas, Nevada, or New York 
City. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 455, 458-
460. Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, 378 U. S .. at 203-204. 
Roth v. United Slates, 354 U. S. 476, 496, 500-503. See 
also Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U. S. 524 (dissenting opin-
ion); Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (dissenting opinion); 
Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U. S. 319 (dissenting opinion). 
See O'Meara, Shaffer. Obscenity in The Supreme Court: 
A note on Jacobellis v. Ohio, 40 Notre Dame Law., 1, 
6-7. As the Court made clear in .Mishkin v. New York, 
383 U. S. 502, 508-509, the primary concern with requir-
ing a jury to apply the standard of "the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards" is to 
be certain that, so far as material is uot aimed at a 
deviant group, it "·ill be judged by its impact on an 
average person , rather than a particularly susceptible or 
7 In Jar·obellis Y. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, l'omr .Ju~ticf'H argurd Owl 
application of "local" communit~· standards would run thr ri ~k of 
provenling di~::;rmination of material~ in some pl:tcr~ brcau::;r srllcrs 
would be unwilling to ri~k criminal convirtion b~· tc•sting variations 
in standard::; from place to placr. 378 U. S., at 19:~-195. Thr u::;c 
of ·'national" ::;landards, however, ncer~~arilr implirs that matcriab 
found tolrrablr in some plaerH, but not undrr tlw ··national" critrria, 
will nrvrrthelrss br unav:tilnblr where thr~· arc :tcrcplablc. Thus, 
in trnn~ of d:mgc•r to fr<'C cxprC':;~ion. t lw pot cnt i:il for "u pprc~~ion 
~rrms at least a ~ ~rent in the application of a ~ inglr nationwide 
~tanclnrd nH in allrmin~ di~tribution in accoJTl:III<'C wililloeal tastes, 
a point which .Ju ~ticc Harl:tn often C'mphn~izcd. Sec Roth , .. Cnitrd 
8tatrs. supra, :3-L'5 U. S., at 506. 
.. -
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sensitive person-or indeed a totally inscn~itivc one. 
Rec Roth Y. United States, supra, 354 U. S., at 480-400. 
Compare tho now discredited test in Regina v. Hicklin 
(1868) L. R. 3 QB 360. \Ve hold the requirement that 
the jury evaluate the materials \Yith reference to con-
temporary standards of the State of California serves this 
protective purpose and is constitutionally adequate. 
IV 
Equating the free and robust exchange of ideas and 
political debate with commercial exploitation of porno-
graphic and obscene material demeans the grand con-
ception of the First A1ncndment and its high purposes 
in the historic struggle for freedom. Th<"rc is no evi-
dence, empirical or historical, that the stern 19th century 
American censorship of public distribution and display 
of material relating to sex, see Roth v. United States, 
supra, at 482-485, in any,yay limited or affected expression 
of political, scientific. or literary ideas. On the con-
trary, it \Yas an "extraordinarily vigorous period" not 
just in economics and politics, but in belle leth·es and in 
"the outlying fields of social and political philosophies."" 
To see the harsh hand of censorship of ideas and "repres-
sion" of political liberty lurking in every state regulation 
of commercial exploitation of human interest in sex is 
naive. at the very least. It confuses the means of sup-
pression "·ith the objectives. 
'Rrc Pnrring:ton, :\Jain Currrnt~ in .\nwriean Thought. Yol. :2, 
p. n·. & et Sf(f. A~ to tiH' !attN part of the lflth rrntm.l·, Parring-
t on ob,PI"\'rrl '·A nrw ngr hnd romr n ncl ot hrr cl rrnm~-t hr ngr and 
drrnm8 of n miclcllr ela~ .... ~oYerrig:nt~· . . . . Fmm t hr crudr and Ya~t 
romn nt ie:-nn:; of t h:11 Yigorou~ ~O\"PI"Pign t ~· emNgc•d r1·rn t tt:dl.1· a 
~pirit of rrnli~tir rritiei~m, srrkinJ?: to eYnluatr thr worth of thi~ urw 
Amrrira, and di~ro1·rr if po~~iblr othrr philo~ophir~ to takr 1 hr 
pl:1rc• of tho~r whic·h had p;onr clown in lhr firrrr hattlr~ of th<'" 
Cil"il \Ynr." !d., YO!. 2, :1t -1.7-t 
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One can concede that the "sexual revolution" of recent 
years is not without useful byproducts in striking layers 
of prudery from a subject long irrationally kept from 
needed ventilation. But it does not follow that "any-
thing goes." and that no regulation of explicit materials 
is needed or permissible, any more than civilir.ed people 
allow unregulated access to heroin because it is the prime 
source of medicinal morphine. 
The judgme11t of the Appellate Department of the 
Superior Court. Orange County, California., should be 
vacated and the case remanded to that court for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is for 
the California courts to determine, in the first instance. 
whether the California obscenity la \\'S, as construed and 
applied, meet the standards enunciated today by this 
Court. 
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MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opnnon of 
the Court. 
This is one of a group of "obscenity-pornography" 
cases being reviewed by the Court in a re-examination 
of standards enunciated in earlier cases on what Mr. 
Justice Harlan called "the intractable obscenity problem." 
Interstate Circuits, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 704. 
Appellant conducted a mass mailing campaign to ad-
vertise the sale of illustrated books, euphemistically called 
"adult" material After a jury trial he was convicted 
of violating California Penal Code § 311.2 (a), a mis-
demeanor, by willfully and knowingly distributing ob-
scene matter.1 Appellant's conviction was specifically 
1 The California Penal Code reads in relevant part: 
"§ 311.2 Sending or bringing into state for sale or distribution; 
printing, exhibiting, distributing or possessing within 
state 
"(a) E\·ery person who knowingly: sends or causes to be sent, 
or brings or causes to be brought , into this state for sale or distribu-
tion, or in this state prepares, publishes, prints, exihibits, di~tributes, 
or offer::; to distribute, or has in his possession with intent to dis-
tribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute, any obscene matter, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 
"§ 311. Definitions 
"As used in this chapter : 
" (a) 'Obscene matter ' means matter, taken as a whole, the pre-
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ba~?ecl on his conduct in causing five unsolicited advertis-
ing brochures to be sent through the mail in an envelope 
addressed to a restaurant in Ne\\'port Beach, California. 
The envelope 'vas opened by the manager of the restau-
rant and his mother. They had not requested the bro-
chures; they complained to the police. 
The brochures advertise four books entitled "Inter-
course," "l\1an-\Voman," "Sex Orgies Illustrated," and 
"An Illustrated History of Pornography," and a film en-
titled "Marital Intercourse." While the brochures con-
domin:111t appeal of \Yhich to the :n·eragr prr,;on, appl,,·ing con-
trmporar~· ~tandard~, i~ to prmirnt in I rrr~t. i. e., a shameful or 
morbid intcrr~t in m1dit~·, >:rx, or rxcrrtion: and iN mattrr \\·hich 
taken a::; a wholr goes suh"tnnti:lll.'· hr,,·oml cu~tomar)· limits of 
candor in dC'sc·ription or rC'prC'senta lion of such nwl tcr~: and is 
mal trr which taken as a wholr is ut terl~· wil bout rrdreming social 
importnnce. 
"(1) The predominnnt nppcal to prmient intrrest of thr m:1tler 
is judgrcl \\·ith refrrence to :1\'eragr nclul!N unlr~~ it npprarH from 
thr nature of thr mattrr of the rircllm~tancr;; of ils di,~emination, 
di,trilmt ion or exhibition, t hnt it i~ clr~ip;nrd for clen rl~· clrfi ned 
de,·iant sexual group~. in which cnse the predomin:mt app<'al of 
the mattrr shnll be jmlgrd wilh rcfNence to its intended rccipirnt 
group. 
"(2) In prosecutions under thi~ rlwptrr, where circumstancr.~ of 
production, prrsentat ion, sale, cli~semin:ll ion, di~trilml ion, or publi<'il y 
indicaiC' th:1t mattrr is being rommcrcinll~· exploilrcl b~· th<' clrfrnd-
ant for the ~:1ke of it~ prurirnt appr:d, ~nrh o,·idenre is prohatiYo 
with rr~pcct to thr nature of tho matler aml ran jn~tif~· thr conclu-
sion that the mattrr i~ ullerly without reclremillg social importance. 
"(b) 'l\ latter' me:m~ an~· book, magazine, 11C'\\'"J1apcr or other 
printed or writ t <'n mat erial or an~· pir·lnre. dr;nYing, photo).!;r:qJh, 
mot ion picture, or other pictorial rrprr~enl Mion or an~· ~t nlue or 
other fignrr, or nn)· rC'corcling, transcription or meehnnical. C'll<'ll1ical 
or electrical rcprodudion or an~· olhrr arliclr:', equipment , machim's 
or materials. 
"(c) 'Person' mean~ any indi,·idual, 11:Lrlner~hip, finn, a"'t)('ialicm, 
corporation or other legal entity. 
"(d) 'Distributr' mean" to tran~fer pos~r~'<sion of, wlJCthcr wiLh 
or without eonRicleration." 
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tain some descriptive printed material, primarily they 
consist of pictures and clra"·ings very explicitly depicting 
men and \YOmen in groups of two or more engaging in a 
variety of sexual activities, with genitals often promi-
nently displayed. 
I 
This case involves the application of a State's criminal 
obscenity statute to a situation in " ·hich sexually explicit 
materials have been thrust by aggressive sales action 
upon unwilling recipients \Yho had in no way indicated 
any desire to receive f'uch matE'rials. This Court has re-
cognized that the States have a lcgi tim ate interest in pro-
hibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material,~ 
2 This Comt h.1~ ckfinrcl "ob~rrnr mntrrinl" rtR "mntrrinl whirh 
deaL" with ~c·x in a m:mner appraling; to pmrirnt intrrr~t." R(lth 
Y. Unitrd States. 354 U. S. 476, 4~7 (19.57). hut the Roth clrfinition 
clors not rrnrrt thr ])rrri~c meaning of "ohsrrnr" ns trnditionall.v 
u~rcl in the Engli"h lnnguagr. DNiYrcl from 1 hr Lnt in obsrarnum. 
of filth, "ob>:rrnr" is drfinrd in thr '\Vrb"trr's New Intrrnational 
Dirtionnr~· (Unnhriclgrd. 2d rd .. 19!i~) n~ "ofTrn,ivr to ia~tr: fmd: 
loath~omr. di"gu,ting ... offrn~iw to rhaRtit~· of mind or to 
mod rot~·: rxprr~O'illg or pre,.;rnt ing to 1 hr mind or Yirw "omcthing 
that drlirac)·, pmit~· and decrnry forbid to he exposed; lewd ; 
inclrrrnt: as obsrrnr language, danrrs, images." Tbr authoritat i\'C' 
Oxford Engli~h Dictionary (1933 rd.) give" a "imilar definition , 
"offrnsi,·r to thr "rnscs. or to taste or refinement: cli~gu"ting , rrpul-
si,·r. filthy, foul, nbominable. loath~ome." 
Thr material \Ye are cli~ru~~ing in thi~ ra~e i~ more :trcuratrly 
defined as "pornograph~·" or "pornographic material." "Pornog-
raph~·" deriye,; from the Greek (porn!>, harlot and (J1'Q7Jhos. to 
write). The word now mran~ "1. Description or portra~·:t! of pro~­
titutr~ or pro~! it ut ion. 2. Ob~rrnr or licrntiou~ 1niting. paint-
intr. or the likc." 'Veh~trr'" Ne\\' International Dirtionnr~·. supra. 
Pornographir mnterinl which is ob~rrnr forms a sub-group of all 
"oborrnc" expression, but not the wholr. at lea~( as the word "ob-
scene" is now used in om l:mguagr. We note. thrrrforr, that the 
words "obscene material" a~ used in thi~ cacc haYe ::t sperifir judicial 
mraning whirh elates from the Roth case, i. e., ob~crnr matcri:tl 
"which deals with srx." Roth, supra, 354 U. S., at 487. Sec also· 
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particularly when the rnodc of dissemination carries with 
it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of 
unwilling recipients or of ex osure to juveniles. Stan-
ey v. eorgw, 4 U. . 557, 56 ; e rup v. New 
York, 386 U. S. 767, 769; Ginzburg v. United States, 383 
U.S. 463, 468-470. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 
622, 641-642; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 88-89; 
Prir1ce v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 169-170. Cf. 
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 382-383; Public 
Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451, 464-465. It 
is in this context that we are called on to define the 
standards which must be used to identify obscene mate-
rials within the power of the State to regulate. See 
Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476. 
By way of background, it is helpful to recall that, 
apart from the initial formulation in the Roth case, no 
majority of the Court has at any given time been able 
to agree on a standard to determine what is pornographic 
or obscene material subject to regulation under the police 
power. See, e. g., Redrup v. New Y ark, 386 U. S. 767 
(1967) . We have seen "a variety of views among the 
members of the Court unmatched in any other course 
of constitutional adjudication." Interstate Circuit, 
supra, 390 U. S., at 704-705 (Harlan, J., concurring and 
dissenting). 3 
A. L. I. Model Penal Code, § 251.4 (I) "Obscene Defined." (Of- I 
ficial Draft, 1962.) 
3 In the absence of !J majority Yiew, this Court was compelled 
to embark on the practice of summarily rever~ing conviction~ for 
tl1e dis~emination of material~ that at lcn~t five mPmb:'r,.; of 
ilw Court, npplying their 8eparate test~, found to be protected 
by the First Amendment. Redrup Y. New York, 386 U. S. 767. 
Thirty-one ca~es haYe been decided in this manner. Beyond the 
nece~::>ity of rirrumst:Jnce::, howrYer, no ju::>tification has ever bern 
offered in support of the Rrdrup "policy." See Walker v. Ohio, 398 
U. S. 43-1 (di~RC'nt). The Redrup prorrdure has cast us in the role 
of an unre\·icwable hoard of cen~or::;hip for the 50 State~, subjcetively 
judging each picre of material brought before us. 
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The view attracting the most support at any one time, 
but never a majority, has been the tripartite test articu-
lated by MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, joined by Chief Justice 
Warren and Mr. Justice Fortas, in Memoirs Y. Massachu-
setts, 383 U. S. 413, 418. That opinion stated: 
"We defined obscenity in Roth in the following 
terms: '[W]hether to the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards, the dominant 
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to 
the prurient interest.' 354 U. S., at 489. Under 
this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, 
three elements must coalesce: it must be estab-
lished that (a) the dominant theme of the material 
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in 
sex; (b) tho material is patently offensive because it 
affronts contemporary community standards relat-
ing to the description or representation of sexual 
matters; and (c) the material is utterly without 
redeeming social value." 383 U. S., at 418. 
The case we now review was tried on the theory that the 
California Penal Code § 311 incorporates that three-
stage test. But now the Memoirs test has been aban-
doned as unworkable by its own author 4 and no member-
of the Court today supports the Memoirs formulation. 
We reverse and remand this case for reconsideration 
in light of standards adopted today by the Court. 
II 
This much has been categorically settled by the Court,. 
that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amend-
ment, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 475. "The First 
and Fourteenth Amendments have never been treated as 
ab::.olutes." Brear·d Y. Alexandria., supra, 341 U. S. 622, 
1 See the opinion of MR. JuoncE BHENNAN in Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton,- U.S.-,---- (Hl73). 
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at 642, and cases ci tecl ~"'"' Tr.o~"'-_._._ ~----__ _ 
----
(1) the work taken as a whole has a predominant appeal to the prurient 
interest, Roth, supra, 354 U.S. , at 498, (2) that the work portrays 
specifically defnied physical conduct in a fundamentally offensive way, 
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values applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment arc adequately protected by the ultimate 
power of appellate courts to conduct an independent re-
vicm of constitutional claims when necessary in par-
ticular cases. Sec Memoirs Y. J.lf assachusetts, 383 U. S. 
413, 455 (dif'senting opinion); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 
U. S. 184, 203 ( dis:::enting opinion); Roth v. United 
Slates, 354 U. S. 476, 306 (concurring and dissenting 
opi11ion). 
\Vc cmphasiw that it is not our function to propose 
regulatory schemes for the States. That must await 
their concrete lcgislati ve efforts. It is possible, however, 
to give plain illustrative examples of prurient physical 
conduct. 
(a) Fundamentally offensive representations or de-
scriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, 
actual or simulated. 
(b) Fundamentally offe11sive representations or de-
scriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd ['"om iSS i D NJ 
exhibition of the human body, such as suggestive or 
sexually inviting postures focused on the genitals. 
Sex and nudity may not be exploited without limit 
on film or in pictures any more than they can be exhibited 
without limit in open public places.7 At a minimum, such 
exhibition must have serious artistic or scientific justifica-
7 Alt.hou~h we a rr not pn:~rnt ed hrre with tlw problem of re~u­
lating public lewd phy~irnl conduct itHelf, thE' Statef' h:wc greater 
power to regulate noll\·erbal, ph~·~ical conduct than to suppre~s 
pictorial or three-dimcmionnl repre~entntion;; of the ~ame behn\·ior. 
~uch state regulation "is sufficiently ju:;tified if ... il further<:~ 
an important or ~ub:-;tantial ~o\·emmrnt inlere"t; if the gon'rn-
mrnt intrre~t is unrPiatecl to thr ~UPJlre~~ion of free expre~~ion; 
:mel if the incident a! re~trirtions on allc~rd Fir.•t AmPndment free-
doms i~ no p;rratrr than is r~~rnlial to the furtherance of that 
interest." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376-377. See· 
California v. LaRue, - U. S. - (slip opinion, at 8-9) (71-36)-
(Dec. 5, 1972). 
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tion. Medical books for the education of physicians and 
related personnel, for example. necessarily use graphic 
illustrations and descriptions of human anatomy. In re-
solving the inevitably sensitive questions of fact ancllaw, 
we must continue to rely on the jury system, accompanied 
by the safeguards that judges. rules of evidence, pre-
sumption of innocence and other protective fea.tures pro-
vide, as we do with rape, murder and a host of other 
offenses against society and its individual members. 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, author of the opinion of the 
Court in Roth, supra, Jacobellis, supra, Ginzburg v. 
United States, 383 U. S. 436, Mishkin v. New York, 383 
U. S. 502, 510, and Memoirs, supra, has abandoned his 
former position and now maintains that no formulation 
of this Court, the Congress, or the States ca.n adequately 
distinguish obscene material unprotected by the First 
Amendment from protected expression, Paris Adult 
Theatre v. Slaton, - U. S. - (1973) (opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.). Paradoxically, MR. JusTICE BRENNAN 
concedes that suppression of unprotected obscene ma-
terial is permissible to avoid exposure to unconsenting 
{)___ adults, as in this case, and to juveniles, although he gives 
~ indication of how the division between protected and 
nonprotected materials may be drawn with greater pre-
cision for these purposes than for regulation of com-
mercial exposure to consenting adults only. Nor does he 
indicate where in the Constitution he finds the authority 
to distinguish between a willing "adult" of 22 and a will-
ing "juvenile" of 20. 
Under the hol-dings announced today, no one will be 
subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene 
materials unless these materials depict or describe funda-
mentally offensive "hard core" sexual conduct specifically 
defined in advance by the regulating state law, as 
written or construed. We are satisfied that these specific 
prerequisites will provide fair notice to a dealer in such 
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pornography that his public and commercial activities 
may bring prosecution. If the inability to define regu-
lated materials with ultimate, god-like precision 8 removes 
the power of the State to regulate altogether, then "hard 
core" pornography must be exposed without limit to the· 
juvenile, the passerby, and the consenting adult alike, 
as, indeed, MR. JusTICE DouGLAS contends. Miller v. 
California,- U.S.- (1973) (opinion of DouGLAS, J.). 
See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 443, 476, 482· 
(dissenting opinions of Black, J., and DouGLAS, J.); 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (concurring opinion 
of DouGLAS, J.); Roth, supra, 354 U. S., at 508 (dissent-
ing opinion of DouGLAS, J.). In that contention, how-
ever, MR. JusTICE DouGLAS stands alone. 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN also emphasizes "institutional 
stress" in justification of his change of view. Noting 
8 As MR. JusTICE BRENNAN himself stated in Roth, wpm, 354 
U. S., at 491-492: 
"Many decisions have recognized that these terms of obscenity 
statutes are not precise. [Footnote omitted.] This Court, however, 
has consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to 
the requirements of due process. ' ... [T]he Constitution does 
not require impossible standards'; all that is required is that the 
language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed 
conduct when measured by common understanding and prac-
tices. . .. ' United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 7-8. These 
words, applied according to the proper standard for judging ob-
scenity, already discussed, give adequate warning of the conduct 
proscribed and mark ' ... boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges. 
and juries to administer the law . . . . That there may be mar-
ginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line 
on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to 
hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense. . . .' 
/d., at 7. See also United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 624, 
n. 15; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc . v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340; 
United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 523-524; United States v. 
Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396; Hygrade Provision Co. v . Sherman, 266 
U. S. 497; Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273; Nash v. United States,. 
229 U. S. 373." 
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that "tho number of obscenity cases on our docket gives 
ample testimony to the burden that has been placed 
upon this Court," he quite rightly remarks that the exam-
ination of contested materials "is hardly a source of 
edification to members of this Court." Paris Adult 
Theatre, supra, at - (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). He 
also emphasizes, and we agree, that: "ullcertainty of ... 
standards creates a continuing source of tension between 
state and federal courts . . . . [ t I he problem is that 
one cannot say with certainty that material is obscene 
until at least five members of this Court, applying various 
obscure standards, have pronounced it so." 
But today, for the first time since Roth was decided 
in 1957, a majority of this Court has agreed on con-
creto guidelines to isolate "hard core" pornography from 
expression protected by tho First Amendment. No\Y we 
may abandon tho casual practice of Redrup v. New York, 
supra, and provide positive guidance to tho federal and 
state courts. This may not be an easy road, free from 
difficulty. But no amount of "fatigue should lead us to 
adopt a convenient "institutional" rationale-an abso-
lutist, "anything goes" view of the First Amendment-
because it will lighten our burdens. Any assumption con-
coming the relative burdens of tho past and tho probable 
burden under the standards now adopted is pure specula-
tion. Nor do we remedy "tension between state and fed-
eral courts" by arbitrarily clepri ving the States of a power 
reserved to them under the Constitution and which they 
have enjoyed and exorcised continuously from before 
the adoption of the First Amendment to this day. See 
Roth, supm, 354 U. S., at 482-48.3. 
Ill 
Under a national Constitution, fundamental First 
Amendment limitations on the po"·ers of the States do 
not vary from community to community, but this does 
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not mean that there arc, or should or can be, fixed, uni-
form national standards of precisely what constitutes 
"prurient appeal'' or "fundamental offensiveness." 
These are essentially questions of fact, and this nation 
is simply too big and too diverse for this C'ourt to reason-
ably expect that such standards could be articulated for 
all 50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the 
prerequisite consensus exists. 'Vhen triers of fact are 
asked to decide whether "the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards" "·ould consider cer-
tain materials "prurient," it would be unrealistic to re-
quire that the answer be based on some abstract 
formulation. The adversary system, with lay jurors as 
the ultimate factfindcrs in criminal prosecutions, has his-
torically permitted jurors to dra\Y on the standards of 
their community, guided ahYays by limiting instructions 
of the law. To require a State to structure obscenity 
proceedings around evidence of a national "community 
standard" would be an exercise in futility. 
As noted before, this case was tried on the theory that 
the California obscenity statute sought to incorporate the 
tripartite test of ]!,[ emoirs. This, a "national" standard 
of First Amendment protection enumerated by a plurality 
of this Court, was correctly regarded at the time of trial 
as limiting state prosecution under the controlling case 
law. The jury, hmYever, was explicitly instructed that, 
in determining whether the dominant theme of the ma-
terial "taken as a "·hole appealed to the prurient inter-
est" and in determining whether the material "goes 
substantially beyond customary limits of candor and 
affronts contemporary standards of decency," it was 
to apply contemporary community standards prevailing 
in the State of California. Thus, during the trial, both 
the prosecution and the defense assumed that the rele-
vant "community standards" in making the determina-
tion of obscenity were those of the State of California, 
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not of the entire United States of America. Defense 
counsel at trial never objected to the testimony of the 
State's expert on community standards or to the in-
structions of the trial judge on "state-wide" standards. 
On appeal in the Orange County Superior Court, Ap-
pellate Department, appellant for the first time con-
tended that application of state rather than national 
standards violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
We conclude that the State's failure to offer evidence 
of "national standards" and the court's charge that the 
jury consider state standards, was not constitutional 
error. Nothing in the First Amendment requires that a 
jury must consider such hypothetical and unascertainable 
"national standards" when attempting to determine 
whether, as a matter of fact, certain materials are obscene 
or pornographic.8 It is neither realistic nor constitution-
ally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that 
the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depic-
tion of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New 
York City. M emoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 
458-460 (dissenting opinion). Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, 
378 U. S., at 203- 204 (dissenting opinion). Roth v. 
United S tates, supra, 354 U. S. 476, 500-503 (concurring 
and dissenting opinion). See also Hoyt v. Minn esota, 
8 In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, two Justirrs nrgu cd thnt 
npplication of "local" community standards would run the ri ,,k of 
proyenting dissemination of materials in some places because sell ers 
would be unwilling to risk criminal conviction by testing variat ions 
in standards from place t o place. 378 U. S .. a t 193- 1D5. The use 
of "national" standards, ho\Yevcr, neces~arily implirs that mat erials 
found tolerable in some places, but not under the "nat ionnl" r rit r ria, 
will nc\·erthclcss be unavailable where they arc accept able. Thus, 
in t rrms of danger to free cxprrssion , the potential for supprr~~ion 
srems at least as great in the application of a single na tionwide 
standard as in allowing clistribut ion in accordamc with local taHtcs, 
a point which Justice Harlan often emphaRizccl. See Roth v . ['uitcd 
St ates, supra, 345 U. S., at 506. 
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399 U. S. 524 (dissenting opinion); Walker v. Ohio, 398 
U. S. 434 (dissenting opinion); Cain v. Kerntucky, 397 
U. S. 319 (dissenting opinion); O'Meara, Shaffer, Ob-
scenity in The Supreme Court: A note on Jacobellis 
v. Ohio, 40 Notre Dame Law., 1, 6-7. People in dif-
ferent States vary in their tastes and attitudes and 
this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism 
of imposed uniformity. As the Court made clear in 
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502, 508-509, the 
primary concern with requiring a jury to apply the 
standard of "the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards" is to be certain that, so far as 
material is not aimed at a deviant group, it will be 
judged by its impact on an average person, rather than 
a particularly susceptible or sensitive person-or indeed 
a totally insensitive one. See Roth v. United States, 
supra, 354 U. S., at 489-490. Compare the now dis-
credited test in Regina v. Hicklin (1868), L. R. 3 QB 
360. We hold the requirement that the jury evaluate 
the materials with reference to contemporary standards 
of the State of California serves this protective purpose 
and is constitutionally adequate. 
IV 
The dissenting Justices sound the alarum of repression. 
But, in our view, to equate the free and robust exchange 
of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation 
of obscene material demeans the grand conception of the 
First Amendment and its high purposes in the his-
toric struggle for freedom. It is a "misuse of the great 
guarantees of free speech and free press .... " Breard 
v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622, 645. The First Amendment 
protects works which have serious literary, artistic, po-
litical or scientific content, regardless of whether the 
government or a majority of tho people approve of the 
ideas those works represent. But tho public portrayal 
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of hard core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the 
ensuing commcrical gain, is a different matter. 
There is no evidence, empirical or historical, that the 
stern 19th century American censorship of public dis-
tribution and display of material relating to sex, see 
Roth v. United States, supra, 354 U. S., at 482-485, in 
anyway limitC'd or affcctrcl C'xprcssion of political, scien-
tific. or litC'rary ideas. On the contrary, it is beyond any 
question that the era. from Thomas Jefferson to Theodore 
Roosevelt, \Yas an "extraordinary vigorous period" not 
just in economics and politics, but in belle lettres and in 
"the outlying fields of social and political philosophies." 9 
\Ve do not see the harsh hand of censorhip of ideas-
good or bad. sound or unsound-and "repression" of po-
litical liberty lurking in every state regulation of com-
mercial exploitation of human interest in sex. Mn. Jus-
'l'JCE BRENN AN finds "it is hard to sec how state-ordered 
regimen ta.tion of our minds can ever be forestalled." 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra,- U. S., at-
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.). But this Court can distin-
guish commerce in ideas, protected by the First Amend-
ment, from commercial exploitation of pornography and 
0 Sec Parrin~rton, Main Current~ in American Thought, vol. 2, 
p. IY, & et SNJ. .\~to the latter part of the 19th crntur.1·, Paning-· 
ton observrcl "A nrw ngc hnd rome :1ncl othrr drrams-lhr agr tmd 
dreams of a middle class so1·rrPignt~· . . . . From thr crude and Yast 
romnntir~ms of that Yigorous soYrrrignt~· emerged rwn(ll;lll.'· a 
spirit of rralistir critiei~m, seekiug to eya]uatc thr \rorth of thi~ new 
Amerira, nncl discon•r if pos;:;iblC' other philosophies to take the 
plarr of tho::;r which hnd gone clown in the fierre battlr~ of ihe 
Cid \Ynr." !d .. ,·ol. 2, at 47-L 8rr nl~o ::'llori~on, Comm:1ger, nncl 
Lcuchtrnburg, Thr Growth of thr American Republic (6th rd., 
19()9), Yol. 2. nt 107-288; Gnrr;ll~· . Thr Nrw Commom,·calth (196.'1 
eel.), 220-385; Pnth~ of Amrrir;m Thought (SehbingN, \Vhifr eel., 
1063 rei.). 105-lHl, 12a--2!)0 (nrtieb br Firming. L<.'rnrr. Coh<.'n, 
White, K Ro~tow, Samul'l~on, Knr-in, Tlof~tadtrr); and vVi~h, So-
rirty and Thought in Modern Amerit•a (1!).')2 rd.), 337-:3RG. 
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obscenity. Moreover the control of hard core pornog-
raphy so as to make it unavailable to nonadults has all 
the elements of "censorship" applying only to adults; 
indeed even more rigid enforcement techniques may be 
called for with this dichotomy of regulation. 
One can concede that the "sexual revolution" of recent 
years may have had useful byproducts in striking layers 
of prudery from a subject long irrationally kept from 
needed ventilation. But it does not follow that no regu-
lation of sexually explicit materials is needed or per-
missible; civilizerl people do not allow unregulated access 
to heroin because it is the prime source of medicinal 
morphine. 
The judgment of the Appellate Department of the 
Superior Court, Orange County, California, is vacated 
and the case remanded to that court for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Vacated and rem,anded. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTIC E WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~u:prttttt <qoud of tqt ~ttittb ~~ts­
~agqmgton. ~. <q. 21lpJ~.;t 
January 18, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE-: Obscenity Cases 
The Chief Justice has circulated Memoranda in 
No. 70-2 United States v. 200 Ft. Reels 
No. 70-69 United States v. Or ito 
No. 70-73 Miller v. California 
No. 71-1051 Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton 
/ 
I assume he will in due course be circulating a Memorandum 
in the remaining three cases: 
No. 71-1134 Roaden v. Kentucky 
No. 71-1315 Alexander v. Virginia 
No. 71-1422 Kaplan v. California 
In light of the views I expressed in my Memorandum in 
Paris Adult Theatre, I would, of course, disagree with the 
Chief Justice in Or ito, 200 Ft. Reels and Miller. I shall, after 
the memorandum in the three remaining cases is circulated, 
attempt a revision of my Memorandum in Paris Adult Theatre 
to answer the proposals of the Chief Justice in all of the cases. 
I contemplate that I'll not be able to complete this for some time. 
W.J.B. Jr. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
j>uvrmt <!Jcurt cf t4t 'Jllnittlt j5taftg 
~asJrmghtn.. ~. <!f. 2LT.;t't.~ 
March 19, 1973 
Re: Obscenity Cases 
Dear Bill, 
As I have previously told you, I agree 
with your views in these cases. Accordingly, 
I join your eight separate circulations of 
March 16. · 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
j;uvumc ~ou.rt of tltt ?Jnitdt ,§tales 
'Wru;ItiJt!)ton. p. <!f. 20,5)1-,3 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL March 20, 1973 
Re: Obscenity Cases 
Dear Bill: 
I agree with all eight of your 
obscenity proposals. I am ready to join 
each of them. 
Sincerely,~'-­
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: Conference 
April 16, 1973 
'/(), 7:3 
Miller v. California and ether Obscenity Cases 
Dear Chief: 
Over the weekend, I reviewed preliminarily your revised drafiB 
of ~inions for the Court in the obscenity cases. 
One point that attracted my attentioo and seems important is the 
change in the pr~osed test of "obscene" material. This occurs in 
MUler, the ease in which the test is formulated. In the third draft of 
Miller, p. 5, the test includes the famUiar Roth requirement: 
"That the 'dominant theme of the regulated material 
taken as a whole' appeals to the prurient interests, " 
R<th, supra . . . " 
- The new drafts changed this language (see p. 6 drafts 4 and 5 of 
MUler) to read as follows: 
''Whether the 'average persoo apply.ing contemporary 
community standards' would find (i) that the challenged 
material, viewed in Its setting, appeals to the prurient 
interests, Rcth, supra. " 
On the same page the third portion of the test is articulated in similar 
language as follows: 
'~3) that the challenged material, viewed in its setting, 
does n<t have serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific content. " 
-2-
I recognize, of course, that no words in this esoteric area can 
be free from doubt as to their meaning. The Roth and Memoirs tests 
abundantly demonstrated the impossibility of assigning precise meaning 
to particular words. The great virtue of your new formulation is to re-
late the test, overall, to conduct. This, in itself, is a significant clari-
fy~ step. 
Yet, I must say that I feel less sure as to the meaning of the 
language change from "taken as a whole" to "viewed in its setting." I 
am in full accord with the view made clear elsewhere in your opinion that 
an otherwise obscene product cannot be sanctified by including fragments 
of history, politics or meritorious literature. Yet, I still think juries 
should be required to view the work "as a whole, " and not be left free to 
condemn a book or a movie on the basis of random selected descriptions 
or portrayals offensive to the particular jury. This random selection 
technique would conceivably have invalidated a substantial segment of 
what is widely regarded as serious and meritorious literary work. 
There is also merit, I think, in changing the Roth formulation only 
where it must be changed to accord with your basic "conduct" orientation. 
I am in full accord with the elimination of the third element in Memoirs, 
requiring that the material be "utterly without redeeming social value." 
This qualification has been the principal defect in the Roth test, as ex-
panded in Memoirs. -
With these thoughts in mind, I wonder if you would be :willine: to 
revert to the substance Qf your original formulation ' so that the ba.'~ic 
guidelines (Miller, p. 6} would read substantially as follows: 
"(1) that the dominant theme of the challenged 
material , taken as a whole, appeals to the pru-
rient interest, Roth, supra, 3 54 U.S. 489, (2) 
that the material portrays specifically defined 
physical conduct in a fundamentally offensive way, 
and (3) that the challenged material lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political or scientific content." 
Apart from believing that this terminology is less likely to be mis-
understood or abused, I would prefer to see us remain as close to Roth as 
we can. You accept Roth as the basic foundation for your opinion, namely, 
that the First Amendment does not protect obscene materials. It is Justice 
Brennan's opinion that now wishes to jettison Roth, abandoning a substantial 
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volume of constitutional doctrine. There is virtue in maintaining as 
much constancy as possible, and I think your opinion is strengthened 
by maintaining that posture and, perhaps, even contrasting it with the 
radical new departure by the dissenters. 
I am not circulating this letter to the Conferenee, as I do not 
wish to add further uncertainty at this time. I think, however, that 
your original language presents a stronger opinion. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
LFP,Jr.:psf 
CHAMI!IERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
,jn:prttttt <!fourl of flrt ~b .ibdtg 
'JihtgJrington. ~. <!f. 2llgi~.;l 
April 16, 1973 
Re: Obscenity Cases 
Dear Chief: 
/ 
Having reviewed the recent circulations in these 
cases, including yours, I am still with you in 
No. 70-2, 12 200-Ft Reels, based on your second draft 
of April 9; No. 70-69, Orito, based on your second 
draft of April 9; No. 70-73, Miller v. California, 
based on your fifth draft of April 11; and No. 71-1051, 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, based on your fourth 
draft of April 11. 
I also join your opinion in No. 71-1422, Kaplan 
v. California, based on your second draft of April 9, 
as well as your suggested per curiam in No. 71-1315, 
Alexander v. Virginia, circulated on April 9. 
In view of the changes you have made in your 
present circulations, I am inclined to withdraw my con-
curring opinion circulated in some of the above cases. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~upr.em.e Cliourt of t~.e ~11it.eo ~tat.es 
?Jlffas~ington, c!EL QI. 20543 
May 9. 1973 
Re: No. 70-73 - Miller v. California and companion cases 
Dear Chief: 
I have studied carefully your recirculations of May 8. 
I am close to joining you. but I have one primary reservation. 
I learned this morning that Lewis entertains the same reservation. 
He showed me today his letter to you of April 16. and 1 am free 
to state that I am substantially in accord with both points he raises 
in that letter. 
My concern centers on the revised material on page 7 
of the Miller opinion. This. of cou se. is the heart of the obscenity 
decisions. Despite the addition of the new footnote 7. I am some-
what concerned -- and Lewis entertains this concern -- with the 
descriptions in (1), (2). and (3) in the first full paragraph of that 
page. We know what you mean, but each of us wonders whether 
the meaning is absolutely clear. I believe our difficulty centers 
in the phrase "in its entire setting. 11 This phrase would replace 
the familiar Roth requirement that the "work" be "taken as a whole." 
Courts and lawyers will be asking themselves (as, indeed both 
Lewis and I did) whether the opinion intends to change the rather 
fundamental requirement that the challenged work be judged as a 
whole rather than fragmented. Doubt as to our meaning would 
frustrate one of the purposes of our many months of effort: to 
clarify and resolve as many of the present ambiguities as possible. 
In addition. if the words "challenged material" in (3) were replaced 
by the single word "work." or something similar, I would feel 
better. 1 also suggest. mildly, that the last two words of (3) be 





If these changes could be made, I am with you. 1 
realize that you may !eel I am quibbling. I earnestly feel that 
these suggestions will aid in clat"ification, and I suspect that 
is what we are all stl"iving for at this point. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
be: Mr. Justice Powell V 
5-9-73 Rider A (Miller) 
This phrase woulll replace the familiar ~requirement 
that the "work" be "taken as a whole". Courts and lawyers will 
be asking themselves (as, indeed both Lewis and I did) whether the 
opinion intends to change the rather fundamental requirement that .. 
the challenged work be judged as a whole rather than fragmented. 
Doubt as to our meaning would frustrate one of the purposes of our 
many months of effort: to clarify and resolve as many of the present 
ambiguities as possible. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~rttttt <qomt ttf tqt ~ttittb .itattg 
._ulfhtghm. ~. <q. 2ll,?){.,;l 
May 15, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: Obscenity Cases 
/ 
I have advised the Chief Justice that, subject to some 
suggested changes in phraseology, I am prepared to join his 
opinions in the following cases: 
No. 70-73 Miller v. California 
No. 71-1051 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 
No. 71-1422 Ka£lan v. California 
No. 70-2 United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels 
No. 70-69 United States v. Orito 
No. 11-1;n5 Alexander v. Virginia 
The Chief advises me that these changes will be made. I 
therefore circulate this memorandum to avoid further delay pending 
receipt of new drafts from the printer. 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.i;ltpt'mt:t ~xmrl of t!rt ~b .i;taftg 
'Jiiag!p:ttght~ J. <!J. 2ll&l~~ 
May 18, 1973 
Re: No. 70-73 - Miller v. California 
Dear Bill: 
In response to your suggestion, I am quite willing 
to change footnote No. 8 on page 8 to read as follows: 
'''§_/ 
Although we are not presented here with 
the problem of regulating lewd public conduct 
itself, the States have greater power to regulate 
nonverbal, physical conduct than to suppress 
depictions or descriptions of the same behavior. 
In United States v. O'Brien, 391 u.s. 367, 376-
377 (1968), a case not dealing with obscenity, 
the Court held a State regulation of conduct which 
itself embodied both speech and non-speech 
· elements to be 1 sufficiently justified if • • • it 
furthers an important or substantial government 
interest; if the government interest is unrelated 
to the suppression of free expressioa; and if 
the incidental restrictions on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest. 1 
See California v. LaRue, U.S. (slip 
opinion, at 8-9) (71-36) (Dec. 5, 1972). 11 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
7 
t:..~ f. • ~~ 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
$ Mr. Just ~ ce Brennan 
Mr. Just'cc Stewart 
Mr. Just ce Vlhi te 
Mr . Jus t ' ce r.:·ushall 
Mr . Justice Blackmun 
Mr . Justice Powell 
Kr . Justice Rehnquist 
2nd DRAFT 
From : The l-~LLc:.1. Justice 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATmculated : MAY 1 9 1972 
No. 70-73 Recirculated : __ ~----~---
Ma.rvin Miller, Appellant, 
v. 
State of California. 
On Appeal from the Ap-
pellate Department, Su-
perior Court of California, 
County of Orange. 
[May - , 1972] 
Memo to the Conference. 
Here are my views on the above case. I begin with 
the facts. 
Appellant was convicted by jury of violating Cali-
fornia Penal Code § 311.2, a misdemeanor, by willfully 
and knowingly distributing obscene matter. His con-
viction was based on his conduct in causing five un-
solicited advertising brochures to be sent through the 
mails in an envelope addressed to a restaurant in New-
port Beach, California as part of a mass mailing of 
such brochures. The envolope was opened by the man-
ager of the restaurant and his mother, who then com-· 
plained to the police. 
The brochures advertise four books entitle "Inter-
course," "Man-Woman," "Sex Orgies Illustrated," and 
"An Illustrated History of Pornography," and a film 
entitled "Marital Intercourse." While they contain 
some descriptive printed material, listings of other avail--
~able publications, and order blanks, they primarily con-· 
sist of pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting 
men and women in groups of two or more engaging in 
a variety of sexual activities, with genitals often promi-· 
nently displayed. 
An examination of the materials reveals that by a.ny· 
standard they are "hard core" pornography of a kind 
not protected by the First Amendment. Nevertheless,. 
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petitioner claims error in that the jury was instructed 
to determine the obscene character of the materials with 
reference to state-wide, rather than national, standards 
of offensiveness. 
I 
I begin with the proposition that under Roth v. United 
States, 354 U. S. 476 ( 1957), the First Amendment does 
not protect the right to disseminate or engage in other 
"public" activities with respect to obscene materials. 
Cf. United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super Bmm. 
Film, et al., ante, at - ; Stanley v. Georg1:a, 394 U. S. 
557 (1969). This leaves the difficult problem of how 
to identify what is or is not "obscene" and whether 
there is but one or a spectrum of standards. 
Apart from the initial formulation in the Roth case, 
no majority of the Court at any given time has been 
able to agree on a single rule to describe "obscene" 
materials subject to regulation. Sec, e. g., Redrup v. 
New York, 386 U. S. 767 (1967). In light of this lack 
of unanimity, the idea that the Constitution commands, 
or that the Court can articulate, a single verbal formula 
of nationwide applicability governing every State was 
perhaps never more than a wish to find a simple solu-
tion to a complex a.nd elusive . problem. The States 
should not be forced into a constitutional straitjacket 
am61guously verbalized when a maJority of £Ius Court 
is una6le to agree on a standard. The critical inquiry, 
so far as state prosecutwns are concerned, should b 
whether the elements of the state offense arc drawn with 
sufficient care to ensure that enforcement of the state 
law is clearly focused on materials that portray sexual 
activities in a fundamentally offensive way, as distin-
guished from communication of ideas in works having 
literary, artistic, political, or social value. If a state 
statute is reasonably limited in this regard, by its terms 
C-f.·~ 
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or as interpreted, then First Amendment values, as appli-
cable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
arc adequately served by the additional freedom of ap-
pellate courts, including this Court, to conduct an inde-
pendent review of the record when necessary in particula.r 
cases of egregious abuse by state action. See 111 emoirs 
Y. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 455 (1!)66) (dissenting 
opinion); Jacobellis v. Oh·io, 378 U. S. 184, 203 (1!)64) 
(dissenting opinion); Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 
476, 496 (1957) (concurring and dissenting opinion). 
The tripartite test articulated in the plurality opinion 
in Memcnrs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413 (1966), not-
withs tana ing certain infirmities inherent in any such 
"test," is adequate to achieve that end. That opinion 
stated: 
"We defined obscenity in Roth in the following 
terms: '[Wlhethcr to the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards, the dom-
inant ~heme of the material taken as a whole 
appeals to the prurient interest.' 354 U. S., at 
48!). Under this definition, as elaborated in sub-
sequent cases, three ek!_,ncnts must coal~sce: it must 
be established that (a) the dominant theme of 
the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient 
interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive 
because it affronts contemporary community stand-
ards relating to the description or representation 
of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterlyJ 
without redeeming social value." 383 U. S., at 418. 
I 
While this verbal formulation satisfies First Amend-
!3 
~.~ 
ment requirements, I am not prepared to say that it  s'o/, 
is the only satisfactory definition of obscene materials ~~
a State can adopt, or even that it is the best that can I!J.,L~--. 4 
be devised. The unelaboratcd Roth formulation itself '_- -;:--~ q__. 
conveys the essential idea that in order to satisfy the 9 ~>tfo ..t.._{~ ..__ --- ~~·· 
----.t)'---------------------N--------~-- -~? 
.. i I t IJ 1J - A • IJ ~ _ • -~~~ .. cw• au s &>f ,.__..~ ,.v~ 
n_ ~ ~J~~c...,~~~~ 
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First Amendment a state regulation must be clearly 
aimed at materials portraying sexual activities in a 
fundamentally offensive manner. Other "tests" that 
a State might adopt could be equally satisfactory. 
It is in this framework that appellant's contentions 
should be evaluated. 
II 
This case was tried on the theory that the California 
statute incorporates a tripartite test for obscenity sub-
stantially identical to that announced in the plurality 
opinion in the Memoirs case. The jury was explicitly 
instructed! however, ~ in determining whether the 
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole ap-
pealed to the prurient interest and in determining 
whether the material "goes substantially beyond cus-
tomary limits of candor and affronts contemporary 
standards of decency" they were to apply contemporary 
comn111njty standards of the State of California. Bath 
the prosecution and the defense tried the ca.se on tho 
theory that the relevant "community standards'' in I 
making the determination of obscenity wore those of the 
State of California, not of the United States of America 
at large. Defense counsel at trial at no point 
objected to the testimony of the State's expert on com-
munity standards or to the instructions of tho trial 
judge on the ground that "state-wide" standards were 
inappropriate. On appeal in the Orange County Supe-
rior Court, Appellate Department, appellant for the 
first time contended that application of state rather 
than national standards violated the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. He raises the same contention 
here. 
In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184 ( 1964) , four mem-
bers of the Court divided on the question whether the 
prevailing test for obscenity required materials to be 
judged by national or local standards. Since that time, 
70-73-MEMO 
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the Court has not explicitly addressed the issue, and 
it has never fully explicated the role it envisaged for 
"commm1ity standards" in defining obscene materials 
·within the power of a State to regulate under Roth and 
subsequent cases. Probably this reflects what has been 
the continuing uncertainty among members of the Court 
themselves in this perplexing, sensitive and elusive area. 
Community standards was not an explicit element of 
the Model Penal Code test for obscenity that so strongly 
influenced the Court in the Roth and M enwirs cases.1 
In the Roth formulation, community standards appeared 
to be linked to determining the general question of the 
"prurient appeal" of the materials. But in the later 
Memoirs plurality opinion, it was stated to be specifi-
cally relevant to the narrower question of "patent of-
fensiveness"-that is, whether the material is "patently 
offensive because it affronts contemporary community 
standards relating to the description or representation 
of sexual matters." 383 U. S., at 418. I read this 
language as treating dissemination of pornography much 
like any other intolerable nuisance found offensive to 
a community. 
The Memoirs plurality thus recognized that a prima!)" 
justification for the long-standing power of States, in 
the exercise of the1r pohce power, to regulate "public" 
activities with respect to obscene "lnateria:ls-such "7ts 
the d1ssemmatwn revealed""by this record-rs their atent 
ot:ensiveness to the deeply held standar s regarclin~ 
portrayal of sexual matters ;erevailing in the commu-
nity. fn these terms, the application of the standards 
or the local community where the dissemination occurs 
properly serves the values of the First Amendment, as 
the decisions of this Court and others have long as-
sumed. The very instructions before the Court when 
1 Model Penal Code § 251.4 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) ,. 
§ 207.10 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957). 
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it affirmed the conviction in Roth clearly contemplated 
that the jury would apply its own concept of standards 
of decency as the "common conscience" of what the 
judge referred to as "our community." They were ex-
plicitly instructed that they were completely free to 
disregard any and all expert testimony as they saw 
fit.~ In light of this instruction, it can hardly be sug-
2 The pertinent instruct ionr-; in Roth wrrr nr-; follows: 
"The real disputed is~ue is thr second elemrnt of the offenso-the 
nature and character of the circulnrs, book, pictures :1nd publications. 
Who dCltermines that issue? 
"You, as membe1·s of the jury, are the sole and exclu~ive judges 
of the facts, and it is for you to deride, as you decide all questions 
of fa.rt. 
"What is mrant b~· 'obscrne, lewd. lascivious nnd filthy' and what 
standards do you apply in reaching a cletrrmination whether the 
pictures, circular~ or hook nrc of thnt charactrr? 
"The words 'obscrne, lewd nne! lasci,·ious' as used in the law, 
signify thnt form of immorality which has relation to sexual im-
purity and has a trndenr~' to excite lustful thoughts. The matter 
must be calculated to corrupt nnd debauch the minds nnrl mornls 
of those into whose hands it may fall. It must lend to stir sexual 
impulses and lmd to sexual!~· impure thoughts. The test is not 
whether it would nrm1~c sexual desires or sexunl impure thoughts 
in those comprising a pnrticulnr segment of the cmmmmity, the 
young, the immature or thc highly prudiHh or would leave nnother 
segment, the scientific or highl.v cducatcd or the so-called worldly-
wise and sophisticated indifferent and unmoYed. 'Filthy' as used 
here must also relate to sexua I. matters. It is dist inguiHhable from 
the term 'obscene,' which trnd to promote l.u~t nnd impure thoughts. 
'Filthy' pertnins to that sort of treatment of sexunl matters in such 
a vulgar and indecent way, so that it tend~ to nrou~e n feeling of 
disgust and revulsion. 
"The test in each case is the effect of the book, picture or publi-
cation considered as :1 whole, not upon any particular class, but 
upon all those whom it is likrl~' to reach. In other words, you de-
termine its impact upon the a\·era~;~_e pcr~on in the community. 
The book~, pictures nnd circul:i7s must be judged as a whole, in 
their entire context, and you arc not to com,icler detached or separate 
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gestcd that the trial judge, or this Court 111 affirming 
Roth's conviction, expected the jury to apply some 
concept of a "national" standard of decency and ac-
ceptability in the portrayal of sexual matters. The 
t1trPi1 nnd publication~ which have brrn put in evidencr by present-
day standards of the community. You ma~· ask your~elves does it 
offend the common ron~rienre of thr community by present-day 
stand:uds. 
"The dcfmdant hrrr has rnlled rrrtain rxprrt witne~ses. Their 
testimony has bern admitted for the purpose of showing you what 
the rommon conscience of the community is tocl:ty. You are not 
bound by it. You are at libe1·ty to arcept or reject, in whole o:r in 
part, such testimony, accepting only that portion which commends 
itself to your judgment. Thr~e witnesses ~ave their opinions as to 
the impart this literature would have on the general public. 
Whether or not i hrHe pirtmrs nnd publications are of such a char-
acter a~ to stir sexual impnbes or arou~r lustful passions or are 
revulsive or dis~nsting must be detrrmined b~· you and you alone, 
acrordin~ to the st:mdnrcls I have given you. 
"The testimony of an expert witness is treated no differently than 
that of any other witne~s. Yon wei~h his or her interest in the case, 
possible bias or prrjudire, manner of trstifying, and in general 
evaluate the testimony in accordance with your !!;OOd, sound rom-
mon sense and what apprals to ~·our reason. 
"The defendant. fllso introduced in evidPnce certnin books, best-
sellers, and excrrpts therefrom, as some evidence of the current read-
ing hnbits of the public. I instruct ~·ou whnt wei!!;ht if any you give 
to this evidPJH'e re8ts with you. I cnution you you nre not required 
to limit yourselws to a consideration of one or all of the books 
introduced b~· the defencbnt as exnmples of presrnt-dny standards 
of litrra.r~· taste. You may con~ider and compare the number of 
people who read these books with the number of people who mnke 
up our community, nnd it mny be your judgmc•nt that some or all of 
the boob introduced by the defendnnt :1re obscene themselves, in 
accordance with the standard I have given you. 
"In thi.~ tasr, ladies and gentelmen of tlw juru, you and you alone 
are the exclusive judges of what the common conscience of the com-
munity is, and in determining that conscience you are to consider 
the community as a 11•hole, ymwg and old, educated and uneducated, 
the religions and the irreligious-men, women and children . ... " 
(Emphasi'J added.) 
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jury's assessment of community standards of decency 
on the basis of its mvn experience is not fundamentally 
different from the use of the "reasonable man" criteria 
in other contexts, on \Yhich courts have relied for 
centuries. 
This view, implicit in Roth, was made explicit in 
Justice BRENNAN's dissenting opinion in Kingsley Books, 
Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436, 447-448 ( 1957), in which 
he stated: 
"In Alberts v. California and Roth v. United 
States, decided today . . . , the Court held to be 
constitutional the following standard for judging 
obscenity-whether to the average person, arply-
ing contem Jorary community standards, the dom-
inan 1eme of the material ta en as a w ole appeals 
to prurient interest. . . . J 
"The jury represents a cross-section of the com-
munity and has a special aptitude for reflecting 
the view of the average person. Jury trial of ob-
scenity therefore provides a peculiarly competent 
application of the standard for judging obscenity 
which, by its definition, calls for an appraisal of 
material according to the average person's appli-
cation of contemporary community standards. A 
statute which does not afford the defendant, of 
right, a jury determination of obscenity falls short, 
in my view, of giving proper effect to the standard 
fashioned as the necessary safeguard demanded by 
the freedoms of speech and press for material which 
is not obscene. Of course, as with jury questions 
generally, the trial judge must initially determine 
that there is a jury question, i. e., that reasonable 
men may differ whether the material is obscene." 
(Emphasis added.) 
70-73-MEl\10 
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Perhaps the most perceptive statement of the role 
the jury should nd the standards it should apply 
is that of Judg Hand · his seminal decision in United· 
States v. Kenner , 09 Fed. 119 (SDNY 1913). There 
he stated: 
"Yet, if the time is not yet when men think in-
nocent all that which is honestly germane to a 
pure subject, however little it may mince its wordsr 
still I scarcely think that they would forbid all 
which might corrupt the most corruptible, or that 
society is prepared to accept as its own limitations 
those which may perhaps be necessary to the weak-
est of its members. If there be no abstract defini--
tion, such as I have suggested, should not the wor-d 
'obscene' be allowed to indicate the present critical 
point in the compromise between candor and shame 
at which the community may have arrived here 
and now? If letters must, like other kinds of con-
duct, be subject to the social sense of what is right, l 
it wouLd seem that f!)uru.. shou~d in each case estab-
lish the standard much as they do in cases of 
1::;-g[-~,gence. To put thought m leash to the average 
consc1ence of the time is perhaps tolerable, but to 
fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least 
capable seems a fatal policy. 
"Nor is it an objection, I think, that such an 
interpretation gives to the words of the statute a 
varying meaning from time to time. Such words 
as these do not embalm the precise morals of an 
age or place; while they presuppose that some things 
wilt always be shocking to the public taste, the 
vague .subject matter is left to the gradual devel-
op_)nent of general notions about what is decent. 
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the content comprised within such words at any 
given time, but to do so they must be free to fol-
low the colloquia.l connotations which they lwve 
drawn UJJ instinctively from life and common 
speech." 209 Fed. , at 121. (Emphasis added.) 
That we have almost instantmlcous global communi-
cations, gives no support for the concept that there 
exist "national" standards of taste or of what consti-
tutes pornography or obscenity. In a society as diverse 
as ours, the notion of a homogenous "national" con-
sensus of what is or is not tolerable in the commercial 
exploitation of human interest in sexual matters is com-
pletely divorced from reality. Beyond that there is 
no rational basis whatever in law, logic, or human 
experience to tell us that the people of every State and 
community must adjust their ideas of what is decent 
in the portrayal of sexual activities to what is found 
tolerable in some other and perhaps distant place. The ( 
Constitution does not demand such Orwellian c<m: 
f ~mity to uniform standards of taste. Moreover, as 
illustrated by t 1e cone uct of the tnal in this case, it 
is difficult enough to ascertain "statewide" community 
standards with any degree of certainty and objectivity, 
let alone those of the Kation as a whole. Here, for 
example, the prosecution relied on a statewide survey, 
admittedly not "scientifically" designed, conducted by 
a vice-squad sergeant in the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment, while the defense relied on the conclusions of its 
alleged "expert" based in large part on occasional dis-
cussions with relatives a.nd friends. \Vhat either could 
contribute that jurors did not know is at best a matter 
of dubious conjecture. For rvery other purpose within 
the fact-finding function of .~r,ors we treat them as in 
a collective sense "ths conscience of the community." 
That this is fraught with hazards and difficulties in the 
First Amendment area there is no doubt, but that is 
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the essence of our system of justice up to now and few \ 
would be so bold as to say the jury system is any less 
pcr·fect than other human institutions. 
Recognizing these difficulties, Mr. Chief Justice War-
ren wrote in Jacobellis, supra: 
"It is my belief that when the Court said in Roth I 
that obscenity is to be defined by reference to 
'communit stan rc s 1 meant commum s an -
ards-not a national stanc ard, as 1s sometimes ar-
gued. Tbelieve that there is no provable 'national 
standard,' and perhaps there -;holi'i'C.'i"be no-ne.-At 
all eve~ts, this Court has not been able to enunciate 
one, a11d it would be unreasonable to expect local 
courts to divine one. It is said that such a 'com-
munity' approach may well result in material being 
proscribed as obscene in one community but not 
in another, and in all probability, that is true. But 
communities throughout the Nation are in fact 
diverse, and 1t must be remembered that, m cases -such as this one. the Court is confronted with the 
task of reconciling conflicting rights of the diverse 
communities within our society and of individuals." 
378 U. S., at 200-201. 
I accept this analysis. In a society that prides it-
self-and properly so-in supporting pluralism and di-
versity there is no sound reason for the law to say that 
what is found tolerable in the portrayal of sexual activi-
ties in Los Angeles or Las Vegas must be accepted in 
Maine and Vermont. The justification for regulation 
of the dissemination of such material is the offense it 
gives to the people living in the community in which 
the dissemination occurs-not that it might give in 
some other community hundreds or thousands of miles 
away. 
The primary concern of Roth over "tests" and stand-
ards was not that the jury would draw simply upon its 
-~,h~ 
~~ 
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own experience in determining the degree of offensive-
ness and indecency of the sexually oriented materials 
before it, but that they might be swayed by undue 
regard for the sensibilities of some peculiarly susceptible 
or sensitive member of the community. So far as the 
related question of the "prurient appeal" of the materials 
was concerned, this was the primary fallacy of the now 
discarded and unworkable test of Regina v. Hicklin, 
L. R. 3 Q. B. 360, that permittee! materials to be pro-
hibited where "the tendency of the matter charged as 
obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds 
are open to such immoral influences." A rule permit-
ting regulation of public activities with respect to sexually 
explicit materials solely on the basis of their offensive-
ness to particularly susceptible or weak individuals would 
be equally objectionable. Cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 
U. S. 380 (1957). 
An instruction to the jury to assess the materials in 
terms of the standards of their own community is as 
sound to assure that dissemination of such materials 
will not be prohibited solely on the basis of the per-
sonal predilictions of members on the jury as the "reason-
able man" criteria of negligence and other kinds of 
cases. It minimizes the risk that the evaluation will 
be made on the basis of possible impact on a peculiarly 
sensitive person; in so doing the instruction adequately 
serves the purposes of the First Amendment. 
It should be fully evident from the previous description 
of the materials involved in this case that regulation of 
their dissemination presents none of the exceedingly dif-
ficult problems surrounding attempts to-regulate works 
of genuine literary, scientific, educational, political or ar-
tistic value, most often presented in book form. Words,\ 
of course, are poor instruments to convey the distinction \ 
between legitimate works and the kind of materials in-
volved in this case. But the instructions of the trial 
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judge required the jury to find, before reaching its verdict, 
not only that the dominant theme of the material taken 
as a whole appealed to the prurient interest of an average 
person, but that the material was "utterly without re-
deeming social value." (I have never been sure just 
what this phrase means, but neither-very likely-are 
most lay jurors so that we could disregard it without 
great risk.) 
It is open to dispute whether an inqury into "redeem-
ing social value" should be viewed as a First Amendment 
requirement separate and apart from the question of the 
"prurient appeal" of the material. See, e. g., M emoiTs v. 
Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 460 (1966) (WHITE, J., 
dissenting). Furthermore, the statement that material 
should be "utterly" without redeeming social value is 
clearly too sweeping, for its tendency has been to permit 
those who would commer cially exploit the market for 
matenals portraymg sexual acb v1h es m a fundame'i1tally 
offensive and indecent way to insulate themselves from 
liability by the formalistic inclusion of some material 
th-;t might "6e tliought to n ave some tfvalue,' ' but is 
usually at best only tangentially relateCI to the real 
matter of interest. Courts have seen patently spurious 
"inserts" to season filth with a dash of the race problem~ 
foreign policy or the evils of "war profiteering." But 
such questions are not squarely presented on this record. 
Whatever the requirements of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, the California statute required the jury to 
find not only that the dominant theme of the materials 
appealed to the prurient interest, but that it was "ut-
terly" without redeeming social value. Independent re-
view of the record shows the jury's conclusion in these 
respects abundantly supported. Under these circum-
stances, I am unwilling to conclude that the high pur-
poses served by the First Amendment additionally require 
that the jury find the materials "patently offensive" when 
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judged by some hypothetical and unascertainable "na-
tional" standard unrelated to any offense or injury the 
dissemination may have caused in the place where it 
occurred. The local jury, representing the conscience 
of the community in which the activities occurred, 
is peculiarly qualified to apply the standards of that 
community to the materials and activities involved in 
the case before it to determine whether they fall below 
what is acceptable and if we do not accept that we con-
demn the jury system. Its finding that the materials are 
patently offensive when judged by community standards, 
insures as has already been noted that dissemination of 
such materials will not be prohibited unless they are 
indeed patently offensive to the average, rather than a 
peculiarly sensitive, individual, and serves the purposes 
of the First Amendment as well as can be done in this 
sensitive area with the blunt instrument of trial by jury.:• 
What has been said should demonstrate that there was 
no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in permit-
ting the jury here to assess the offensiveness of the ma-
terials in terms of less than national standards, guided 
by opinion testimony of limited value regarding such 
standards. The ·ury's own assessment of the evidence I 
is what is enerall 1 )OSSitive of the vast majorit of 
a cases, both civil and criminal. If we are o rely on 
:• In Jacobellis, two member~ of the Court nrgucd that applica-
tion of "lorn!" eommunity sf nndnrd~ would run the risk of pre-
venting dissemination of m:tfrrials nceeptnblc in ~orne pl:lers becnuse 
sellers would be unwilling to risk rriminnl c·om·ietion by trsting 
variationH in standard~ from pl:.wc to pl:we. Howe\·er , the usc of 
"national" standard~ ncce~~arily implie~ that materiab found toler-
able in some places, hut not under the "national" criteria will newr-
thrless be unavailable where thry arc accrptablc. Thus in terms 
of danger to free expre~sion, the potential for suppression seems 
at least as great in the application of a single nationwide standard 
as in allowing distribution in areordancc with local tastes, a point 
which Justice Harlan often emphasizrd. 
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a system of fact-finding by lay juries, we must assume 
that in a period of great tolerance generally on matters 
of sex the accused will not be convicted in a case of this 
kind unless his ·wares and the mode of their dissemination 
are in fact patently and grossly offensive to an average 
individual in the community. Application of state-wide 
standards as seen by lay jurors also served to insulate 
the accused from arbitrary action. Indeed the Cali-
fornia procedure gave appellant some additional pro-
tection beyond what the Constitution requires, by making 
sure that individual jurors would be informed of some 
objective criteria rather than being confined to their own 
experience as to what was acceptable in their community 
and State. 
The jll!'y here was also instructed that they must de-
termine the "prurient appeal" of the material with refer-
ence to contemporary community standards of the State 
of California. As the Court made clear in Mishkin v. 
New York, 383 U. S. 502 (1966), the primary concern 
with respect to the element of "prurient appeal" is that, 
so far as material not aimed at a deviant group is con-
cerned, it be judged with reference to its effect on an 
average person, rather than its effect on a particularly 
susceptible or sensitive person as it 'vould be under the 
now discredited Hicklin test. It is clear that the require-
ment that the jury evaluate the materials with reference 
to contemporary standards of the State of California 
adequately served this protective purpose. 
In the long run this Court cannot act an an efficient ~ 
Super Censor and the sooner ,.,,.e leave the problem to 
the States the better off we and the public will be. 
III 
In a subsidiary argument, appellant contends that 
the State's expert on the standards of California, officer 
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based on a "patently defective" survey. Appellant 
argues that the group surveyed was not representative 
of all economic, philosophical and geographical groups 
in the State, that the questions asked were not "scien-
tifically" selected to elicit the proper information. and 
that the survey was distorted because conducted by a 
known police officer. 
The record shows that while officer Shaidell acknowl-
edged that the survey was not completely scientific, and 
was unable to break down those interviewed into age 
and economic groups, he did make a serious effort to 
obtain a representative sample of opinion from a "cross-
section" of residents of California. The survey sampled 
opinions of 1,902 citizens in 18 counties representing 
90o/o of the State's population, and was conducted in 
both rural and urban a.reas, and among members of 
many different religious, fraternal, and civic groups. In 
addition, officer Shaidell testified that while he gave 
'"quite a bit of weight" to the survey, he gave "a lot 
more" to his six years of broad experience while work-
ing in the field of obscenity. During that course of 
·time, the officer had received over 100,000 complaints 
from members of the public regarding dissemination of 
materials dealing with nudity and sex, and had traveled 
throughout the State as a police department representa-
tive talking to groups and individuals concerning their 
'feelings about such materials and observing the mate-
Tials being offered to the public. He had qualified as 
an expert on statewide standards on 26 occasions in a 
period of slightly over a year prior to trial. 
Considering the record as a whole it cannot be said 
that the trial judge abused his discretion in receiving 
the testimony of officer Shaidell as one who was quali-
fied to give an opinion on statewide standards; and 
there is no basis for a conclusion that receiving that 
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testimony was an error of constitutional dimensions. 
Cf. United States v. Augenbl-ick, 393 U. S. 348 (1969). 
Indeed, his qualifications compared quite favorably 
'with those of the experts tendered by the defense. Any 
deficiencies in the basis for Shaidell's opinion were, of 
course, fully open for defense counsel to bring to the 
attention of the jury on cross-examination and in closing 
argument. Indeed, in large measure the complaints re-
garding his testimony are merely inescapable conse-
quences of any attempt to ascertain so elusive a matter 
as a "community" or "state-wide" standard on matters 
of decency, with any degree of precision. We may 
assume that the jurors assessed all of the expert testi-
mony in light of their own experience regarding stand-
ards of acceptability in their community and State .. 
There is nothing remarkable in this; jurors doubtless do 
this with respect to expert testimony on land values and 
other subjects. Such an assessment unguided by any 
expert testimony would adequately have served First 
Amendment purposes. The additional guidance pro-
vided by officer Shaidell was certainly not so lacking 
in foundation as to create a constitutional error. 
Appellant also argues that the federal laws punish-
ing mailing or advertising by mail of obscene materials 
have pre-empted state prosecutions for distribution of 
obscene materials through the mails. 18 U. S. C. 
§§ 1461, 1463. Roth itself strongly suggested, however, 
that state statutes regulating dissemination of obscene· 
materials, whether through the mails or otherwise, do· 
not pose the type of direct physical interference with 
or immediate burden on the performance of the postal 
function that might support a. finding of pre-emption 
under the Supremacy Clause. 354 U. S., at 493-494. 
The prosecution here certainly involved no interference 
with the operation of the postal service. There is no. 
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reason to suppose the Congress expected or desired the 
federal mailing statutes to supplant the operation of 
state and local laws in this area of primary local re-
sponsibility and concern. See Huron Portlm1d Cement 
Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U. S. 440 (1960); Head v. 
New Mexico Board, 374 U. S. 424 (1963).' 
Finally, appellant argues that he has been subjected 
to the application of an Ex Post Facto law. At the time 
appellant committed the offense involved in this case, 
the California Penal Code defined "knowingly" for the 
purpose of a ~ 311.2 prosecution as "having knowledge 
• Appellant al~o ar~u~ that , rntirrl~r npart from the Fir~t Amrnd-
ment or any fedrral pre-rmption, thr Commrrrc Clau~r of it~ own 
force prohibits application of varying standard~ for ob~ccnity from 
State to State because of the drlcterioul' effect such varying l'tand-
ards could h:n-e on inter~ta tr commerce in ~Hc·h ot lwrwi~e non-
protected materials. No sueh i~~ue is presented by this rnsr, for 
1 hero is no indiration that nppellant 's materinb were rvrr di~trib­
Htrd inter~tate. But the argmnrnt would nppr~1r without sub~t:uwr 
in any e\·C'nt. Matrrial" of nn ob~renc ehnrncter that mn~· bo 
validly pro"cribcd by a Stnte in the exerrise of itH power to protrct 
the health, "afC'ty, and g<'nrrnl welfare of its population hnn~ Jl<',·er· 
been thought to be le~~:it imate ~ubjrrt~ of intrr~tate ronunrree. 
Such materials arc no morr entitled to the protection of the Com-
mcr·re Clau~e than materials hnzardou· to the hralth or ;:afrt~' of 
the citizens of a State enn if thry are not found object ionablr in 
the Stnte of origin or othrr plarc~. Ab~ent nn:v effort to bmdrn 
intrr"tnte commrree to obtain n local rror1omic advnntagr, the 
exerri;.e of thr traditional!~· lo<'nl power to prr,·rnt di~;:rmination 
of ob"cenc mnteri:d" not protretrd b~' the Fir~t Amrndmrnt rai'r~ 
no ~ub~tantinl is~u<' , de~pite i'omr po~~ible inridentnl rffcrt on the 
flow of such matrrin.ls aero~~ stntr lin~. SC'e, e. g., Ilead v. New 
Jlfc:rico Boar·d, 374 U. S. 424 (1963); lhtr·un Portland Cempnt Co_ 
Y. City of Detroit, 362 U. S. 440 (1960); Beard , .. ('ity of Alrx-
andl'ia, 341 U. S. 622 (1951); JI. P. Hood c~· Sons v. D1ulfond,. 
336 U. S. 525 (1949); Bald·ll'ill v. G. A. F. Secli11g, 294 U. S. 511, 
525 (1935); Slight v. Kirktcood, 237 U.S. 52 , 59-60 (1915). 
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that the matter is obscene." After the commission of 
this offense, but prior to appellant's trial, the Penal Code 
was amended to provide that "knowingly means being 
aware of the obscene character of the matter." At trial, 
the jury was instructed not only in the language of the 
statute in effect at the time of the offense, but also that 
"knowlingly ... imports a knowledge of the contents of 
the material, and being aware of its obscene character 
or nature." (Emphasis added.) 
On the basis of this instruction, appellant contends 
that a more liberal definition of knowledge added to the 
Penal Code after he committed his offense was improperly 
applied at his trial, in violation of the prohibition against 
Ex Post Facto laws. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10. The rec-
ord conclusively shows, however, that the new statute 
was not applied at appellant's trial. Instead, it is clear 
that the instruction quoted was based on California cases 
interpreting the version of the Penal Code in effect at 
the time appellant committed his offense. See People 
v. Pinkus, 256 C. A. 2d 941, 63 Cal. Reptr. 680 (App. 
Dept., Superior Court, Los Angeles 1967); People v. 
Campise, 242 C. A. 2d 905, 51 Cal. Rptr. 815 (App. Dept., 
Superior Court, San Diego, 1966). Thus, appellant was 
not subjected to trial under a new legislative definition 
of knowledge enacted after he committed his offense, but 
only to an instruction based on prior judicial interpreta-
tions of the statute in effect at the time of his offense. 
The prohibition against Ex Post Facto laws applies only 
to retroactive legislation, and is therefore inapposite here. 
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347 (1944); James 
v. United States, 366 U. S. 213, 241 (1961) (concurring 
and dissenting opinion); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 
309 (1915); Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 389. And, it is 
clear that there was no problem of due process warning 
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here comparable to that involved in the Bouie case, for 
the prior state decisions on the question, previously cited, 
were in accord with the instructions given at appellant's 
triaU 
r. In his jurisdictional stntemcnt, appellant also contended that he-
had bt?en subjected to double jeopardy by his rorn-iction, undrr 
tho Court'!:i drci~ion in Ashe v. Steenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970). 
Particularly, he claimed that he had previous!~, brrn pro~rcuted in 
a mnnici11al court in Los Angeles County for dit<tributing the same 
brochures that arc thE' subject of the present Orangr Count~' pros-
ecution to a different individual. Appellant contended thnt. in tho 
Lo~ Angeles Count~· case. the trial judge had grnntt?d his prctrial 
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the material<~ 
"·ere, as a matter of law, not obscenE', and argued that the State 
\\"US therefore collaterally e 'topped, as a constitutional matter, from 
claiming the materials to be unprotected in the present case. 
That claim i~ not free from doubt, involving a~ it docs a claim 
that the Constitution precludes the State from relit igating a lcgal 
determination of a court of lt?sser jurisdiction in a subsequent crim-
inal prosecution basE'd on a separate criminal act. against an e11tirely 
diffcrent victim. There is no need to rench this issue, however, as 
it is not properly presented on this record. In the state appellate 
court, its motion to affirm in this Court, and in its brief on the 
merits, the State has consistently a~erted that the issue was not 
properly presented in the state courts, bt?causc appellant pleadcd 
"not guilty," instead of "once in jeopardy" a required under 
California Penal Code § 1017 ( 4). As the Californin appt?llate 
court affirmed appellant's conviction without opinion, it is not 
absolutely certain that it ncceptcd this argument, but a reYiew of 
California cases reveals strong authority that a plea of former 
jropardy under § 1017 (4) i the proper and rxrln~ive mode 
of raising such an issue, and that it is waived if not so raised nnd 
may not be raised for the first time on appeal. E. g., In re Ilarron, 
191 Cal. 457 (1923); People v. Fairchild, 254 C. A. 2d 8.'31, G2 Cal. 
Rptr. 535 (1967); People v. Garcia, 166 C. A. 2d 141, 3:33 P. 2d 
69 (1958). The record docs indicate that appellant rai~ed this 
contention by motion to strike the complaint prior to trinl. But 
tho California cases are to the effect that such a motion is not a 
proper substitute for the plea required by the Penal Code. Sec 
People v. Martinson, 179 C. A. 2d 164, 3 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1960); 
People v. Mims, 136 C. A. 2d 828, 289 P. 2d 539 (1955); sec gCJJ-
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erally Witkin, Calif. Criminal Procedure, § 244 (1963). Moreover, 
on ornl argument the State represented without contradiction that 
appellant presented no evidence on this motion and tJ1at there was 
no hearing on it. 
Appellant has at no time responded to the State's contention that 
this question was not properly raised in the California courts, and 
indeed has neglected to address any portion of his brief on the 
merits to this issue. Under the circumstances, and considering 
that this issue is not, in m1y event, a proper subject for an appeal,. 
it is unnecessary to reach or decide this matter. See, e. g., Mishkin 
v. New York, 383 U. S. 502, 512-514 (1965). 
To: Mr. z-, 6 J .. ('. •" PS 
Mr. J n 
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This is one of a group of "obscenity-pornography'' 
cases being reviewed by the Court in a re-examination 
of standards enunciated in earlier cases on what Mr. 
Justice Harlan called "the intractable obscenity problem." 
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 704 
(1968) . 
Appellant conducted a mass mailing campaign to ad-
vertise the sale of illustrated books, euphemistically called 
"adult" material. After a jury trial, he was convicted 
of violating California Penal Code § 311.2 (a), a mis-
demeanor, by willfully and knowingly distributing ob-
scene matter/ and the Appellate Department, Superior 
1 At the time of the commisswn of the alleged offense, which wa;, 
prior to June 25, 1969, § 311.2 (a) and § 311 of the California Penal 
Code read in relevant part : 
''§ 311.2 Sending or bringing into state for sale or distribution ; 
printing, exhibiting, distributing or possessing within 
state 
"(a) Every person who knowingly : sends or causes to be sent, 
or brings or causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribu-
~ 
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Court of California, County of Orange, summarily af-
firmed the judgment without opinion. Appellant's con-
viction was specifically based on his conduct in causing 
tion, or in this state prepares, publishes, prints, exthibits, distributes, 
or offers to distribute, or has in his possession with intent to dis-
tribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute, any obscene matter, is 
guilty of a mtsdrmeanor . .. " 
"§ 311. Definitions 
"As used in this chapter : 
"(a) 'Obscene' mean::; that to the avt>rngr pPI'son, applyin!!: eon-
temporary ::;tandards, the predominant appeal of the matter , taken 
a::; a whole, is to prurient interest, i. e., a ::;hameful or morbid intere~t 
in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond cu~­
tomary limits of candor in description or representation of ::;uch 
matters and is matter whJCh ~~ utter!) without redeemin~ HOrta] 
importance 
"(b) 'Matter' means any book, magazme, new::;paper or othet 
printed or written material or any picture, drawing, photograph, 
motion picture, or other pictorial representation or any statue or 
other figure, or any recording, transcription or mechanical, chemical 
or electrical reproduction or any other articles, equipment, macluncs 
or materials. 
"(c) 'Person' means any individual, partnership, firm, association, 
corporation or other legal entity. 
"(d) 'Distribute' means to transfer possession of, whether with 
or without consideration." 
" (e) 'Knowingly ' mean/:i havmg knowledge that the matter tl:-
obscene." 
Section 311 (r) of the Caltforma Penal Code. supra, wa::; amended 
on July 25, 1969, to read as follows. 
" (e) 'Knowmgly' means bcmg aware of thr character of the 
matter or live conduct. " 
See Cal. Amended Stats. 1969, c. 24!:J, § l, p. 598 Desptte peti-
tioner's contentions to the contrary, the record indicates that the 
new § 311 (e) was not applied ex post facto to hts casr, but only 
the old § 311 (e) as construed by state decisions pnor to the com-
mission of the alleged offense. See People v. Pinkus, 256 C. A. 2d 
941, 63 Cal. Rptr. 680 (App. Dept , Superior Court, Los Angrles, 
1967); People v. Campise, 242 C. A. 2d 905, 51 Cal. Rptr. 815 (App. 
Dept., Superior Court, San Dtego, 1966) . Cf Bouie v. City of 
C'olumb~a. 378 t l. S. 347 (1944) Nor did § ;nu, supra, as au-, 
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five unsolicited advertising brochures to be sent through 
the mail in an envelope addressed to a restaurant in 
Newport Beach, California. The envelope was opened 
by the manager of the restaurant and his mother They 
had not requested the brochures; they complaiurd to tlw 
police. 
The brochures advertise four books entitled "Inter-
course," "Man-Woman," "Sex Orgies Illustrated/' and 
"An Illustrated History of Pornography," and a film en* 
titled "Marital Intercourse." While the brochures con-
tain some descriptive printed material, primarily they 
consist of pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting 
men and women in groups of two or more engaglng m a 
variety of sexual activities, with genitals often promi-
nently displayed. 
I 
This case involves the application of a State's criminal 
obscenity statute to a situation in which sexually explicit 
materials have been thrust by aggressive sales action 
upon unwilling recipients who had in no way indicated 
any desire to receive such materials. This Court has r~­
cognized that the States have a legitimate mterest in pro-
hibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene matenal 
phed, create any " rhn•et, illlJTIPdmtP burdt-11 011 the perforlllalH'v 
of postal functiOn;; ," or mfnng<' on congr<>:;sional comm<>rce power~ 
under Art. 1, § 8, cl . 7 SeC' Roth v. United 8tates, :354 U S 476, 
494 ( 1957) , quoting Railway 111 ail Assoc. v. Corsi , :326 U. S. 88, 9ti 
(1945); !d., 354 l l. S., at 504 (Harlan , .J., dJ:,;:,;elltmg) . SeC' abo 
Mishktn v. New York, 383 U. S. 502, 506 ( 1966) ; Sm!th v. CaMorma . 
361 U. S. 147, 150-152 (1959) 
2 This Court has defined "obscene material" as "matenal whiCh 
deals With sex Ill a manner app<>aling to prunC'nt mterC'st," ltoth 
v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 487 (1957) , but the Roth defimtwu 
does not reflect the precise meaning of "obscene" as traditionally 
used in the English language. Derived from the Latin obscaenum, 
of tilth , " obscene". iR drfined m tlw Web~ter';; New TnternationR) 
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when the mode of dissemination carries with it a sig:.. 
nificant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling 
:recipients or of exposure to juveniles. Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U. S. 557, 567 (1969). Ginsberg v. New York, 
3'90 U. S. 629, 637- 643 (1968). Interstate Circuit, Inc. 
v. Dallas, supra, 390 U. S., at 690 (1968). Redrup v. 
New York, 386 U. S. 767, 769 (1969). Ginzburg v. 
Unite:d States, 383 U.S. 463, 468-470 (1967). Jacobellis 
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1963). Joseph Burstyn, Inc. 
v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 502 ( 1952). See Rabe v. Wash-
ington, 405 U. S. 313, 317 ( BuRGEH, C. J., concurring) 
(1972); United States v. Reidel, 402 U. S. 351, 360-362 
(MARSHALL, J. , concurring) ( 1971) ; Breard v. Alex-
andria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-642 ( 1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 
336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158, 169- 170 (1944). Cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 
Dictionary (Unabridged, 2d ed., 1958) as "offensive to taste; foul; 
loathsome, disgusting . . . offensive to chastity of mind or to 
modesty; expressing or presenting to the mind or view something 
that delicacy, purity and decency forbid to be exposed; lewd ; 
indecent ; as obscene language, dances, images." The Oxford English 
Dictionary (1933 ed.) gives a similar definition, "offensive to the 
senses, or to taste or refinement ; disgusting, repulsive, filthy, foul, 
abominable, loathsome." 
The material we are discussing in this case is more accurately 
defined as "pornography" or "pornographic material." "Pornog-
raphy" derives from the Greek (pome. harlot, and graphos, to 
write) . The word now means "1. Description or portrayal of pros-
titutes or prostitution. 2. Obscene or licentious writing, paint-
ing, or the like," Webster's New International Dictionary, supra. 
Pornographic material which is obscene forms a sub-group of all 
"obscene" expression, but not the whole, at least as the word "ob-
scene" is now used in our language. We note, therefore, that the 
words "obscene material," as used in this case, have a specific judicial 
meaning which derives from the Roth ca~e, i. e., obscene material 
"which deals with sex." Roth, supra, 354 U. S., at 487. See also 
A. L. I. Model Penal Code, § 251.4 (l) "Obscene Defined." (Of-
ficial Draft, 1962.) 
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U. 8. 380, 382-383 (1951); Public Utilities Comm'n v. 
Pollak, 343 U. 8. 451, 464-465 ( 1952). It is in this con-
text that we are called on to define the standards which 
must be used to identify obscene material within the 
power of a State to regulate consistent with the First 
Amendment as applicable to the States through the Four• 
teenth Amendment. 
The dissent of MR. JusTICE BHENNAN reviews tlw 
background of the obscenity problrm, but since tlw 
Court now undertakes to formulate standards more con-
crete than those in the past, it is useful for us to focw, 
on two of the landmark cases in the somewhat torturPd 
record of the CQJJrt.:s obscemty decisions. ln Roth v 
United States, 354 U. 8. 476 ( 1957), the Court sustained 
a conviction under a federal statute pUtushmg the marlmg 
of "obscene, lewd, lascivious or filthy .. " matenals. Tlw 
key to that holding was the Court 's reJrctwu of the claim 
that obscene materials were protected by tfw First 
Amendment. Five JustiCes JOined 111 the oplllion statrug . 
''All Ideas havmg even the sllght<'st redeem!llg 
social importanee-unu~'thodox 1deas. eon troversral 
Ideas, even Ideas hateful to tlw prevailing climat.<' 
of opinwn-have full protPctwu of the l First 
Amendment] guaranties, unless excludable because 
they encroach upon thr limited arra of more im-
portant mterests. lFootnote omrtted.j But ml-
plicit in the history of the First Amendment is the 
reJection of obscemty as utterly without redeem~ 
s~~e. Tlus is the same J udg-
men t expressed by this Court in C haplinsky v New 
Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571-572 
" There are certain well defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech, t,lw preven-
tion and punishment of which have never been 
t,hought to rarse any Constitutional problem. 
.· 
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These include the lewd and obscene. . . . It has 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are 
J 
of such slight social value as a step Lo truth that 
any benefit that may derived from them is 
.clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality . .. .' I Emphasis by Court 
in Roth opinion.] 
"We hold that obscenity is not within the arC'a of 
constitutionally protected s]weeh or press. " :354 
U. S., at 484- 485. 
Nine years later in Memoirs v. Massachusetts , 383 U.S. 
413 'o966), the-court veered sharply away from the 
Roth concept and, with only three Justices 111 the plurallty 
opinion, articulated a new test of obscemty. The plural-
ity held that under the Roth definition . 
" ... as elaborated m subsequent cases, thrC'C' ele-
ments must coalesce: it must be establiRlwd that 
(a) the dominant theme of t!H' ma tPrial taken as a 
whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) tlw 
material is patently offensive because Jt afi'ronts COil -
temporary community standards relating to tlH' de 
scription of representatwn of S('xual matters, and 
(c) the material is, utterly without redeeming social 
value .'' Jd., 383 r S., at 41R 
The sharpness of the break with Roth represented by the 
third rlement of the Memoirs test, emphasi~ed by Juf'-
TICE WHin's dissent, td., 383 U. ~ .. at 461, was further 
underscored when the Memoirs plurality went on to 
state : 
"The Supreme Judicral Court erred m holding that 
a book need not be 'utterly worthless before it ca11 
br deemed obscene.' A book can not he proscribed 
.· 
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unless it is found to be utterly without redeeming 
social value." (Emphasis in original. ) 383 U. S .. 
at 419. 
While Roth presumed "obscemty" to be "utterly with~ 
out redeeming ~cia] importance," ~airs re~ired th~t 
to prove obscenity it must be affirmatively established 
tflat ''the material is ~ without redeeming social 
value." Thus, even as they repeated the words of Roth, 
the Memoirs plurality produced a drastically altered test 
that caiTea OJl the prosecution to pr~ a negative , 1. e., 
that the material was "utterly without redeeming social 
value"-a burden virtually impossible to discharge under 
our criminal standards of proof. ::-luch consideratious 
caused Justice Harlan to wonder 1f "the 'utterly without 
redeeming social value ' test has any meanmg at all. '1 
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, supra, 3H:~ 1'. ~ .. at 45H 
( 1966). See also id., 383 U. :::l .. at 461 ( WHITF~ . .J . (hs-
senting); United States v. Groner , - F. 2d - ( shp 
opinion , at pp. 5- 8) (May 22. lD?aJ (CA5 107:3 J 
Apart from the 1111tial formulatiOn 111 tlw Rolli cast> . no 
majority of the Court has at any given time been able 
to agree on a standard to determine what constitutes 
pornographic or obscene material subJect to regulation 
under the States' police power. See, e. g., Redrup v. 
New York, 386 U. S. 767, 770-771 (1967). We have 
seen "a variety of views among the members of the Court 
unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudi-
cation." Interstate Circuit, Inc v Dallas, supra, 390 
U. S., at 704-705 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring and 
dissenting) .3 This is not remarkable, for in the area of 
8 In the absence of a majority view, this Court was compelled 
to embark on the practice of summarily reversing convictions for 
the dissemination of materials that at least five members of 
the Court, applymg their seJ?a ratf' tests. found to be protected. 
.· 
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freedom of speech and press the courts must always re-
main sensitive to any infringement on genuinely serious 
literary, artistic, political. or scientific expression. This 
is an area in which there are few eternal verities. 
The case we now rrvipw was tned 011 thr throry that 
the California Penal Code ~ :n 1 incorporates tlw thrrc-
stage Memoirs test, supra. But now the Memo1rs test 
has been abandoned as unworkablr by its author' all(! 
no member of thr Court today supports th<' Mernmrs 
formulation. 
II 
This much has been categorically settled by the Court, 
that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amend-
ment. Kots v. Wisconsiu , 40H t '. :"' . 2:W, :230 ( 1U72 J 
Roth v. Cm'ted States, 354 t'. ~- 475, 4Hn ( HH)7 J ·• ''Th<' 
First and Fourteenth Amendments haw never been 
by the First Amendment. Redrup v New Yvrk, :~86 U. S. 767 
(1967). Thirty-one cases have been decided in th1H manner. Be-
yond the necessity of circumstances, however, no JUStificatiOn ha~ 
ever been offered m support of the Redrup "pohcy." Sre Walker v. 
Ohio, 398 U. S. 434, 434-435 (dissPnting opmwn8) (1970). The 
Redrup procedure has cast us m the role of an uureviewablr board 
of censorship for the 50 States, ~:mbjectivdy .1udgmg pach JlH'CE'" of 
material brought before us 
4 See the opinion of MR. JusTICE BRENNAN m Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, - U. S. - , --- (1973) 
~ As Ch1ef Justice Warren stated, d1ssentmg, m Jacobetlts v. Ohio, 
supra, 378 U. S., at 200 (1963) 
"For all the sound and fury that the Roth test has generated, it 
has not been proved unsound, and I believe that we should try to 
live with it-at least until a more satisfactory definition IS evolved. 
No government-be it federal, state, or local-should be forced to 
choose between repressing all material, including that within the 
realm of decency, and allo~ing unrestrained license to publish any 
material, no matter how vile . There must be a rule of reason in 
this as in other areas of the law, and we have attempted in the Roth 
case to provide such a rule," 
\ 
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treated as absolutes." Breard v. Alexandria, supm, 341 
U.S. 622, at 642 (1951), and case cited. :-lee' Times Film 
Corp. v. Chicago, 365 C S . 43. 47- .'50 ( 19(H); Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, supra, 343 U. S., at 502 (1952) . 
We acknowledge, however, the inherent dangers of 
undertaking to regulate any form of expression. State 
statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be 
carefully limited. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 
supra, 390 U.S., at 682-685 (1968) . As a result, we now 
confine the permissible scope of such regulation to wor s 
whic e )ict or escn e sexual eonduct. That conduct 
must be specifically efined by th<' applicable statela"", 
as . written or authoritatJ vely COllStrucd.n A state offense 
must also be limited to works whJCh, taken as a \Vhole 
appeal to the prunent mterest in sex, which portray 
sexua~ct in a patently offensl.ve way~ch. 
taken as a whole, do not have senous hterary, artiStiC, 
political, or scientific value . 
~for tlw tner of fact must bL~ 
(a) whether "the average per~on , applymg cotttc'mpurary 
community standards" would find that thl' "ork . take11 
as a whole, appeals to tlw prunent mterest, K01s v W?s-
consin, supra, 408 (T :-l .. at 230 ( Hl72) and Hoth v. [' nlfed 
6 See, e. g., Oregon Laws 1971, c. 743, Art. 29, § 255, and Hawaii 
Penal Code, Tit. 37, §§ 1210-1217, 1972 Hawa1i Sr::>Hion Lnw::;, Act 9 . 
p . 32, as examples of :;tate laws dm•ctrd at dep1ct ion of defined 
physical conduct, as opposed to expre~s10n . Other ;;tate formula-
tiOns could be eCJually vahd 111 t h1s r('speet. ln g1vmg the Oregon 
and Hawau statutes as examples, wr do not w1sh to be understood 
as approving of them 111 nll other respect~ nor a~ establishing their 
hm1ts as the extent of state power 
We do not hold, a~ MR. .JUH'I'IC'E B~tENNAN mt1mate~, that all 
State;; other thnn Oregon and Hawa11 mu:st now enact new ob~cemt~ 
;;tatutes. Other exi8ting state ~tatute~, ati construed heretofore or 
hereafter, may well be adequate. Sec Umted 8tate8 v 12-200 I•' I , 
Reels Ji'ilrn, - lJ S - (p 7, n ()) , 
.• 
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States, supra, 354 U. S., at 489 (1957), (b) whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lackf' 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.' If 
a state law that regulates obscene material is thus lim-
ited, as written or construed, the First Amendment values 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment are adequately protected by the ultimate power of 
appellate courts to conduct an independent review of 
constitutional claims when necessary. See Kois v. Wis-
consin, supra, 408 U. S., at 232 ( 1972); M ernoirs v. 
Massachusetts, supra, 383 U.S., at 459-460 (Harlan, J .. 
dissenting) (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 204 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ( 1964) ; New York Times Co . v 
Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, .284-285 ( 1964) ; Roth v. U'nited 
States, supra, 354 U. S., at 497- 498 (Harlan, J ., con ~ 
curring and dissenting) ( 1'957). We do not adopt as a 
constitutional standard the "utterly without redeeming 
social value" test of M ernoirs v. M assachuselts, supra,, 383 
U. S., at 418 (1966); that concept has never commanded 
the adherence of more than three Justices at one tinw. 
See pp. 6-7, supra. 
We emphasize that it is not our function to propose 
regulatory schemes for the States. That must await 
their concrete legislative efforts. It is possible, however, 
to give a few plain examples of what "affronts coutem-
porary community standards relating to the description 
7 "A quotation from Voltarie m the flyleaf or a book w11l not con-
~titutionally redeem an otherwi~e obscene publication." Kois v. 
Wisconsin, supra. 408 U. S., at 231 (1972). See Memoirs v. Mas-
sachusetts, supra, 38:3 U. S., at 441-443 (Clark, J ., dissenting) 
(196-) ; id., at 461 (WHITE, ,) ., dissentmg). We also reject, a~ a 
constitutional standard, the ambiguous concept of "social impor-
tance." See id., at 462 (WHI'rE .• J. , diRsentmg) . 
70-73-0P!NION 
MILLER v. CALIFORNIA 11 
or representation of sexual matters," Memoirs v. Massa-
chusetts, supra, 384 U.S., at 418 (1966): 
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions 
of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or 
simulated. 
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions 
of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition 
of the genitals. 
Sex and nudity may not be exploited without limit 
by films or pictures exhibited or sold in places of public 
accommodation any more than live sex and nudity can 
be exhibited or sold without limit in such public places." 
At a minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or 
description of sexual conduct must have senous literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific justification to merit First 
Amendment protection. See Kois v. Wisconsi'll, supra, 
408 U. S., at 230-232 ( 1972); Roth v. United States, 
supra, 354 U. S., at 487 ( 1957) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 
supra, 310 U. S. 88, 101- 102 ( 1940). For exam,Q}e, medi-
cal books for the education of physicians and related 
personnel necessarily use graphic illustratiOns and dr-
scriptions of human anatomy. In resolving the inevi-
tably sensitive questions of fact and law, we must con-
tinue to rely on the JUry system. accompanied by the 
8 Although we are not prE'sented here with the problrm of reg-
ulating lewd public conduct 1tself, the States have greater power to 
regulate nonverbal , phy::;icaJ conduct than to suppress depictwns or 
descriptions of the same behaviOr In Umted States v. O'Br£en, 391 
U. S. 367, 376-377 (1968), a case not dealing with obscenity, the 
Court held a State regulation of conduct which itself embodied both 
speech and nonspeech elements to be "sufficiently justified if ... 
it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the 
government interest IS unrelated to the suppresswn of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restrictions on alleged F1rst Amendment 
freedoms is no greater than IS essential to the furtherance of that 
interest." See California v. LaRue, - 1J S. ·- ·· (slip opmwn, at 
8-9) (71-36) (Dec. 5, 1972) 1 
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safeguards that judges, rules of evidence, presumption of 
innocence and other protective features provide, as we 
do with rape, murder and a host of other offenses 
against society and its individual members." 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, author of the opinions of the 
Court in Roth v. United States, supra, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 
.supra, Ginzburg v. United State<S, 383 U. S. 463 ( 1966) , 
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502, 510 (1966), and 
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, supra, has abandoned his 
former positions and now maintains that no formulation 
of this Court, the Congress, or the States can adequately 
distinguish obscene material unprotected by the First 
Amendment from protected expression, Paris Adult 
Theatre v. Slaton, - U. S. - (1973) (opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.). Paradoxically, MR. JusTICE BRENNAN 
concedes that suppression of unprotected obscene ma-
terial is permissible to avoid exposure to unconsenting 
adults, as in this case, and to ju. ve.niles, although he gives 
indication of how the division between protected and 
nonprotect~d materials may be drawn with greater pre-
cision for these purposes than for regulation of com-
mercial exposure to consenting adults only. Nor does he 
indicate where in the Constitution he finds the authority 
to distinguish between a willing "adult" one month past 
the state law age of majority and a willing "juvenile" one 
month younger . 
Under the holdings announced today, no one will be 
subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene 
materials unless these materials depict or describe pat-
9 The mere fact juries may reach different conclusions as to the 
same material does not mean that constitutional rights are abridged 
As this Court observed in Roth v. United States, supra, 354 U. S., 
at 492, n. 30 "[I]t is common experience that different juries may 
reach different results under any criminal statute. That is one of 
the consequences we accept under our jury system. Cf. Dunlop v" 
United States, 165 U. S, 486·, 499-500/' · 
'• 
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ently offensive "hard core" sexual conduct specifically 
defined by the regulating state law, as written or con-
strued. We are satisfied that these specific prerequisites 
will provide fair notice to a dealer in such pornography 
that his public and commercial activities may bring 
prosecution. If the inability to define regulated mate-
rials with ultimate, god-like precision 10 altogether re-
moves the power of the States or the Congress to reg-
ulate, then "hard core" pornography may be exposed 
without limit to the juvenile, the passerby, and the con-
senting adult alike, as, indeed, MR. JusTICE DouGLA:s 
contends. Miller v. California, - U. S. - (1973) 
(opinion of DouGLAS, J.). See United States v. Thirty 
Seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 379- 380 (dissenting 
opinion of Black, J., joined by DouGLAS, J.); Ginzburg 
v. United States, 383 U.S. 443, 476, 482 (1966) (dissent-
10 As MR. JusTICE BRENNAN stated m Roth v. Umted States , 
supra, 354 U. S. , at 491-492 (1957) 
"Many decisions have recognized that these terms of obscenity 
statutes are not precise. [Footnote omitted.] Th1s Court, however, 
has consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to 
the requirements of due process. ' . . [T]he Constitution does 
not require impossible standards'; all that is required is that the 
language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed 
conduct when measured by common understanding and prac-
tices. . . .' United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 7-8. These 
words, applied according to the proper standard for judging ob-
scenity, already discussed, give adequate warning of the conduct 
proscribed and mark ' ... boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges 
and juries to admimster the law . . . That there may be mar-
ginal cases in which it 1s difficult to determine the side of the line 
on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to 
hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense ... .' 
ld., at 7. See also United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 624, 
n. 15; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337, 340; 
United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 523-524; United States v. 
Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396; Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 
U.S. 497; Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273; Nash v. United States, 
229 U, S. 373 •. " 
.· 
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ing opmwns of Black, J., and DouGLAS, J.); Jacobellis 
v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 196 (1964) (concurring opinion 
of DouGLAS, J.); Roth, supra, 354 U. S., at 508 (1957) 
(dissenting opinion of DouGLAS, J.) . In that contention, 
however, MR. JusTICE DouGLAS now stands alone. 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN also emphasizes uinstitutional 
stress" in justification of his change of view. Noting 
that uthe number of obscenity cases on our docket gives 
ample testimony to the burden that has been placed 
upon this Court," he quite rightly remarks that the exam-
ination of contested materials uis hardly a source of 
edification to members of this Court." Paris Adult 
Theatre v. Slaton, supra, at- (opinion of BRENNAN, 
J.) . He also notes, and we agree . that "uncertamty 
of .. . standards creates a continuing source of tension 
between state and federal courts [ t] he probkm 
is that one cannot say with certainty that material 1s 
obscene until at least five members of this Court, apply-
ing various obscure standards, have pronounced it so. '' 
It is certainly true that the absence, since Roth, of a 
single majority view of this Court as to proper standards 
for testing obscenity has placed a strain on both state and 
federal courts. But today, for the first time smce Roth 
was decided in 1957, a maJority of this Court has agreed 
on concrete guidelines to isolate "hard core" pornography 
from expression protected by the First Amendment. 
Now we may abandon the casual practice of Redrup v. 
New York, supra, and attempt to provide positive guid-
ance to the federal and state courts alike. 
This may not be an easy road, free from difficulty. 
But no amount of "fatigue" should lead us to adopt 
a convenient uinstitutional" rationale-an absolutist, 
"anything goes" view of the First Amendment-because 
it will lighten our burdens.11 "Such an abnegation of 
11 We must note, in additwn, that any assumption concerning the 
relative burdens of the past and the probable burden under the 
standards now adopted is pure speculation, 
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judicial supervision in this field would be inconsistent 
with our duty to uphold the constitutional guarantees." 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, 378 U. S. , at 187- 188 (opinion 
of BRENNAN, J.). Nor should we remedy "tension be-
tween state and federal courts" by arbitrarily depriving 
the States of a power reserved to them under the Con~ 
stitution, a power which they have enjoyed and exercised 
continuously from before the adoption of the First 
Amendment to this day. See Roth v. United States , 
supra, 354 U. S., at 482-485 (1957) . "Our duty admits 
of no 'substitute for facing up to the tough individual 
problems of constitutional judgment involved in every 
obscenity case.' !d., [Roth v. United States, supra] , 
at 498; see Manual Enterprises, Inc . v. Day, 370 U. 8. 
478, 488 (opinion of Harlan, J.)." Jacobellis v. Ohw, 
supra, 378 U. S., at 188 (opinion of BRENNAN , J .J 
III 
Under a national Constitution, fundamental First 
Amendment limitations on the powers of the States do 
not vary from community to community, but this does 
not mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed, 
uniform national standards of precisely what appeals 
to the "prurient interest" or is "patently offensive." 
These are essentially questions of fact , and our natwn 
is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reason-
ably expect that such standards could be articulated for 
all 50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the 
prerequisite consensus exists. When triers of fact are 
asked to decide whether "the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards" would consider cer-
tain materials "prurient," it would be unrealistic to re-
quire that the answer be based on some abstract 
formulation. The adversary system, with lay jurors as 
the usual ultimate factfinders in criminal prosecutions, 
has historically permitted triers-of-fact to draw on the 
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standards of their community, guided always by limiting 
instructions on the law. To require a State to structure 
obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national 
11community standard" would be an exercise in futility. 
As noted before, this case was tried on the theory that 
the California obscenity statute sought to incorporate the 
tripartite test of Memoirs. This, a 11national" standard 
of First Amendment protection enumerated by a plurality 
of this Court, was correctly regarded at the time of trial 
as limiting state prosecution under the controlling case 
law. The jury, however, was explicitly instructed that, 
in determining whether the 11dominant theme of the 
material as a whole ... appeals to the prurient interest" 
and in determining whether the matenal "goes substan· 
tially beyond customary limits of candor and affronts 
contemporary community standards of decency" it was 
to apply "contemporary community standards of the 
State of California." 
During the trial, both the prosecution and the de-
fense assumed that the relevant "community standards" 
in making the factual determination of obscenity were 
those of the State of Calfornia, not some hypothetical 
standard of the entire United States of America. De-
fense counsel at trial never objected to the testimony of 
the State's expert on community standards 12 or to the in-· 
structions of the trial judge on "state-wide" standards. 
On appeal to the Appellate Department, Superior Court 
12 The record simply does not support petitioner's contentwn, be-
latedly raised on appeal, that the State's expert was unqualified to· 
give evidence on California "community standards." The expert, a 
police officer with many years of specmlizatwn in obscemty offenses, 
had conducted an extensive state-widr survey and had given expert 
evidence on 26 occasions iri. the year prior to this trial. Allowing 
such expert testimony was in no way error of constitutional climrn-
sions. Cf. United ·States v. Augenblir:k, 893 U S, :348, 355-:356; 
(1969). 
~·"'· t .. 
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of California, County of Orange, appellant for the first 
time contended that application of state, rather than 
national, standards violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
We conclude that the State's alleged failure to offer 
evidence of "national standards" and the court's charge 
that the jury consider state standards, was not con-
stitutional error. Nothing in the First Amendment 
requires that a jury must consider such hypothetical and 
unascertainable. "national standards" when attempting to 
determine whether c~rtain materials are obscene as a maL-
ter of f~ct. Chief Justice Warren pointedly commented 
in his dissent in Jacob ellis v ()hw, supra, :178 U 8 .. at 
200 : 
"It is my belief that when the Court said in 
Roth that obscenity is to be defined by reference 
to 'community standards,' it meant community 
standards-not a national standard, as is sometimes 
argued. I believe that there is no provable 'na-
tional standard, ' . . . At all events, this Court has 
not been able to enunciate one, and it would b< 
unreasonable to expect local courts to divine one." 
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read 
the First Amendment as requiring that the people of 
Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct 
found tolerable in Las Ve~~:as, or New York City.ta 
1 :; In Jarobellis v. Ohw, :37H U. ::3 184 (19()4) , two .Ju::;tJCe::; arguC'd 
that apphcation of "local" community standards would run the risk of 
preventing dissemination of materials in some places because sellers 
would be unwilling to risk criminal conviction by testing variations 
in standards from place to place. 378 U. S., at 193-195. The use 
of "national" standards, however, necessarily implies that materials 
found tolerable in some places, but not under the "national" criteria, 
will nevertheless be unavailable where they are acceptable. Thus, 
in terms of danger to free expression, the potential for suppression 
seems at least as great in the application of a single nationwide 
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See Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524-525 ( 1970) (BLACK-
MUN, J., dissenting); Walker v. Ohio, 398 U. S. 434 
(1970) (BuRGER, C. J., dissenting); id., 398 U.S., at 434-
435 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 
319 (BuRGER, C. J., dissenting) ( 1970); id., 397 U.S., at 
319-330 (Harlan, J. , dissenting); fTnited States v. 
Groner,- F. 2d - (slip opinion, at ~)-14) (May 22. 
1973) (CA5 1973). O'Meara, Shaffer, Obscenity ill ThP 
Supreme Court: A note on Jacobellis v. Ohio, 40 Notre' 
Dame Law., 1, 6-7. See also Menw~rs v. Massachusetts, 
383 U.S. 413, 458 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (1966) 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, 378 U. S., at 203- 204 (Harlan, 
J., diesenting) ( 1964). Roth v. United States, supra, 
354 U. S. 476, 505-506 (Harlan, J.. concurring and dis-
senting) (1957). People in different States vary in then 
tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to b<> 
strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity. As 
the Court made clear in Mishkin v. 1\ 'ew York, 383 U.S. 
502, 508-509 ( 1966), the pnmary concern with r<'qmrmg 
standard as in allowing distribution in accordance with local tastes, 
a point which Justice Harlan often emphasized. See Roth v . United 
States, supra, 345 U. S., at 506 (1957) . 
Petitioner al~o argues that adherence to a "natwnal ;;tandard" 
is neces~ary " in order to av01d unconscionable burclem; on thf' 
free flow of int<'f~tatl" comm~?rce . " A~ notre! bdore , pp. 2-:3, n. I, 
supra, the application of domest1r Htatr policr powl"rs in this cas!" 
did not mtrude on any congrr~swnal powrr~ undn Art. l, § H, cl. 7, 
for 1 here 1::; no indication that appellant',; matl"rial::; wrrr ewr d\::;-
tributed int~?n;tatr. The argument would apprar w1thout wb::;tance 
in any event. Obscrne material may be validly rrgulated b~· a 8tate 
\n the E'XerCI~e of its traditwnaJ local power to protrct the general 
welfare of it~ populatiOn dP~p1te somr po~~ible mc1clental ~?ffect on 
the flow of such matenals aero:;~ state !mE's. Srr, e. g., Ilead v. New 
Mexico Board, 374 U. S. 424 (1963); Huron Portland Cement Co . 
v. City of Detroit, 362 U. S. 440 (1960)) ; Breard v. City of Alex-
andria, 341 U. S. li22 (1951) ; H . P. flood & Sons v. DuMond, 
336 U.S. 525 (1949) ; Southern Pac!fic Co. v. Anzona, 325 U. S. 711 , 
766 (1945) ; Baldwin v. G. A. P. Seeling, 294 U S. 511 , 525 (1935) , 
Sligh v. Kirkwood , 237 {) S. 52, 59-tlO (1915) . 
-.. 
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a jury to apply the standard of "the average person, ap-
plying contemporary community standards" is to be 
certain that, so far as material is not aimed at a deviant 
group, it will be judged by its impact on an average per-
son, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitiv<' 
person-or indeed a totally insensitive one. ~ee Roth v, 
United Stales, supra, 354 U. ~ .. at 489 ( 1957). Com-
pare the now discredited test in Regina v. Hicklin [1868] 
L. R. 3 Q. B. 360. We hold the requirement that the 
jury evaluate the materials with reference to "contemu 
porary standards of the State of California" serves this 
protective purpose and is constitutionally adequate .'' 
IV 
The dissenting Justices sound the alarm of represswu 
But, in our view, to equate the free and robust exchange 
, 14 Appellant's Jurisdictional statement contends that he was sub-
Jected to "double jeopardy" because a Los Angeles County tnal Judge 
dismissed, before trial, a prior prosecution based on the same bra-
chum,;, but apparently allegmg expo::;urr:-; at a diffC'fc•nt time in 
a diffrrent Hrtt ing. Appellant argur~ that otH'(' matrnal has bc·Ptl 
found not to br obscene in one procc>edmg, tlw Stntr ts "collatrralh 
estopped" from ever alleging 1t to bP obsccm· m a d1ffrrent pro-
ceeding. It is not clear from the record that appeJ!ant proper!) 
raised this is::;ue, better regarded as a question of procedural due 
process than a ''double jeopardy" claim, m the state court~; below 
Appellant failed to addres::; any portion of h1::; bnef on the ment~ 
to this t::;sue, and appellee eontrnd::; that tlw que::.;t1on wa:s 
waived at Ca!tfornia law because 1t was Improperly pleaded at trial 
Nor is 1t totally clear from the record before us what collateral effect 
the prrtnal di~miHHHI might have under Htate law. Tlw diHITII~<."al wa~ 
based, at least 111 part, on a fa1lure of thr prosecutton to present 
affirmattve evidence required by state law, evtdrncr wluch was ap-
parently presented in this case. Appellant'::; content10n, therefore, 
Js best left to the California courts for further considrrat10n on re-
mand. See Paris Adult Theatre 1 v. 8laton, - U. S - (1973) 
(p.· 5, n. 3) . The 1ssue IS not, m any event, a proprr subject fot 
appeal: See Mishkin v New York, 88a U . S. 502, 512-514 (1965), 
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of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation 
of obscene material demeans the grand conception of the 
First Amendment and its high purposes in the his-
toric struggle for freedom. It is a "misuse of the great 
guarantees of free speech and free press . . ." Breard 
v. Alexar~>dria, 341 U. S. 622, 645 (1951). The First ~~ 
Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have I 
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value, re- /, 
gardless of whether the government or a majority of the V 
people approve of the ideas these works represent. "The· 
protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people,'' Roth 
v. United States, supra, 354 U. S., at 484 (emphasis 
added). See Kois v. Wisconsin, supra, 408 U. S., at 231 
( 1972); Thornhill v. Atabama, supra, 310 U. S., at 101-
102 (1940). But the public portrayal of hard core s.exual 
conduct for its own sake, and for the ensuing commercial 
gain, is a different matter.1 5 
There is no evidence, empirical or historical, that the 
stern 19th century American censorship of public distri-
bution and display of material relating to sex, see Roth v 
Unite.d States, supra, 354 U. S., at 482- 485, in anyway 
limited or affected expression of literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific ideas. On the contrary, it is beyond any ques-
tion that the era, following Thomas Jefferson to Theodore· 
Roosevelt, was an "extraordinary vigorous period" not 
just in economics and politics, but in belle lettres and in 
1 5 In the apt word~ of Chief Ju~t1cc Warren, the petJtwner in 
this case was "plainly engaged in the commercial exploitation of 
the morbid and shameful craving for materials with prurient effect . 
I believe that the State and Federal Governments can constitutionally 
punish such conduct. That is all that these cases present to us, 
and that is ali that we need to decide." Roth v. United States, , 
354 U. S., at 496 (concurring opinion) (1957). . 
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~'the outlying fields of social and political philosophies."'t6 
We do not see the harsh hand of censor hip of ideas-
good or bad, sound or unsound-and "repression" of po ... · 
litical liberty lurking in every state regulation of com-
merci1;~1 exploitation of human interest in sex. 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN finds "it is hard to see how state .. 
ordered regimentation of our minds can ever be fore-
stalled." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra, -
U. S., at- (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). These doleful 
anticipations assume that courts cannot distinguish 
commerce in ideas, protected by the First Amendment, 
from commercial exploitation of obscene material. More-
over, state regulation of hard core pornography so as to 
make it unavailable to nonadults, a regulation which 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN finds constitutionally permissible, 
has all the elements of "censorship" for adults; indeed 
even more rigid enforcement techniques may be called 
for with such dichotomy of regulation. See Interstate 
Circuit v. Dallas, supra, 390 U. S .. at 690 ( 196R) 11 
16 See Parrmgton, Main Currrnti:l Ill Amcnca11 Thought, vol :.!,, 
p. IV, & et seq. A! to the latter part of the 19th century, Farring-
ton observed "A new age had come and other dreams-the age and 
dreams of a middle class sovereignty . . . From the crude and vast 
romanticsms of that vigorous sovereignty emerged eventually a 
spirit of realistic criticism, seeking to evaluate the worth of this new 
America, and discover if possible other philosophies to take the 
place of those which had gone down in the fierce battles of the 
C::ivil War." !d., vol. 2, at 474. See also Morison, Commager, and 
Leuchtenburg, The Growth of the American Republic (6th ed., 
1969), vol. 2, at 197-233; Garraty, The New Commonwealth (1968 
ed.), 220-335; Paths of American Thought (Schlesinger, White ed., 
1963 ed.), 105-119, 123-290 (articles by Fleming, Lerner, Cohen, 
White, E. Rostow, Samuelson, Kazin, Hofstadter); and Wish, So 
ciety and Thought in Modern America (1952 ed.), 337-386 
1 7 " [W]e have mdicated that brrau::;r of it:< i:ltrong and 
abiding mterest m youth, a State may rrgulate the d1ssrminatlon to 
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One can concede that the "sexual • revolution" of recent 
years may have had useful byproducts in striking layers 
of prudery ftom a subject long irrationally kept from 
needed ventilation. But it does not follow that no regu-
lation of patently offensive "hard core" materials is 
needed or permissible; civilized people do not allow un-
regulated access to heroin because it is a derivative of 
medicinal morphine. 
ln sum we (a) reaffirm the Roth holding that obscenP 
material is not protected by the First Amendment .. 
(b) hold that such material can be regulated by thP 
f-ltates, subject to the specific safeguards enunc1ated 
above, without a showinp: that the matpnal is "utterly 
without redeeming :wcial value, " d . .\fe111oms v ~lassa­
chusetts, supra, 383 U. ::::l., at 418 (1H66 J, and (c) hold 
that obscenity is to be determined by applying "con -
temporary community standards ," see Kois v. Wiscon -
sin, supra, 408 U. S., at 230 ( 1972), and Roth v. United 
States, supra, 354 U. S., at 489 (1957), not "uational 
standards." Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, :378 U. 8., at, 
195 (1964). The judgment of the Appellate Departmellt 
of the Superior Court, Orange County , California, is va-
cated and the case remanded to thaL court for furtlwr 
proceedings not inconsistent with the First Amendment 
standards established by this opinion. See United States 
v 12 200-Ft . Reels. - F . ::::l.-.- rim:3J (p. 7. n. ;iJ . 
Vacated and remanded for further proceedings 
juveniles of, and their access to, material obJectionable as to them, 
but which a State clearly could not regulate aH to adults. Ginsberg 
v Neu• York, ante, p. ()29 " lnterstair r'm·u!l v Dalla~. supra. :~90. 
I ' S . at f\90 ( 19()1-< l 
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Dear Chief: 
I have reviewed the 8th draft of your opinion and I am still 
with you. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
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cc: The Conference 
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